VICP Registry Case Source Bundle
Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01606
Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01606
Petitioner: Taylor Williams
Filed: 2021-07-22
Decided: 2025-04-09
Vaccine: influenza
Vaccination date: 2018-11-26
Condition: Guillain-Barré syndrome
Outcome: compensated
Award amount USD: 171885

AI-assisted case summary:
On July 22, 2021, Taylor Williams, a 15-year-old, filed a petition seeking compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. She alleged that an influenza vaccine received on November 26, 2018, caused her to develop Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS). The case proceeded as a Table claim, as GBS is a recognized injury for the flu vaccine within the specified timeframe. Petitioner presented with numbness in her legs and fingers on January 2, 2019, approximately 37 days after vaccination, leading to a diagnosis of GBS. She underwent hospitalization, IVIG treatment, and extensive physical, occupational, and speech therapy. While she showed significant improvement, some residual symptoms and impacts on her academic and athletic pursuits persisted. The respondent did not contest entitlement, and the Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran found that Petitioner met the requirements for a Table-GBS claim in a ruling dated April 29, 2024. A subsequent damages decision, dated April 9, 2025, awarded Taylor Williams $171,885.19. This award comprised $170,000.00 for pain and suffering and $1,885.19 for unreimbursed medical expenses. The award reflected the moderate severity of her GBS injury, its impact on her youth, and the common sequelae associated with GBS, while acknowledging her largely good recovery. Petitioner was represented by Nancy R. Meyers of Turning Point Litigation, and the Respondent was represented by Colleen C. Hartley of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Theory of causation field:
Petitioner Taylor Williams, age 15, received an influenza vaccine on November 26, 2018. She alleged a Table claim for Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) as a result. On January 2, 2019, 37 days post-vaccination, she presented with numbness in her legs and fingers, leading to a diagnosis of GBS. The public decision does not name specific medical experts for the petitioner or respondent. The Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran found that Petitioner met the Table requirements for GBS, including the timeframe of onset between three and 42 days post-vaccination. The respondent did not contest entitlement, though the Special Master noted evidence of an intercurrent upper respiratory infection prior to GBS onset. The Special Master determined that the respondent did not meet the burden to show a "factor unrelated" to the vaccine caused the injury. A damages decision awarded Petitioner $171,885.19, consisting of $170,000.00 for pain and suffering and $1,885.19 for unreimbursed medical expenses. Attorneys for Petitioner were Nancy R. Meyers and for Respondent were Colleen C. Hartley. The decision on entitlement was dated April 29, 2024, and the damages decision was dated April 9, 2025.

Public staged source text:

================================================================================
DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01606-0
Date issued/filed: 2024-05-28
Pages: 9
Docket text: PUBLIC ORDER/RULING (Originally filed: 04/29/2024) regarding 43 Ruling on Entitlement. Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (mva) Service on parties made.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 45 Filed 05/28/24 Page 1 of 9
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 21-1606V
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*
TAYLOR WILLIAMS, * Chief Special Master Corcoran
*
*
Petitioner, * Filed: April 29, 2024
*
v. *
*
SECRETARY OF HEALTH *
AND HUMAN SERVICES, *
*
Respondent. *
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Nancy R. Meyers, Turning Point Litigation, Greensboro, NC, for Petitioner.
Colleen C. Hartley, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1
On July 22, 2021, Taylor Williams filed this action seeking compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the “ Vaccine Program”).2 Petition (ECF No. 1).
Petitioner alleges the Table claim that an influenza (“flu”) vaccine she received on November 26,
2018, caused her to incur Guillain-Barré syndrome (“GBS”). Id.
I set a schedule for briefing on entitlement, and both sides have offered their position. See
Petitioner’s Motion for Ruling on the Record, dated Mar. 22, 2024 (ECF No. 41) (“Br.”);
Respondent’s Brief, dated Apr. 19, 2024 (ECF No. 42) (“Opp.”). Although Respondent contests
1 Under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen (14) days within which to request redaction “of any information
furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or
confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the whole Decision will be available to the public
in its present form. Id.
2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660,
100 Stat. 3758, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 through 34 (2012) [hereinafter “Vaccine Act” or “the
Act”]. Individual section references hereafter will be to § 300aa of the Act (but will omit that statutory prefix).

