VICP Registry Case Source Bundle
Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_24-vv-00847
Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_24-vv-00847
Petitioner: Mary Annalee Hull
Filed: 2025-01-10
Decided: 2025-02-04
Vaccine: HPV
Vaccination date: 
Condition: postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (POTS)
Outcome: dismissed
Award amount USD: 

AI-assisted case summary:
Mary Annalee Hull filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program on January 10, 2025, alleging she suffered injuries, including postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (POTS), from two human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccinations received in April 2016. Petitioner counsel was Robert M. Hatch of Bronster Fujichaku Robbins. Respondent counsel was Julia M. Collison of the U.S. Department of Justice. The petition was filed over eight years after the vaccinations and the onset of her symptoms in 2016. Petitioner argued for equitable tolling of the 36-month statute of limitations, claiming she was unaware of the potential adverse effects and the Vaccine Program until June 2020, and that the vaccine manufacturer engaged in fraudulent concealment. Petitioner stated that at the time of vaccination, no Vaccine Information Statement (VIS) was provided, and no information about the Vaccine Program was relayed. Petitioner did not provide an affidavit from her parents, who presumably attended the vaccination appointments, regarding any information provided. The public decision does not describe the specific onset of symptoms, medical records, diagnostic tests, or treatments. Respondent argued for dismissal due to untimeliness. Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran noted that the Vaccine Act does not have a discovery rule and that lack of awareness of rights or the program does not support equitable tolling. The court clarified that equitable tolling requires both diligent pursuit of rights and extraordinary circumstances preventing timely filing. Petitioner's arguments about the manufacturer's purported fraudulent conduct were deemed speculative and not evidentiarily supported, and not a basis for tolling. The court also noted that the vaccination appointment records stated that risks, potential benefits, and anticipated side effects were discussed. Petitioner failed to establish both elements required for equitable tolling. Consequently, the case was dismissed for being untimely filed. The public decision does not name any medical experts or detail the specific mechanism of injury.

Theory of causation field:
Petitioner Mary Annalee Hull, age 13.5, received two HPV vaccinations in April 2016. She alleged injury, including postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (POTS), with symptoms progressing from 2016. The petition was filed on January 10, 2025, over eight years after the vaccinations and symptom onset. Petitioner sought equitable tolling of the 36-month statute of limitations, arguing lack of awareness of adverse effects and the Vaccine Program until June 2020, and alleged fraudulent concealment by the manufacturer. Petitioner did not provide affidavits from parents present at vaccination appointments regarding information provided. Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran dismissed the case, finding Petitioner failed to establish equitable tolling. The decision stated the Vaccine Act lacks a discovery rule, and unawareness of rights or the program does not support tolling. Allegations of manufacturer misconduct were deemed speculative and not a basis for tolling. Petitioner did not demonstrate diligent pursuit or extraordinary circumstances. No specific medical experts were named, and the theory of causation was not detailed beyond the alleged injury and vaccine. The case was dismissed as untimely filed.

Public staged source text:

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DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_24-vv-00847-0
Date issued/filed: 2025-02-04
Pages: 5
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 1/10/2025) regarding 10 DECISION of Special Master. Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (abs) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:24-vv-00847-UNJ Document 11 Filed 02/04/25 Page 1 of 5
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 24-847V
UNPUBLISHED
MARY ANNALEE HULL,
Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner,
v.
Filed: January 10, 2025
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
Robert M. Hatch, Bronster Fujichaku Robbins, Honolulu, HI, for Petitioner.
Julia M. Collison, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DECISION1
On May 31, 2024, Mary Hull filed a petition for compensation under the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa—10 through 342 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered various injuries from two human
papillomavirus (“HPV”) vaccinations she received in April 2016 (no specific dates
provided).3 ECF No. 1 at 2.
Because the petition was untimely filed, and Petitioner has failed to establish a
basis for equitable tolling, this case is DISMISSED.
1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made
publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or
at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government
Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In
accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other
information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I
agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa
(2012).
3 A footnote states that Petitioner received her first HPV vaccine on May 28, 2008, but this statement
appears erroneous because, in addition to contradicting the body of the petition, Petitioner would have
been six years old at that time. ECF No. 1 at 1 n.1. The earliest the CDC recommends giving children
HPV vaccines is nine years old (https://www.cdc.gov/hpv/parents/vaccine-for-hpv.html).

