VICP Registry Case Source Bundle
Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_23-vv-00802
Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_23-vv-00802
Petitioner: Taryn Starck
Filed: 2023-05-31
Decided: 2025-10-30
Vaccine: human papillomavirus (HPV)
Vaccination date: 2008-03-17
Condition: injuries and death after HPV vaccinations
Outcome: dismissed
Award amount USD: 

AI-assisted case summary:
On May 31, 2023, Juli Shimp filed a petition on behalf of Taryn Starck, alleging that Ms. Starck suffered injuries and died on February 8, 2023 after human papillomavirus vaccinations administered on March 17, 2008 and June 6, 2008. The public decision states that Ms. Starck was a competent adult from the vaccinations until her death and was married when she died; it does not state her exact age or provide a medical chronology of the alleged vaccine injury.

The case turned on representation and prosecution rather than a merits ruling on causation. On September 29, 2023, the court noted that because Ms. Starck was an adult, it was unclear whether her mother had legal authority to bring the case on behalf of the estate. A death certificate was eventually filed, but no probate documents established Ms. Shimp as estate administrator. The court also noted that because Ms. Starck was married at death, her husband appeared more likely to be the estate administrator.

Ms. Shimp filed a notice to withdraw before establishing estate authority, then reported for months that she was attempting to open an estate. In February 2025, counsel reported that she was no longer seeking appointment as administrator and still wished to withdraw. After an August 28, 2025 order to show cause, Chief Special Master Corcoran dismissed the case on October 30, 2025 for failure to prosecute and disregard of court orders. No compensation was awarded. The decision also noted that, apart from the authority issue, the case likely faced statute-of-limitations problems.

Theory of causation field:
Death case. Taryn Starck, a competent adult at all relevant times, allegedly suffered injuries and died February 8, 2023 after HPV vaccinations March 17, 2008 and June 6, 2008. DISMISSED. No merits causation ruling; public decision lacks clinical injury/death chronology. Mother Juli Shimp filed May 31, 2023 but never established authority as estate administrator; Taryn was married at death, making husband more likely administrator. After failed withdrawal/probate efforts and order to show cause, CSM Corcoran dismissed October 30, 2025 for failure to prosecute. No award.

Public staged source text:

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DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_23-vv-00802-0
Date issued/filed: 2025-11-25
Pages: 3
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 10/30/2025) regarding 29 DECISION of Special Master. Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (abs) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:23-vv-00802-UNJ Document 30 Filed 11/25/25 Page 1 of 3
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 23-802V
UNPUBLISHED
JULI SHIMP on behalf of her deceased
child, TARYN STARCK, Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner,
Filed: October 30, 2025
v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
Bijan Esfandiari, Wisner Baum, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.
Heather L. Pearlman, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DECISION1
On May 31, 2023, Juli Shimp filed a petition on behalf of Taryn Starck for
compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §
300aa—10 through 34 (the “Vaccine Act”). Ms. Shimp alleged that Ms. Starck suffered
injuries and ultimately died on February 8, 2023, after receiving human papillomavirus
vaccinations on March 17, 2008, and June 6, 2008.2 ECF No. 1. Due to Ms. Shimp’s
failure to prosecute the claim, this case is DISMISSED.
Relevant Procedural History
On September 29, 2023, an order issued noting that, based on the petition,
Taryn Starck was a competent adult at all times relevant to this case, from the
vaccinations until her death. ECF No. 13. The order stated that it was unclear whether
her mother, Ms. Shimp, has the legal authority to bring this case in a representative
capacity on behalf of Ms. Starck’s estate. While a death certificate was eventually filed
1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made
publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or
at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government
Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In
accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other
information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I
agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2 If not for the issue regarding the legal authority to bring this case, the case would have faced likely
dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.

