Dallas Christian Grice v. HHS - IPV/Polio, other (1996)

On June 24, 1994, petitioners filed a claim on behalf of Dallas Christian Grice under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program for injuries allegedly suffered after receiving an oral polio immunization vaccine on October 27, 1992, and a second dose on January 5, 1993. The respondent, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, conceded entitlement to compensation on September 26, 1994.

However, due to a delay by the Chief Special Master in rendering a decision on the compensation amount, petitioners exercised their right to withdraw from the program on May 30, 1995, to pursue a civil action. The Clerk of the Court entered judgment on this withdrawal on September 13, 1995.

Petitioners subsequently filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs totaling $22,285.86. The respondent objected, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to award fees after a withdrawal.

The Chief Special Master awarded $7,714.00 in fees and $10,875.84 in costs, for a total of $18,589.84. The respondent filed a motion for review, challenging the jurisdiction.

The court, in an opinion by Judge Robinson, affirmed the Chief Special Master's decision. The court held that it retained jurisdiction over the collateral issue of attorneys' fees and costs, and that the withdrawal did not preclude an award of fees when the petitioner acted in good faith and had a reasonable basis for the claim, especially given the respondent's prior concession of entitlement.

The court applied the "not in accordance with the law" standard for statutory construction and the "abuse of discretion" standard for the award of fees and costs, while reviewing factual findings under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. The court rejected the respondent's argument that a voluntary withdrawal under Section 21(b) of the Act resulted in a loss of jurisdiction for awarding fees, drawing an analogy to voluntary dismissals and citing Supreme Court precedent in Cooter & Gell v.

Hartmarx Corp. that courts do not lose jurisdiction over collateral issues upon voluntary dismissal. The court also found that the petitioners had acted in good faith, noting that the respondent had already conceded entitlement and that petitioners were required to file under the Act before pursuing other remedies.

The court concluded that the Chief Special Master's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and affirmed the award of $18,589.84 in attorneys' fees and costs.