Sheri A. Taylor v. HHS - DPT, residual seizure disorder and encephalopathy (1995)

Sheri A. Taylor, on behalf of her minor daughter Kristin Michelle Coffman, sought compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Program for injuries allegedly sustained from a diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT) vaccine administered on January 24, 1983.

Petitioner claimed her daughter developed a permanent residual seizure disorder and encephalopathy following the vaccination. The petition was filed on September 18, 1990.

A special master dismissed the petition on March 27, 1995, determining that the claim was jurisdictionally barred because Ms. Taylor had previously elected to file a civil suit in another court for the same alleged vaccine-related injuries.

This election precluded filing a petition under the Vaccine Act, as specified in 42 U.S.C. § 11(a)(6). Following the special master's dismissal order, the Clerk of the Court of Federal Claims entered judgment on April 27, 1995, as no motion for review was filed within the thirty-day statutory period.

Petitioner's counsel filed an untimely motion for review on April 28, 1995, which was denied by the Clerk. Subsequently, on May 2, 1995, petitioner filed a motion to vacate the judgment under RCFC 60(b)(1) and (6), arguing that the untimely motion for review was due to counsel's mistaken belief that he had an additional three days to file due to service of the dismissal order by mail, pursuant to Vaccine Rule 19(c).

Petitioner contended that it would be inequitable to let the judgment stand because she intended to file a timely motion for review. The respondent argued that RCFC 60(b) cannot be used to challenge the substance of a special master's decision or overcome a jurisdictional bar.

The court denied the motion to vacate, holding that RCFC 60(b) cannot be used to escape a jurisdictional limitation or to toll, extend, or waive the statutory time period for filing a motion for review. The court distinguished this case from situations where relief is granted for an error of the court, noting that petitioner sought relief from her own error and review of the merits of the special master's decision.

The court also addressed petitioner's alternative contention for equitable tolling, stating that while the thirty-day period is subject to equitable tolling in cases of due diligence and factors outside the petitioner's control, counsel's mistaken interpretation of Vaccine Rule 19(c) and its relation to the statutory filing deadline did not constitute grounds for equitable tolling. The court found this to be a "garden variety" claim of excusable neglect, citing Irwin v.

Department of Veterans Affairs and Gilbert v. Secretary of HHS.

The court affirmed the special master's dismissal order, and the Clerk was directed to enter judgment for the respondent. The public decision does not describe the specific onset of symptoms, diagnostic tests, treatments, or expert witnesses.

Petitioner's counsel was Sheri A. Taylor, and respondent's counsel is not named in the public decision.