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 45 Filed 05/28/24 Page 2 of 9
entitlement (at least in terms of how he construes the record), he has represented that he will not
defend against the entitlement phase of the claim. Opp. at 10; Amended Rule 4(c) Report, dated
Jan. 30, 2024 (ECF No. 40) at 10. Based on the foregoing, as well as my own review of the record,
I find that Petitioner has met the flu vaccine-GBS Table requirements, and therefore is entitled to
damages.
I. Fact History
Vaccination and Evidence of Intercurrent Infection
On November 26, 2018, Ms. Taylor, then 15 years old, went to Nurse Practitioner Lynn
Kitchel for a routine wellness visit. Ex. 1 at 74. At this time, she received the subject flu vaccine
(as well as another vaccine not herein alleged as causal of injury). Id. at 79–80. A neurological
exam then performed yielded normal results. Id.
Less than one month later, on December 21, 2018, Petitioner was treated by NP Kitchel for
“URI symptoms.” Id. at 87. She reported that her symptoms (body aches, chills, fever, nasal
congestion, headache, and dizziness) had begun five days before. Id. Testing was performed to
identify possible infectious etiologies for her symptoms (in particular, Influenza A and B, plus
Epstein-Barr virus), but all produced negative results, and NP Kitchel diagnosed petitioner with
an unidentified “[v]iral upper respiratory illness.” Id. at 89. A few days later, Petitioner reported
some improvement, albeit with nasal congestion, and her high temperature began to decline. Ex.
1 at 96, 99.
However, on December 24th, and after Petitioner’s mother had spoken to NP Kitchel about
observed symptoms improvements, Petitioner was taken to an urgent care facility, where she was
seen by Nurse Practitioner Mendy Sharpe, complaining of “headache, nasal congestion, productive
cough, fever, fatigue, and body aches that began 1 week ago.” Ex. 10 at 15. NP Sharpe diagnosed
her with acute bronchitis and prescribed an inhaler and antibiotic. Id. at 16.
Beginning of Neurologic Symptoms
On January 2, 2019—now 37 days after the subject vaccination—Ms. Taylor was taken to
the WakeMed Raleigh emergency department. Ex. 2 at 768–70. She reported numbness in her legs
and fingers over the past two days, and also informed treaters of her previously-diagnosed
bronchitis and antibiotic course. Id. An exam revealed that Petitioner’s lower extremity strength
and reflexes were diminished, and it was recommended she obtain a neurologic consult. Id. at 772.
Petitioner was subsequently admitted to the hospital for further neurologic evaluation. Id.
Spinal and brain MRIs initially performed were normal. Id. at 799. But a nerve conduction study
demonstrated evidence of left tibial neuropathy with both axonal and demyelinating features. Id.
2

