VICP Registry Case Source Bundle Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_23-vv-01690 Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_23-vv-01690 Petitioner: Kenneth Berard Filed: Decided: 2026-05-27 Vaccine: Vaccination date: Condition: Outcome: dismissed Award amount USD: AI-assisted case summary: Kenneth Berard filed a petition for vaccine injury compensation. The case progressed to the expert reports stage, and it was noted that the claim was off-Table, requiring an expert report to proceed. Petitioner's counsel filed a motion to withdraw, and Petitioner subsequently indicated his intention to proceed pro se. Over a period of 338 days, Petitioner was given multiple opportunities to obtain new counsel or file an expert report, but failed to do so. The court issued an Order to Show Cause, and despite further warnings and extensions, Petitioner did not comply with court orders. Consequently, the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Separately, a decision was issued awarding interim attorneys' fees and costs to Petitioner's counsel, Wendy Cox, in the amount of $88,484.23, due to the protracted nature of the proceedings and the counsel's impending withdrawal. Theory of causation field: Off-Table Public staged source text: ================================================================================ DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_23-vv-01690-0 Date issued/filed: 2026-07-27 Pages: 3 Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 7/2/2026) regarding 67 DECISION of Special Master. Signed by Special Master Herbrina D S Young. (gf) Petitioner served via First Class mail on 7/31/2026. Modified on 7/31/2026 (fm). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Case 1:23-vv-01690-UNJ Document 70 Filed 07/27/26 Page 1 of 3 In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS Filed: July 2, 2026 Reissued for Public Availability: July 27, 2026 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * KENNETH BERARD, * * Petitioner, * No. 23-1690V * v. * Special Master Young * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Kenneth Berard, pro se, Vancouver, WA, for Petitioner. Madylan Louise Yarc, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. DISMISSAL DECISION1 On July 30, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion to stay his expert report deadline due to the withdrawal of Petitioner’s counsel. ECF No. 34. On July 31, 2025, I granted this motion and directed Petitioner to file a status report updating me on the progress of obtaining new counsel by no later than August 29, 2025. Non-PDF Order, docketed July 31, 2025. Petitioner subsequently submitted status reports on August 29, 2025, September 26, 2025, and October 29, 2025, indicating that he had still not found replacement counsel. ECF Nos. 35, 38–39. Accordingly, on October 31, 2025, I issued an order directing Petitioner to either file with replacement counsel or indicate his intention to proceed pro se by no later than Monday, December 1, 2025. ECF No. 40. On December 1, 2025, Petitioner filed a status report indicating his intention to proceed pro se. ECF No. 41. Because Petitioner’s claim was in the expert reports stage, on December 11, 2025, I held a status conference in this case to discuss Petitioner’s counsel’s pending motion to withdraw and Petitioner’s efforts to obtain alternate counsel. See Min. Entry, docketed Dec. 11, 2025. I explained to Petitioner that given the off-Table nature of his claim, he would require an expert report to continue litigating his case. I noted the difficulties of obtaining such a report without being represented by counsel. Due to the upcoming holiday season, Petitioner requested additional time to continue to seek representation. I also explained to Petitioner’s counsel that if her motion to withdraw was granted, she would have to rely on Petitioner to communicate any updates as well as to receive any potential funds awarded from her pending motion for interim attorneys’ fees and 1Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 18(b), this Decision was initially filed on June 17, 2026, and the parties were afforded 14 days to propose redactions. The parties did not propose any redactions. Accordingly, this Decision is reissued in its original form for posting on the court’s website. Case 1:23-vv-01690-UNJ Document 70 Filed 07/27/26 Page 2 of 3 costs. Petitioner’s counsel indicated she would remain the attorney of record and therefore continue to be responsible for communicating updates to Petitioner about his case, until her pending motion for interim attorneys’ fees and costs has been adjudicated. Accordingly, I ordered Petitioner to submit either a motion for substitution of counsel or a status report indicating how he wished to proceed by no later than February 2, 2026. ECF No. 44. Petitioner filed two more status reports on February 2, 2026, and March 2, 2026, indicating that he had still not found replacement counsel. See ECF Nos. 47–48. I subsequently issued an Order to Show Cause as to why Petitioner’s claim should not be dismissed, and explained that the filing of a substantive expert report or the filing of a motion to substitute counsel would serve as compliance with the Order. ECF No. 51. On March 17, 2026, Petitioner’s counsel filed a second motion to withdraw as counsel. ECF No. 53. Petitioner’s counsel then filed a motion for a ruling on her motion to withdraw as counsel on April 15, 2026. ECF No. 54. I denied Petitioner’s motion for a ruling on April 23, 2026, staying her motion to withdraw and reiterating that