Case 1:23-vv-00802-UNJ Document 30 Filed 11/25/25 Page 2 of 3
(exhibit 6), no probate documents have been submitted in compliance with Vaccine
Rule 2(c)(2)(C) to establish the administrator of Ms. Starck’s estate. Ms. Shimp has not
asserted in the petition or her declaration (exhibit 1) that she has the authority to bring
this case on behalf of Ms. Starck’s estate or that she expects to obtain that authority in
the future. Moreover, since Ms. Starck was married at the time of her death (exhibit 6), it
appears more likely that her husband would be the administrator of Ms. Starck’s estate.
The order required Ms. Shimp to file the probate documents establishing her as the
administrator of Ms. Starck’s estate or, at a minimum, a status report explaining when
the documents would be available.
On January 29, 2024, the statutorily-required order issued advising that, since
240 days had passed from the filing of the petition, the petitioner could choose to
withdraw the case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa—12(g). ECF No. 18.
On February 1, 2024, Ms. Shimp filed a notice to withdraw the petition without
having filed any probate documents to establish herself as the administrator of Ms.
Starck’s estate. ECF No. 19.
On February 2, 2024, an order issued noting the lack of probate documents
prevented Ms. Shimp from having the legal authority to withdraw the case. ECF No. 20.
Ms. Shimp was advised that the withdrawal of the case would be effectuated once the
probate documents were filed.
On April 2, 2024, Ms. Shimp’s counsel filed a status report stating that Ms. Shimp
was working to open an estate on behalf of Ms. Starck and requested additional time to
complete the probate process. ECF No. 22. For the next ten months, counsel continued
to report that Ms. Shimp was attempting to establish an estate. ECF Nos. 23-25.
On February 11, 2025, counsel filed an update stating that Ms. Shimp was no
longer seeking to be appointed as the administrator of Ms. Starck’s estate and
reiterated her request to withdraw the case. ECF No. 26.
On August 28, 2025, I issued an order to show cause for failure to prosecute.
ECF No. 27. I reiterated the issue that Ms. Shimp did not have the authority to withdraw
this case and had not complied with my orders to remedy that issue. Counsel was
ordered to serve the order to show cause on Ms. Shimp.
On September 24, 2025, counsel filed a certified mail receipt indicating that the
order to show cause was served on Ms. Shimp. The due date for a response set in the
order to show cause has now passed without any further submissions from Ms. Shimp.
2

Case 1:23-vv-00802-UNJ Document 30 Filed 11/25/25 Page 3 of 3
Grounds for Dismissal
It is a petitioner’s obligation to follow and respond to orders issued by a special
master in a case. The failure to do so – whether on account of attorney error, inaction,
or because a petitioner has failed to stay in contact and/or communicate with counsel -
is grounds for the claim’s dismissal. Padmanabhan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
638 Fed. App’x 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Tsekouras v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
26 Cl. Ct. 439 (1992), aff’d, 991 F.2d 810 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (per curiam), (“[c]ontrolling
precedent considers dismissal appropriate when failure to act is deemed willful, when it
is in violation of court orders, when it is repeated, and when clear warning is given that
the sanction will be imposed”); Sapharas v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 35 Fed.
Cl. 503 (1996) (“[n]ot only did petitioner fail to meet the court's . . . . deadline, but he
also ignored the chief special master's ‘warning’ order, clearly placing petitioner on
notice that failure to respond to the court's order . . . , would result in dismissal of the
claim. The chief special master clearly did not abuse his discretion in dismissing this
case for failure to prosecute”); see also Vaccine Rule 21(b) (“[t]he special master or the
court may dismiss a petition or any claim therein for failure of the petitioner to prosecute
or comply with these rules or any order of the special master or the court.”).
Ms. Shimp was specifically advised in the August 28, 2025 order to show cause
that failure to follow orders issued in this matter risked dismissal of the claim. As noted
in counsel’s February 11, 2025 status report, Ms. Shimp has no intention of obtaining
the necessary authority to continue or withdraw this claim. Because Ms. Shimp has
continued to disregard my orders, without justification or explanation, dismissal is now
appropriate.
Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED for failure to prosecute. The clerk
shall enter judgment accordingly.3
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
3 If Petitioner wishes to bring a civil action, he must file a notice of election rejecting the judgment
pursuant to § 21(a) “not later than 90 days after the date of the court’s final judgment.”
3