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 45 Filed 05/28/24 Page 3 of 9
at 800. The treating neurologist proposed the overall picture was most consistent with GBS,
although not definitively enough for the diagnosis, and Petitioner received a course of IVIG.3 Ex.
2 at 814.
On January 8, 2019, Petitioner was discharged to an inpatient rehabilitation facility with
the diagnosis of GBS (although because of the nature of her presentation, it was not deemed to fit
the “classic” form). Id. at 798. By January 24, 2019, she had completed rehabilitation. Id. at 152–
53. At the time of discharge, she was free of numbness or tingling in her lower extremities, and
displayed moderate to full strength in bilateral lower extremities as well. Id. Indeed, by the end of
that month, Petitioner was able to engage in school sports to a more limited extent, and her
neurologic evaluation by NP Kitchel was deemed normal. Ex. 1 at 117. On January 28, 2019, after
eight outpatient physical therapy (“PT”) visits, Petitioner was deemed to have met her goals and
discharged for home exercise. Ex. 3 at 11.
On March 20, 2019, Petitioner saw Dr. Traci Sheaffer, a pediatric neurologist. Ex. 4 at 2–
5. She reported overall improvement, but did not feel that she had yet returned to full strength. Id.
Her neurological examination was deemed normal, except for consistently absent deep tendon
reflexes, and it was advised she continue to work with a personal trainer on her deficits while also
following up for additional neurologic treatment in the future. Id.
Subsequent Treatment
For the remainder of 2019 to the present, Petitioner had additional treatment on several
occasions, although most of her subsequent health issues cannot be reasonably linked to her earlier
GBS diagnosis. In particular, the record reveals many instances in which Petitioner complained of
headaches that she reported were possibly associated with a different vaccine she had received in
the fall of 2018, although the neurologic exams she repeatedly received yielded normal findings.
See, e.g., Ex. 10 at 8–11 (May 2019 urgent care visit for headaches); Ex. 6 at 29–30 (October 2019
visit with primary care provider), 11 (February 2020 treater visit, complaining of fever and
headache); Ex. 4 at 21.
Ms. Taylor did, however, have follow-up visits with neurologists for further evaluation and
treatment of her post-GBS sequelae. See, e.g., Ex. 4 at 7–10 (November 2019 visit with Dr.
Sheaffer), 12–16 (February 2020 visit with Dr. Sheaffer). At some of these visits, there was
discussion of whether headaches could reflect post-GBS sequelae, although other etiologic
explanations were favored. Ex. 4 at 21 (April 2020 visit with Dr. Shaeffer; headaches attributable
to orthostatic hypotension), 23 (May 2020 telemedicine visit with Dr. Sheaffer), 28 (June 2020
3 “Intravenous immunoglobulin” is a blood product used to treat patients with antibody deficiencies, including
neurological disorders. Clinical Use of Intravenous Immunoglobulin, NCBI (2005)
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1809480/ (last visited on Apr. 29, 2024).
3

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 45 Filed 05/28/24 Page 4 of 9
telemedicine visit with Dr. Sheaffer). By an October 2020 visit with Dr. Shaeffer, Petitioner was
reporting that her headaches had improved, although she continued to experience some motor
deficits thought to be GBS-related, and leading Dr. Sheafer to propose PT for strength building.
Id. at 33–35.
II. Treater Statement
While this action was pending, in September 2023 Petitioner submitted in support of her
claim, an unsworn letter from Dr. Sheaffer. See generally Ex. 11. In it, Dr. Sheaffer concludes that
Petitioner “suffered Guillain-Barre Syndrome (“GBS”) following vaccinations.” Id. at 1. She also
acknowledges that Petitioner “had an intercurrent upper respiratory infection[] in mid-December
and bronchitis in later December but had been feeling better prior to her second immunization.”
Id. Dr. Sheaffer concludes that “the immunizations were more likely than not to be a substantial
factor in causing her GBS,” and that her treatment of Petitioner later included headaches and
dizziness (although other than their post-GBS character, makes no statements as to their
relationship). Id.
III. Procedural History
The case was initiated in July 2021, and (after the process for evaluating the sufficiency of
document filings in the case was completed), assigned to the “Special Processing Unit” in April
2022, based on the initial supposition that the Table claim alleged was amenable to settlement.
Thereafter, however, despite some efforts to settle the matter, the parties proved unable to come
to an agreement, and the case was subsequently transferred to my own docket in October 2023. I
ordered Respondent to file an expert report or some other evidence supporting the “factor
unrelated” defense, since it appeared Petitioner could otherwise meet the elements of a flu vaccine-
GBS Table claim. See Nov. 3, 2023 Scheduling Order. The parties filed the briefs referenced
above, and the matter is now ripe for resolution.
IV. Parties’ Arguments
Petitioner argues that she has met her prima facie burden of demonstrating a Table Injury—
she received a flu vaccine, experienced GBS, and her onset fell within three to 42 days of
vaccination. Br. at 7. She references the January 2019 clinical evidence of GBS-like symptoms
(diminished reflexes, bilateral limb weakness, a monophasic injury course, and timeframe from
onset to nadir consistent with the Table GBS definition). Id. at 8–10. She also asserts that there is
no other evidence of an alternative cause (ignoring the proof of an intercurrent infection, but
stressing Respondent’s failure to preponderantly establish a counter-explanation). Id. at 10–11, 12.
Respondent’s recitation of the fact history makes mention on several occasions of the
intercurrent infection that Petitioner was clearly experiencing prior to formal onset of neurologic
4