Petitioner’s response to the Order to Show Cause remained due by no later than May 4, 2026. ECF No. 55. Petitioner filed his response to the Order to Show Cause on May 4, 2026, in which he requested I rule on his counsel’s motion to withdraw and grant him additional time to respond pro se. ECF No. 56 at 2. Because of the nature of Petitioner’s response, on May 20, 2026, I held a status conference between the parties. See Min. Entry, docketed May 20, 2026. At this conference I confirmed that Petitioner was aware of the implications of my Order to Show Cause and that he was comfortable to proceed pro se if I granted his attorney’s motion to withdraw. I further explained that due to the current stage of litigation and the length of time this case had been paused, if he was unable to comply with the terms of my Order to Show Cause I would dismiss his case without further warning. Petitioner indicated his understanding of these circumstances. Accordingly, I granted Petitioner’s counsel’s motion to withdraw on May 28, 2026, and directed Petitioner to file a response to the Order to Show Cause by no later than June 30, 2026. ECF Nos. 65–66. As of the date of this filing, Petitioner has not submitted any response to the Order to Show Cause. Petitioner has been afforded 338 calendar days to procure alternate counsel or file an expert report in support of his claim, and in this process has been warned several times that the continued failure to adhere to Court orders would result in an Order to Show Cause and dismissal of his cause. See ECF Nos. 40, 48, 51, 55, 66. Though I empathize with the difficulties faced by pro se petitioners, especially where an expert report is required to proceed with one’s claim, I cannot continue to allow this case to languish on the docket any further. Both pro se petitioners and petitioners represented by counsel are held to the same procedural requirements by this Court, and when a petitioner fails to comply with Court orders to prosecute his case, the Court may dismiss his claim. Vaccine Rule 21(b)(1); Sapharas v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 35 Fed. Cl. 503 (1996); Tsekouras v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 26 Cl. Ct. 439 (1992), aff’d, 991 F.2d 810 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (table); see also Claude E. Atkins Enters., Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1180, 1183-85 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of case for failure to prosecute for counsel’s failure to submit pre-trial memorandum); Adkins v. United States, 816 F.2d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal of case for failure of party to respond to discovery requests). 2 Case 1:23-vv-01690-UNJ Document 70 Filed 07/27/26 Page 3 of 3 Therefore, Petitioner’s case is DISMISSED for failure to prosecute, specifically for a failure to adhere to Court orders regarding the filing of evidence to substantiate his claim. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.2 IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Herbrina D. S. Young Herbrina D. S. Young Special Master 2 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment is expedited by the parties’ joint filing of a notice renouncing the right to seek review. 3 ================================================================================ DOCUMENT 2: USCOURTS-cofc-1_23-vv-01690-1 Date issued/filed: 2026-07-27 Pages: 5 Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 5/27/2026) regarding 59 DECISION of Special Master - Interim Attorney's Fees. Signed by Special Master Herbrina D S Young. (gf) Service on parties made. Petitioner served via First Class mail on 7/31/2026. Modified on 7/31/2026 (fm). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Case 1:23-vv-01690-UNJ Document 71 Filed 07/27/26 Page 1 of 5 In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS Filed: May 27, 2026 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * KENNETH BERARD, * * * Petitioner, * No. 23-1690V * v. * Special Master Young * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Wendy Cox, Siri & Glimstad, LLP, Austin, TX, for Petitioner Madylan Louise Yarc, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1 On May 26, 2026, Kenneth Berard (“Petitioner”) filed a motion for interim attorneys’ fees and costs, requesting a total of $94,761.18 for the work of his counsel, Wendy Cox. Pet’r’s Motion for Interim Attorneys’ Fees & Costs (“Pet’r’s Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 57.2 This amount consists of $89,938.90 in fees and $4,822.28 in costs. Id. at 3. Petitioner has not incurred any personal costs related to the prosecution of his petition. Id. On May 27, 2026, Respondent filed his response to Petitioner’s motion. Resp’t’s Response, ECF No. 58. In his response, Respondent stated that he “defers to the court regarding whether the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case.” Id. at 2. For the reasons stated below, I will award interim attorneys’ fees and costs to Petitioner’s counsel, Ms. Cox. 1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access. 