Case 1:24-vv-00847-UNJ Document 11 Filed 02/04/25 Page 2 of 5
Relevant Factual Background
After the April 2016 vaccinations, Petitioner stated that unspecified injuries
“progressed in the subsequent years” and she became aware in June 2020 that the
HPV vaccine could cause adverse effects. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5, 6. Petitioner stated she was
later diagnosed with postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (POTS). Id. ¶ 8.
Petitioner has not filed any medical records to establish these facts.
Petitioner alleged the preceding medical history in the petition and repeated the
history in her response to the order to show cause. Facially, Petitioner’s claim herein was
filed over eight years after the HPV vaccinations, which were administered in 2016, and
over eight years from the time she began manifesting symptoms in 2016. But Petitioner
maintains her delay is excusable. Petitioner has only stated, but not attested in an
affidavit, that at the time these vaccinations occurred, no Vaccine Information Statement
(VIS) was provided, and no information was relayed about the Vaccine Program.
Petitioner again only stated, but did not attest, she became aware that the HPV vaccine
could have potential adverse effect shortly before filing her vaccine claim in June 2020.
As these vaccinations would have occurred when Petitioner was thirteen or fourteen
years old, Petitioner similarly did not submit an affidavit from either of her parents, one at
least who presumably would have attended the vaccination appointments, about whether
any counseling or information was provided about the HPV vaccine or the Vaccine
Program.
Relevant Procedural History
Given that the timeliness of the claim was legitimately called into question merely
by the face of the actual Petition, while the case was still in the initial “pre-assignment
review,”4 I ordered Petitioner to show cause why the claim had not been filed outside the
Act’s 36-month statute of limitations. Sec. 16(a)(2); ECF No. 6.
On August 9, 2024, Petitioner filed a response. ECF No. 9. Petitioner did not
dispute that her symptoms progressed from 2016 until 2020, or that her petition was filed
in 2024 (and not sooner than the statute of limitations deadline), but instead argued that
the limitations period should be equitably tolled. Petitioner asserted that she had diligently
pursued her rights once she became aware of her legal rights. Petitioner also made
allegations not relevant to a Vaccine Act claim, about the perfidious conduct of the vaccine
manufacturer in fraudulently concealing the HPV vaccine’s harmful character from the
public. ECF No. 9 at 17. Relatedly, Petitioner argued that the failure of a healthcare
professional to provide her with a VIS at the time of vaccination can be attributed to the
4 Pre-Assignment Review, or PAR, is a process utilized by the Office of Special Masters to assess
whether a claim’s primary evidentiary documentation has been filed. See notice at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/vaccine-programoffice-special-masters.
2

Case 1:24-vv-00847-UNJ Document 11 Filed 02/04/25 Page 3 of 5
Department of Health and Human Services’ failure to systematically ensure that VIS are
explained and provided to all vaccine recipients. Id. at 3.
Respondent submitted a brief of his own, arguing for dismissal due to
untimeliness.5 ECF No. 7. Respondent maintained that Petitioner in fact had not diligently
pursued her rights before filing a vaccine claim in 2024. Respondent also disputed the
veracity of contentions about the manufacturer’s conduct, and whether it could in any
event constitute an extraordinary circumstance that would serve as a basis for tolling of
the statute.
Legal Standards
The Vaccine Act's statute of limitations is thirty-six months. Sec. 16(a)(2). The
statute begins to run from the manifestation of the first objectively cognizable symptom,
whether or not that symptom is sufficient for diagnosis (or even recognized by a claimant
as significant). Id.; Carson v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 727 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
The Federal Circuit has held that the doctrine of equitable tolling can apply to
Vaccine Act’s statute of limitations. See Cloer v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 654 F.3d
1322, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, in keeping with applicable U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, equitable tolling of a limitations period is to be permitted “sparingly.” Irwin v.
Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, (1990). The appropriateness of equitable tolling
is ultimately to be determined on a case-by-case basis, without rigid application of any
relevant overarching guidelines. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649–50 (2010); accord
Arctic Slope Native Ass'n v. Sebelius, 699 F.3d 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Petitioners must prove two elements to establish equitable tolling: (1) that
petitioner diligently pursued her rights, and (2) an extraordinary circumstance prevented
her from timely filing the claim. K.G. v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 951 F.3d 1374,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255
(2016)).
5 Respondent filed his “response” to Petitioner’s arguments before Petitioner had submitted her filing with
those arguments. For context, this case is part on ongoing series of vaccine cases (over 50 at this point)
that were filed beyond the statute of limitations deadline and have all presented the same legal
arguments regarding the equitable tolling of that deadline. Since Respondent has standardized his
response to these legal arguments, Respondent has chosen in some cases to file his response before
Petitioner files a response to the order to show cause. As I ruled in other cases where the petitioner
objected to Respondent’s early filing of his response, I understand Respondent to have waived any right
to later reply to Petitioner’s response (if it happened to contain arguments not anticipated by Respondent)
and find that Petitioner was not prejudiced or harmed by Respondent’s deviation from the standard
sequence of responsive filings.
3