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 45 Filed 05/28/24 Page 5 of 9
symptoms in January 2019. Opp. at 2–3. Although Petitioner was diagnosed at this time with
bronchitis, testing for infections in December yielded negative results. Id. Respondent also
highlights that Petitioner’s clinical presentation was not deemed consistent with GBS in a “classic
sense,” even though it was still thought to be GBS. Id. at 4. Otherwise, Respondent has reiterated
that he will not defend against this claim (while reserving his right to argue in a damages phase
that certain claimed costs or expenses are not injury-related). Id. at 10.
V. Applicable Legal Standards
A. Petitioner’s Overall Burden in Vaccine Program Cases
To receive compensation in the Vaccine Program, a petitioner must prove either: (1) that
he suffered a “Table Injury”—i.e., an injury falling within the Vaccine Injury Table—
corresponding to one of the vaccinations in question within a statutorily prescribed period of time
or, in the alternative, (2) that his illnesses were actually caused by a vaccine (a “Non-Table
Injury”). See Sections 13(a)(1)(A), 11(c)(1), and 14(a), as amended by 42 C.F.R. § 100.3; §
11(c)(1)(C)(ii)(I); see also Moberly v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 592 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); Capizzano v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 440 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006).4
In this case, Petitioner asserts the Table claim of GBS caused by the flu vaccine.
For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance
of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). That is, a petitioner must offer evidence that
leads the “trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence
before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the judge of the fact’s
existence.” Moberly, 592 F.3d at 1322 n.2; see also Snowbank Enter. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct.
476, 486 (1984) (mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient under a preponderance standard).
Proof of medical certainty is not required. Bunting v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 931 F.2d
867, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In particular, a petitioner must demonstrate that the vaccine was “not
only [the] but-for cause of the injury but also a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.”
Moberly, 592 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Shyface v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 165 F.3d 1344,
1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Pafford v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 451 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2006). A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions;
rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent
physician. Section 13(a)(1).
4 Decisions of special masters (some of which I reference in this ruling) constitute persuasive but not binding authority.
Hanlon v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 40 Fed. Cl. 625, 630 (1998). By contrast, Federal Circuit rulings concerning
legal issues are binding on special masters. Guillory v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 59 Fed. Cl. 121, 124 (2003),
aff’d 104 F. Appx. 712 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Spooner v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 13-159V, 2014 WL
504728, at *7 n.12 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 16, 2014).
5

