VICP Registry Case Source Bundle
Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_25-vv-00340
Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_25-vv-00340
Petitioner: Mary Byrd
Filed: 2025-02-25
Decided: 2025-08-28
Vaccine: human papillomavirus (HPV)
Vaccination date: 2017-10-16
Condition: fainting episodes and tachycardia symptoms
Outcome: dismissed
Award amount USD: 

AI-assisted case summary:
On February 25, 2025, Mary Byrd filed a petition alleging that HPV vaccinations administered on October 16, 2017, February 22, 2018, and July 18, 2018 caused fainting episodes and tachycardia symptoms beginning in 2018. She was 13 years old at the first vaccination, so the case remains tagged as pediatric.

The case was dismissed on limitations grounds before medical causation was reached. Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran ordered petitioner to show cause why the claim was not untimely, because the petition was filed more than six years after the vaccinations and alleged onset. Ms. Byrd argued for equitable tolling, stating that she learned of possible adverse effects in February 2025, had not been given a Vaccine Information Statement at vaccination, and believed manufacturer conduct had affected her ability to pursue the claim.

The Special Master held that the Vaccine Act does not include a discovery rule and that limitations run from the first symptom or manifestation of onset. He found that lack of awareness of the Program or of a possible vaccine relationship, failure to receive a VIS, and general allegations about the manufacturer did not establish extraordinary circumstances or diligent pursuit. The petition was dismissed as untimely on August 28, 2025. No compensation was awarded.

Theory of causation field:
HPV vaccinations on October 16, 2017, February 22, 2018, and July 18, 2018, first dose at age 13, alleged fainting and tachycardia symptoms beginning in 2018. DISMISSED as untimely. Petitioner sought equitable tolling based on learning of possible adverse effects in 2025, lack of Vaccine Information Statement, and alleged manufacturer misconduct. Chief Special Master Corcoran held the Vaccine Act limitations period runs from symptom onset, has no discovery rule, and petitioner showed neither diligent pursuit nor extraordinary circumstances. Decision August 28, 2025. Attorney: Michelle Greene, Lanier Law Firm.

Public staged source text:

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DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_25-vv-00340-0
Date issued/filed: 2025-09-23
Pages: 5
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 8/28/2025) regarding 14 DECISION of Special Master. Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (abs) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:25-vv-00340-UNJ Document 15 Filed 09/23/25 Page 1 of 5
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 25-340V
UNPUBLISHED
MARY BYRD,
Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner,
v.
Filed: August 28, 2025
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
Michelle Greene, Lanier Law Firm, PLLC, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Heather L. Pearlman, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DECISION1
On February 25, 2025, Mary Byrd filed a petition for compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa—10 through 342
(the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered various injuries from human
papillomavirus (“HPV”) vaccinations she received on October 16, 2017, February 22,
2018, and July 18, 2018. ECF No. 1 at 2.
Because the petition was untimely filed, and Petitioner has failed to establish a
basis for equitable tolling, this case is DISMISSED.
Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner received the first HPV vaccination on October 16, 2017 (at thirteen
years old), the second on February 22, 2018 (at thirteen years old), and the third on July
18, 2018 (at fourteen years old). ECF No. 10 (single set of uncertified medical records)
1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made
publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or
at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government
Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In
accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other
information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I
agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa
(2012).

