Harold Snowdon, III v. HHS - DPT, neurological damage (1993)

Petitioners filed a claim under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program on behalf of Harold Snowdon, III, seeking compensation for a permanent neurological injury. In 1967, Harold received a diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT) vaccination.

Within seventy-two hours, signs of neurological damage emerged that proved permanent. In 1969, the Snowdons filed a civil action in state court against the physician who administered the vaccine.

No suit was ever brought against the vaccine manufacturer. In 1974, the civil action against the administering physician was settled for $115,000 — representing the limits of the administrator's liability insurance — which petitioners contend fell far short of adequate compensation for the injuries.

Chief Special Master Golkiewicz dismissed the petition. On review, petitioners filed a motion for review on October 28, 1992, arguing that the Vaccine Act was intended to provide full compensation and should not bar their claim despite the prior settlement.

They contended that section 300aa-11(a)(7), which bars a Vaccine Act petition when damages have been awarded in a civil action against "a vaccine administrator or manufacturer," should be interpreted to bar only settlements with the vaccine manufacturer — leaving open a supplemental Vaccine Act recovery for persons who had settled only with an administrator but never been fully compensated. Judge Turner, writing for the Court of Federal Claims on January 7, 1993, rejected the argument and affirmed the dismissal.

The Federal Circuit had squarely held in Wiggins v. Secretary of HHS, 898 F.2d 1572 (Fed.

Cir. 1990), that if a person has collected any amount whatsoever in a judgment or settlement of a civil action for vaccine-related injuries — regardless of whether the recovery was full compensation — that person may not recover under the Vaccine Act. The Wiggins rule made no distinction based on the identity of the civil defendant (administrator versus manufacturer); the 1987 amendment to section 11(a)(7) expressly added vaccine administrators to the bar alongside manufacturers, and the Snowdons' 1974 settlement occurred well before the Act was ever enacted.

The court also corrected the special master's characterization of the dismissal as one for lack of jurisdiction. The core question — whether the Vaccine Act covered the Snowdons' claim in light of their prior settlement — required the court to decide an arguable legal question on the merits, not a threshold jurisdictional issue.

Where dismissal is reached by deciding an arguable question of law, the court has exercised jurisdiction on the merits. Petitioners' objections were overruled and judgment was entered for respondent in accordance with the special master's September 28, 1992, decision.