2 Petitioner previously filed motions for interim attorneys’ fees and costs on December 2, 2025, and March 3, 2026. See ECF Nos. 42, 50. However, Petitioner’s most recent motion incorporates all costs requested in her prior motions. Accordingly, I will not address Petitioner’s prior motions. Case 1:23-vv-01690-UNJ Document 71 Filed 07/27/26 Page 2 of 5 I. Availability of Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs A. Good Faith and Reasonable Basis Under the Vaccine Act, petitioners may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs only if “the petition was brought in good faith, and there was a reasonable basis for which the petition was brought.” § 15(e)(1). Respondent does not object to Petitioner’s motion on the basis of good faith or reasonable basis, and I find that the statutory criteria for an award of interim fees and costs are met. B. Justification for an Interim Award In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated that a special master may award attorneys’ fees and costs on an interim basis. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The court noted that such awards “are particularly appropriate in cases where proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be retained.” Id. Similarly, the Federal Circuit held in Shaw that it is proper for a special master to award interim attorneys’ fees “[w]here the claimant establishes that the cost of litigation has imposed an undue hardship and that there exists a good faith basis for the claim.” Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 609 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Many cases in the Program are proceeding slower than they have in the past. See Miles v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 12-254V, 2017 WL 4875816 at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 4, 2017) (“[i]t may be months to years before an entitlement ruling is issued”); Abbott v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 14-907V, 2016 WL 4151689, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 15, 2016) (“The delay in adjudication, to date, is due to a steady increase in the number of petitions filed each year.”). An entitlement decision has not been issued, and Ms. Cox has a pending motion to withdraw as the attorney of record in this case. See ECF No. 53. Petitioner’s fees and costs have accumulated in the course of litigation. Petitioner submitted an itemization of attorney fees and a summary and documentation of costs. Petitioner’s counsel requested a total of $91,227.86 in fees and expenses, and “[i]t cannot be seriously argued that in essence loaning cases thousands of dollars for years is not a hardship.” Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 08-241V, 2009 WL 775396, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 13, 2009). Because of the protracted nature of the proceedings, and the fact that Ms. Cox will withdraw as counsel and no longer be on the case, I find an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs reasonable and appropriate for her work completed in this case. II. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. § 15(e). The Federal Circuit has approved the lodestar approach to determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the Vaccine Act. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. This is a two-step process. Id. First, a court determines an “initial estimate . . . by ‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. at 1347–48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Second, the court may make an upward or downward departure from the initial calculation of the fee award based on specific findings. Id. at 1348. 2 Case 1:23-vv-01690-UNJ Document 71 Filed 07/27/26 Page 3 of 5 It is “well within the special master’s discretion” to determine the reasonableness of fees. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521–22 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1991) (“[T]he reviewing court must grant the special master wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs.”). Applications for attorneys’ fees must include contemporaneous and specific billing records that indicate the work performed and the number of hours spent on said work. See Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 85 Fed. Cl. 313, 316–18 (2008). Such applications, however, should not include hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). Reasonable hourly rates are determined by looking at the “prevailing market rate” in the relevant community. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 895. The “prevailing market rate” is akin to the rate “in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Id. at 895 n.11. Petitioners bear the burden of providing adequate evidence to prove that the requested hourly rate is reasonable. Id. A. Hourly Rate The decision in McCulloch provides a framework for consideration of appropriate ranges for attorneys’ fees based upon the experience of the practicing attorney. McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323, at *19 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015), mot. for recons. denied, 2015 WL 6181910 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 21, 2015). The Office of Special Masters has since updated the McCulloch rates, and the Attorneys’ Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedules from 2015 to 2026 can be accessed online.3 Petitioner requests the following hourly rates for the work of his counsel: for Ms. Wendy Cox, $390.00 per hour for work performed in 2023, $430.00 per hour for work performed in 2024, $450.00 per hour for work performed in 2025, and $551.00 per hour for work performed in 2026; for Ms. Jessica Wallace, $275.00 per hour for work performed in 2022, $285.00 per hour for worked performed in 2023, and $359.00 per hour for work performed in 2025; and for Ms. Alison Haskins, $510.00 per hour for work performed in 2024 and $525.00 per hour for worked performed in 2025. Petitioner also requests rates between $174.00 and $227.00 per