Case 1:25-vv-00340-UNJ Document 15 Filed 09/23/25 Page 2 of 5
at 77 (vaccination history). Petitioner did not clarify in her petition or affidavit whether
she went to these vaccination appointments alone, as a young teenager, or with a
parent. Petitioner stated she experienced fainting episodes and other symptoms of
tachycardia in 2018 shortly after the HPV vaccinations and went to a cardiologist. ECF
No. 1 ¶ 3.3 Petitioner stated that related symptoms have continued to the present. Id. ¶
6. In January 2025, Petitioner told her doctor that she thought her tachycardia was
related to feeling anxious. ECF No. 10 at 77.
Facially, Petitioner’s claim herein was filed over six years after the HPV
vaccinations, the most recent one being administered in 2018, and over six years from
the time she began manifesting symptoms later in 2018. But Petitioner maintains her
delay is excusable. At the vaccination appointments, Petitioner has stated, but did not
attest in her affidavit, that no Vaccine Information Statements (VIS) were provided and no
information was relayed about the Vaccine Program. In the event that a parent
accompanied Petitioner to these appointments, no affidavit from a parent has been filed
in support of what Petitioner alleges. Petitioner stated, but did not attest in her affidavit,
that she became aware of the HPV vaccine’s potential adverse effects in February 2025.
ECF No. 13 at 23.
Relevant Procedural History
Given that the timeliness of the claim was legitimately called into question merely
by the face of the actual Petition, while the case was still in the initial “pre-assignment
review,”4 I ordered Petitioner to show cause why the claim had not been filed outside the
Act’s 36-month statute of limitations. Sec. 16(a)(2); ECF No. 7.
On May 5, 2025, Petitioner filed a response. ECF No. 13.5 Petitioner did not dispute
that her symptoms begin in 2018, or that her petition was filed in 2025 (and not sooner
than the statute of limitations deadline of 2021), but instead argued that the limitations
period should be equitably tolled. Petitioner asserted that she had diligently pursued her
rights once she became aware of her legal rights. Petitioner also made allegations not
relevant to a Vaccine Act claim, about the perfidious conduct of the vaccine manufacturer
in fraudulently concealing the HPV vaccine’s harmful character from the public. ECF No.
13 at 24. Relatedly, Petitioner argued that the failure of a healthcare professional to
3 Petitioner does not appear to have filed the vaccine administration records, the 2018 cardiologist’s
medical records, or any medical records close in time to the vaccinations. See ECF No. 10.
4 Pre-Assignment Review, or PAR, is a process utilized by the Office of Special Masters to assess
whether a claim’s primary evidentiary documentation has been filed. See notice at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/vaccine-programoffice-special-masters.
5 Petitioner’s response repeatedly references a different petitioner and other injuries not relevant to this
case.
2

Case 1:25-vv-00340-UNJ Document 15 Filed 09/23/25 Page 3 of 5
provide her with a VIS at the time of vaccination can be attributed to the Department of
Health and Human Services’ failure to systematically ensure that VIS are explained and
provided to all vaccine recipients. Id. at 9.
Respondent submitted a brief of his own, arguing for dismissal due to
untimeliness.6 ECF No. 8. Respondent maintained that Petitioner in fact had not diligently
pursued her rights before filing a vaccine claim in 2025. Respondent also disputed the
veracity of contentions about the manufacturer’s conduct, and whether it could in any
event constitute an extraordinary circumstance that would serve as a basis for tolling of
the statute.
Legal Standards
The Vaccine Act's statute of limitations is thirty-six months. Sec. 16(a)(2). The
statute begins to run from the manifestation of the first objectively cognizable symptom,
whether or not that symptom is sufficient for diagnosis (or even recognized by a claimant
as significant). Id.; Carson v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 727 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
The Federal Circuit has held that the doctrine of equitable tolling can apply to
Vaccine Act’s statute of limitations. See Cloer v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 654 F.3d
1322, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, in keeping with applicable U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, equitable tolling of a limitations period is to be permitted “sparingly.” Irwin v.
Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, (1990). The appropriateness of equitable tolling
is ultimately to be determined on a case-by-case basis, without rigid application of any
relevant overarching guidelines. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649–50 (2010); accord
Arctic Slope Native Ass'n v. Sebelius, 699 F.3d 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Petitioners must prove two elements to establish equitable tolling: (1) that
petitioner diligently pursued her rights, and (2) an extraordinary circumstance prevented
her from timely filing the claim. K.G. v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 951 F.3d 1374,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255
(2016)).
When first articulating this limited exception to equitable tolling, the Federal Circuit
primarily enumerated fraud and duress as a basis for equitable tolling—but not, for
example, lack of awareness on a petitioner's part that she might have an actionable claim.
Cloer, 654 F.3d at 1344–45 (noting that tolling of the Vaccine Act's statute of limitations
period is not triggered “due to unawareness of a causal link between an injury and
6 In other similarly situated cases, Respondent has also preemptively filed his arguments in favor of
dismissal without waiting to see what Petitioner would argue. As noted in those cases, I understand
Respondent to be waiving the right to respond to Petitioner’s arguments by filing preemptively.
3