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 45 Filed 05/28/24 Page 6 of 9
B. Legal Standards Governing Factual Determinations
The process for making determinations in Vaccine Program cases regarding factual issues
begins with consideration of the medical records. Section 11(c)(2). The special master is required
to consider “all [ ] relevant medical and scientific evidence contained in the record,” including
“any diagnosis, conclusion, medical judgment, or autopsy or coroner's report which is contained
in the record regarding the nature, causation, and aggravation of the petitioner's illness, disability,
injury, condition, or death,” as well as the “results of any diagnostic or evaluative test which are
contained in the record and the summaries and conclusions.” Section 13(b)(1)(A). The special
master is then required to weigh the evidence presented, including contemporaneous medical
records and testimony. See Burns v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 415, 417 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (determining that it is within the special master's discretion to determine whether to afford
greater weight to contemporaneous medical records than to other evidence, such as oral testimony
surrounding the events in question that was given at a later date, provided that such determination
is evidenced by a rational determination).
As noted by the Federal Circuit, “[m]edical records, in general, warrant consideration as
trustworthy evidence.” Cucuras, 993 F.2d at 1528; Doe/70 v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 95
Fed. Cl. 598, 608 (2010) (“[g]iven the inconsistencies between petitioner's testimony and his
contemporaneous medical records, the special master's decision to rely on petitioner's medical
records was rational and consistent with applicable law”), aff'd, Rickett v. Sec'y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 468 F. App’x 952 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (non-precedential opinion). A series of linked
propositions explains why such records deserve some weight: (i) sick people visit medical
professionals; (ii) sick people attempt to honestly report their health problems to those
professionals; and (iii) medical professionals record what they are told or observe when examining
their patients in as accurate a manner as possible, so that they are aware of enough relevant facts
to make appropriate treatment decisions. Sanchez v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 11–685V,
2013 WL 1880825, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 10, 2013); Cucuras v. Sec'y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 26 Cl. Ct. 537, 543 (1992), aff'd, 993 F.2d at 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[i]t strains reason to
conclude that petitioners would fail to accurately report the onset of their daughter's symptoms”).
Accordingly, if the medical records are clear, consistent, and complete, then they should
be afforded substantial weight. Lowrie v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 03–1585V, 2005 WL
6117475, at *20 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 12, 2005). Indeed, contemporaneous medical records
are often found to be deserving of greater evidentiary weight than oral testimony—especially
where such testimony conflicts with the record evidence. Cucuras, 993 F.2d at 1528; see also
Murphy v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 23 Cl. Ct. 726, 733 (1991), aff'd per curiam, 968 F.2d
1226 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. den'd, Murphy v. Sullivan, 506 U.S. 974 (1992) (citing United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 396 (1947) (“[i]t has generally been held that oral
testimony which is in conflict with contemporaneous documents is entitled to little evidentiary
6

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 45 Filed 05/28/24 Page 7 of 9
weight.”)).
However, the Federal Circuit has also noted that there is no formal “presumption” that
records are accurate or superior on their face to other forms of evidence. Kirby v. Sec’y of Health
& Hum. Servs., 997 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2021). There are certainly situations in which
compelling oral or written testimony (provided in the form of an affidavit or declaration) may be
more persuasive than written records, such as where records are deemed to be incomplete or
inaccurate. Campbell v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 69 Fed. Cl. 775, 779 (2006) (“like any
norm based upon common sense and experience, this rule should not be treated as an absolute and
must yield where the factual predicates for its application are weak or lacking”); Lowrie, 2005 WL
6117475, at *19 (“[w]ritten records which are, themselves, inconsistent, should be accorded less
deference than those which are internally consistent”) (quoting Murphy, 23 Cl. Ct. at 733)).
Ultimately, a determination regarding a witness's credibility is needed when determining the
weight that such testimony should be afforded. Andreu, 569 F.3d at 1379; Bradley v. Sec'y of
Health & Hum. Servs., 991 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
When witness testimony is offered to overcome the presumption of accuracy afforded to
contemporaneous medical records, such testimony must be “consistent, clear, cogent, and
compelling.” Sanchez, 2013 WL 1880825, at *3 (citing Blutstein v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 90–2808V, 1998 WL 408611, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 30, 1998)). In determining the
accuracy and completeness of medical records, the Court of Federal Claims has listed four possible
explanations for inconsistencies between contemporaneously created medical records and later
testimony: (1) a person's failure to recount to the medical professional everything that happened
during the relevant time period; (2) the medical professional's failure to document everything
reported to her or him; (3) a person's faulty recollection of the events when presenting testimony;
or (4) a person's purposeful recounting of symptoms that did not exist. La Londe v. Sec'y of Health
& Hum. Servs., 110 Fed. Cl. 184, 203–04 (2013), aff'd, 746 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In making
a determination regarding whether to afford greater weight to contemporaneous medical records
or other evidence, such as testimony at hearing, there must be evidence that this decision was the
result of a rational determination. Burns, 3 F.3d at 417.
C. Standards for Ruling on the Record
The Vaccine Act and Rules not only contemplate but encourage special masters to decide
petitions on the papers where (in the exercise of their discretion) they conclude that doing so will
properly and fairly resolve the case. Section 12(d)(2)(D); Vaccine Rule 8(d). The decision to rule
on the record in lieu of hearing has been affirmed on appeal. Kreizenbeck v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 945 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also Hooker v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., No. 02-472V, 2016 WL 3456435, at *21 n.19 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 19, 2016) (citing
numerous cases where special masters decided case on the papers in lieu of hearing and that
7