hour for work performed by his counsel’s paralegals between 2022 and 2026. I find that Ms. Cox’s 2023–2025 rates, Ms. Wallace’s 2022–2025 rates, Ms. Haskins’ 2024–2025 rates, and the rates requested for Petitioner’s counsel’s paralegals are reasonable and in accordance with what these attorneys have previously been awarded for their Vaccine Program work. However, despite requesting these rates in his fees motion, the provided invoice of attorneys’ fees accompanying Petitioner’s motion charges different rates than that requested. Accordingly, 44.5 hours for Ms. Cox will be reduced from $430.00 per hour to $390.00 per hour for work performed in 2023, for a total reduction of $1,780.00.4 Further, Ms. Cox’s 2026 rate has not yet been adjudicated in the Program. Per Ms. Cox’s declaration, filed on December 2, 2025, she became a licensed attorney in 2005 and has continued to practice law since her licensure. Pet’r’s Ex. 19 at 1. At the time of filing her declaration in 2025, Ms. Cox had 19 years of experience as an attorney—as of the writing of this decision, she now has approximately 20. See id. According 3 The OSM Fee Schedules are available at: https://www.cfc.uscourts.gov/osm-attorneys-forum-hourly-rate- fee-schedules 4 (44.5 x $430.00) – (44.5 x $390.00) = $1,780.00. 3 Case 1:23-vv-01690-UNJ Document 71 Filed 07/27/26 Page 4 of 5 to the OSM Fee Schedule, attorneys with 20 to 30 years of experience may be awarded an hourly rate between $552.00 and $655.00 per hour. Because Ms. Cox just recently garnered enough experience to fall into this range, and because Ms. Cox requests a rate below the minimum amount associated with her level of experience, I find this request reasonable. Accordingly, I will award her 2026 rate in full. B. Reasonable Number of Hours Attorneys’ fees are awarded for the “number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. Counsel should not include in their fee requests hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). It is well-established that billing for administrative or clerical tasks is not permitted in the Vaccine Program. See e.g., Rochester v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 379, 387 (1989) (stating that services that are “primarily of a secretarial or clerical nature . . . should be considered as normal overhead office costs included within the attorneys’ fee rates”); see also Isom v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 94-770, 2001 WL 101459, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 17, 2001) (agreeing with Respondent that tasks such as filing and photocopying are subsumed under overhead expenses); Walters v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 15-1380V, 2022 WL 1077311, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 23, 2022) (failing to award fees for the review of CM/ECF notifications and the organization of the file); McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323, at *26 (noting that clerical and secretarial tasks should not be billed at all, regardless of who performs them). Upon review, I find the overall hours billed to be mostly reasonable. Counsel provided sufficiently detailed descriptions for the tasks performed. However, I find a reduction necessary because there were several entries billed for filing. Further, most of the entries for filing were included with other tasks. Because this constitutes block billing, it is impossible to discern how much time was spent on compensable versus noncompensable tasks. Therefore, I find a 5% reduction reasonable. This results in a reduction of $4,496.95.5 C. Costs Similar to attorneys’ fees, a request for reimbursement of costs must be reasonable. Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992). When petitioners fail to substantiate a cost item, such as by not providing appropriate documentation to explain the basis for a particular cost, special masters have refrained from paying the cost at issue. See, e.g., Gardner-Cook v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-480V, 2005 WL 6122520, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 30, 2005). Petitioner requests a total of $4,783.16 in attorneys’ costs. This amount is comprised of acquisition of medical records, the Court’s filing fee, and payment to a potential expert witness. These costs have been supported with the necessary documentation and are reasonable. I will therefore award Petitioner’s request for costs in full. 5 $89,938.90 x 5% = $4,496.95. 4 Case 1:23-vv-01690-UNJ Document 71 Filed 07/27/26 Page 5 of 5 III. Conclusion In accordance with the Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) (2018), I award Petitioner the following in interim attorneys’ fees and costs: Interim Attorneys’ Fees Requested $89,938.90 (Reduction) -$6,276.95 Interim Attorneys’ Fees Awarded $83,661.95 Interim Costs Requested $4,822.28 (Reduction) -$0.00 Interim Costs Awarded $4,822.28 Total Amount Awarded $88,484.23 Accordingly, I award a lump sum in the amount of $88,484.23, representing reimbursement for Petitioner’s attorneys’ fees and costs, to be paid through an ACH deposit to Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement. In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the clerk of the court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with the terms of the above decision.6 IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Herbrina D. S. Young Herbrina D. S. Young Special Master 6 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment is expedited by the parties’ joint filing of a notice renouncing the right to seek review. 5