Case 1:25-vv-00340-UNJ Document 15 Filed 09/23/25 Page 4 of 5
administration of a vaccine”). In K.G., 951 F.3d at 1380–82 (Fed. Cir. 2020), the Circuit
more explicitly endorsed the proposition that an individual’s demonstrated mental
incapacity could be a basis for equitable tolling in the Program. For a mentally
incapacitated individual, the Circuit instructed that the details of the individual’s
relationship with her legal guardian would affect whether there was reasonable diligence
or extraordinary circumstances. K.G., 951 F.3d at 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2020). More recently,
the Circuit concluded that a parent acting as a legal guardian did not have extraordinary
circumstances preventing the filing of a petition where the parent: (1) routinely made
medical decisions on behalf of the legally incapacitated individual during the relevant time
period, (2) had no documented strained relationship with the individual, and (3) had no
conflicts of interest dissuading the parent from filing a petition. W.J. v. Sec'y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 93 F.4th 1228, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
Analysis
The untimeliness of this filing is acknowledged by Petitioner, so the only question
to be resolved is whether equitable tolling should save the claim. But Petitioner has failed
to establish both elements of equitable tolling – diligent pursuit and extraordinary
circumstances.
A) Diligent pursuit
Petitioner argues that she began to diligently pursue her claim when she learned
of the possibility of adverse effects from vaccines in February 2025. Although she was a
minor for several years after her symptoms began, Petitioner did not address whether her
parents or guardians diligently pursued a vaccine claim on her behalf or similarly only
learned about possible adverse effects recently.
These arguments are wholly unpersuasive. It is beyond question that claims
asserted in the Vaccine Program are not subject to a “discovery rule,” accruing only when
a claimant learns he or she might possess a cause of action. Rather, the statute of
limitations period is triggered by the onset of Petitioner’s symptoms – whether or not onset
was understood to be the start of the claimed injurious illness or condition. Cloer v. Sec'y
of Health & Hum. Servs., 654 F.3d 1322, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). And the failure
to be advised of the Vaccine Program or the Act does not support equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations period for an otherwise-untimely filed petition. Speights v. Sec'y of
Health & Hum. Servs., No. 03-2619V, 2013 WL 5944084, at *13 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Oct. 17, 2013). Thus, a petitioner cannot generally shield an untimely claim from dismissal
by asserting, even in good faith, that she literally was unaware of her Vaccine Act “rights.”
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Case 1:25-vv-00340-UNJ Document 15 Filed 09/23/25 Page 5 of 5
B) Extraordinary Circumstances
Petitioner’s arguments about the purported fraudulent conduct of the vaccine’s
manufacturer, in hiding proof of the vaccine’s dangers, deserve even less consideration.
ECF No. 13 at 24. As a threshold matter, these contentions are speculative and not
evidentiarily-supported. And regardless of their actual truth, the fact remains that the
Government has approved the HPV vaccine for administration to minors, rendering it
“covered” under the Act. The only issue to be resolved in a Program case is whether
(assuming, as here, the claim is not a Table claim) the claim meets the standards for
causation – and those standards have nothing to do with a manufacturer’s alleged
misconduct in preparation or promotion of the underlying vaccine.
These allegations also are not a basis for tolling under the circumstances.
Petitioner simply has not shown that contentions of corporate misconduct not specific to,
or directed at, him personally could rise to the level of the kind of “fraud” that might excuse
failing to file a Program claim in a timely manner. Nor has she persuasively established
that the vaccine administrator’s “failure to warn,” or provide a VIS in 2017 or 2018, is an
extraordinary circumstance. Even assuming the factual accuracy of that allegation,7 it
remains the case (as the Circuit recognized in Cloer) that vaccine claims accrue upon
onset – and that the failure to be advised of the Vaccine Program does not support
equitable tolling. Cloer, 654 F.3d at 1340; see also Speights, 2013 WL 5944084, at *13.
And arguments about governmental agency knowledge of a failure to warn reflect
overheated, almost-conspiratorial allegations that do not come close to excusing the
claim’s untimely nature.
Conclusion
Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish equitable tolling. This case is dismissed
for being untimely filed. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.8
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
7 As noted above, Petitioner has not filed the vaccine administration records that would permit a factual
evaluation of whether a VIS was provided to Petitioner at any of the vaccination appointments. Moreover,
Petitioner has not clarified if a parent accompanied her to any of these appointments, and, if so, she has
not filed an affidavit from the accompanying parent in support of her equitable tolling argument.
8 If Petitioner wishes to bring a civil action, she must file a notice of election rejecting the judgment pursuant
to § 21(a) “not later than 90 days after the date of the court’s final judgment.”
5