Case 1:24-vv-00847-UNJ Document 11 Filed 02/04/25 Page 4 of 5
When first articulating this limited exception to equitable tolling, the Federal Circuit
primarily enumerated fraud and duress as a basis for equitable tolling—but not, for
example, lack of awareness on a petitioner's part that she might have an actionable claim.
Cloer, 654 F.3d at 1344–45 (noting that tolling of the Vaccine Act's statute of limitations
period is not triggered “due to unawareness of a causal link between an injury and
administration of a vaccine”). In K.G., 951 F.3d at 1380–82 (Fed. Cir. 2020), the Circuit
more explicitly endorsed the proposition that an individual’s demonstrated mental
incapacity could be a basis for equitable tolling in the Program. For a mentally
incapacitated individual, the Circuit instructed that the details of the individual’s
relationship with her legal guardian would affect whether there was reasonable diligence
or extraordinary circumstances. K.G., 951 F.3d at 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2020). More recently,
the Circuit concluded that a parent acting as a legal guardian did not have extraordinary
circumstances preventing the filing of a petition where the parent: (1) routinely made
medical decisions on behalf of the legally incapacitated individual during the relevant time
period, (2) had no documented strained relationship with the individual, and (3) had no
conflicts of interest dissuading the parent from filing a petition. W.J. v. Sec'y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 93 F.4th 1228, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
Analysis
The untimeliness of this filing is acknowledged by Petitioner, so the only question
to be resolved is whether equitable tolling should save the claim. But Petitioner has failed
to establish both elements of equitable tolling – diligent pursuit and extraordinary
circumstances.
A) Diligent pursuit
Petitioner argues that she began to diligently pursue her claim when she learned
of the possibility of adverse effects from vaccines in June 2020.
These arguments are wholly unpersuasive. It is beyond question that claims
asserted in the Vaccine Program are not subject to a “discovery rule,” accruing only when
a claimant learns he or she might possess a cause of action. Rather, the statute of
limitations period is triggered by the onset of Petitioner’s symptoms – whether or not onset
was understood to be the start of the claimed injurious illness or condition. Cloer v. Sec'y
of Health & Hum. Servs., 654 F.3d 1322, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). And the failure
to be advised of the Vaccine Program or the Act does not support equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations period for an otherwise-untimely filed petition. Speights v. Sec'y of
Health & Hum. Servs., No. 03-2619V, 2013 WL 5944084, at *13 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Oct. 17, 2013). Thus, a petitioner cannot generally shield an untimely claim from dismissal
by asserting, even in good faith, that she literally was unaware of her Vaccine Act “rights.”
4

Case 1:24-vv-00847-UNJ Document 11 Filed 02/04/25 Page 5 of 5
B) Extraordinary Circumstances
Petitioner’s arguments about the purported fraudulent conduct of the vaccine’s
manufacturer, in hiding proof of the vaccine’s dangers, deserve even less consideration.
ECF No. 9 at 17. As a threshold matter, these contentions are speculative and not
evidentiarily-supported. And regardless of their actual truth, the fact remains that the
Government has approved the HPV vaccine for administration to minors, rendering it
“covered” under the Act. The only issue to be resolved in a Program case is whether
(assuming, as here, the claim is not a Table claim) the claim meets the standards for
causation – and those standards have nothing to do with a manufacturer’s alleged
misconduct in preparation or promotion of the underlying vaccine.
These allegations also are not a basis for tolling under the circumstances.
Petitioner simply has not shown that contentions of corporate misconduct not specific to,
or directed at, her personally could rise to the level of the kind of “fraud” that might excuse
failing to file a Program claim in a timely manner. Nor has she persuasively established
that the vaccine administrator’s “failure to warn,” or provide a VIS in 2016, is an
extraordinary circumstance. Even assuming the factual accuracy of that allegation,6 it
remains the case (as the Circuit recognized in Cloer) that vaccine claims accrue upon
onset – and that the failure to be advised of the Vaccine Program does not support
equitable tolling. Cloer, 654 F.3d at 1340; see also Speights, 2013 WL 5944084, at *13.
And arguments about governmental agency knowledge of a failure to warn reflect
overheated, almost-conspiratorial allegations that do not come close to excusing the
claim’s untimely nature.
Conclusion
Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish equitable tolling. This case is dismissed
for being untimely filed. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.7
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
6 As noted above, the vaccination appointment records stated that the “[r]isks, potential benefits and
anticipated side effects [were] discussed.” Exhibit 3 at 72. Petitioner’s only evidence that no VIS or
information about the Vaccine Program was provided is her affidavit dated October 11, 2023, in which she
attested about events that occurred approximately six years earlier when she was twelve years old. Exhibit
23 ¶¶ 2, 3. Petitioner failed to submit affidavits from her parents who were both present at the vaccination
appointment and who would have been the most likely people to receive medical advice and information
on behalf of Petitioner.
7 If Petitioner wishes to bring a civil action, she must file a notice of election rejecting the judgment pursuant
to § 21(a) “not later than 90 days after the date of the court’s final judgment.”
5