Angie Lynn Bouley v. HHS - DPT, other (1997)

Angie Lynn Bouley, a minor, through her legal representative Alyce S. Collier, filed a petition for compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 on January 31, 1991.

The petition alleged injuries suffered as a result of a DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus) vaccination administered on November 5, 1981. The Special Master dismissed the petition on August 23, 1996, finding it barred by Section 11(a)(5) of the Vaccine Act.

This section requires petitioners to choose between relief under the Vaccine Act and civil relief in another court. The Special Master's dismissal was based on a civil action filed by Angie Lynn Bouley in California Superior Court in 1987, seeking compensation for alleged vaccine-related injuries from the vaccine manufacturer and other defendants.

This civil action was pending on the effective date of the Vaccine Act, October 1, 1988. Section 11(a)(5)(A) requires that such pending civil actions be dismissed within two years of the effective date, or by October 1, 1990, and before judgment.

Angie Lynn Bouley did not dismiss her California action until December 4, 1991, which was more than one year beyond the two-year period. Section 11(a)(5)(B) generally prohibits filing a petition under the Vaccine Act if a civil action for vaccine-related damages is pending.

The Special Master concluded that controlling precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, including Flowers v. Secretary, HHS, Weddel v.

Secretary of Dept of HHS, Matos v. Secretary of HHS, and Amendola v.

Secretary, Dept, of HHS, mandated this dismissal. The petitioner contended that the Special Master misinterpreted this precedent, that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply, and that the effective date of Section 11(a)(5) was extended.

The Court of Federal Claims reviewed the Special Master's factual determinations under an arbitrary and capricious standard and legal determinations de novo. The court affirmed the Special Master's decision.

The court found that the petitioner's attempt to distinguish Amendola and Matos based on the fact that her civil action did not go to judgment was unavailing, as the precedent requires dismissal within two years of the effective date and before judgment. The court also agreed with the Special Master's rejection of the equitable tolling argument, noting that the petitioner was bound by the conduct of her legal counsel, and that ignorance of the law or the Vaccine Program was not a basis for tolling the statute of limitations.

The court found no governmental misconduct that would warrant equitable tolling. The court also rejected the argument that the effective date of Section 11(a)(5) was changed.

The court affirmed the Special Master's decision and entered judgment dismissing the petition. The public decision does not describe the specific injuries alleged, the onset of symptoms, diagnostic tests, treatments, or the mechanism of injury.

Petitioner's counsel was Alyce S. Collier.

Respondent's counsel is not named in the public decision. The Special Master's name is not provided in the public decision.

No award amount was granted as the petition was dismissed.