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 45 Filed 05/28/24 Page 8 of 9
decision was upheld). I am simply not required to hold a hearing in every matter, no matter the
preferences of the parties. Hovey v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 397, 402–03 (1997)
(determining that special master acted within his discretion in denying evidentiary hearing); Burns,
3 F.3d at 417; Murphy v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-882V, 1991 WL 71500, at *2
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 19, 1991).
ANALYSIS
GBS is listed as a Table injury for the flu vaccine, and thus a claimant seeking to meet its
requirements need not establish vaccine causation. Instead, Petitioner herein must show (a) receipt
of a covered form of the flu vaccine, (b) that she did in fact experience GBS, as defined in the
Table’s “qualifications and aids to interpretation,” and (c) that her symptoms onset (whether or not
GBS could then be diagnosed, or in fact was) occurred between three and 42 days after vaccination.
42 C.F.R. § 100.3.
Here, there is no dispute that Petitioner received a version of the flu vaccine covered by
the Program, and likely experienced GBS, with onset occurring within the Table-defined
timeframe. Accordingly, she has met her prima facie case.5
At the same time, there is obvious unrebutted evidence that Petitioner experienced an
intercurrent, if unidentified, infection far closer in time to onset of her GBS than vaccination.
Certainly, these kinds of factual circumstances raise the possibility of a “factor unrelated”
explanation for the injury—a showing that Respondent is burdened with establishing, when (as
here) the burden of proof shifts after a claimant’s prima facie success. Section 13(a)(1)(B); Cedillo
v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 617 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Schilling v. Sec’y
of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-527V, 2022 WL 1101597, at *21 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 17,
2022). I have dismissed flu vaccine-GBS Table claims where Respondent carried this burden, and
in so doing explained how a closer-in-time infectious process can rule out vaccine causality—even
though the Table presumes causation otherwise. White v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-
1319V, 2023 WL 4204568, at *18 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 2, 2023), mot. for review den’d, 168
Fed. Cl. 660 (2023), appeal docketed, No. 2024-1372 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 23, 2024).
But in this case, I cannot find that burden-shifted showing has been made. Of course,
Respondent has expressly opted not to attempt to make out the showing at all, and by abandoning
that possibility it would almost be improper to conduct a factor unrelated analysis. But even despite
5 As this is a Table claim, I do not (in assessing Petitioner’s prima facie showing) analyze the confounding evidence
of an alternative explanation that would often occur were this a causation-in-fact claim (an in particular, the “did
cause” prong of that analysis). Causation is presumed under the circumstances, and therefore the obvious record
evidence of alternative explanations for the injury are better evaluated as part of Respondent’s “factor unrelated”
burden. And of course, claimants are never obligated to negate the possibility that something else caused their injury—
even though evidence of alternative causal factors often undermines a claimant’s overall showing.
8

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 45 Filed 05/28/24 Page 9 of 9
the presence of some evidence of an alternative explanation, I cannot find on this record that
preponderantly some other infection was causal, ruling out vaccination. Testing for an alternative
infection was inconclusive, and there has not been shown to be substantial treater support for an
infection as causal (while there is treater support going the other way). All that remains is
Petitioner’s preponderant satisfaction of the Table elements.
CONCLUSION
Based on the entire record in this case, I find that Petitioner has provided preponderant
evidence satisfying all requirements for a Table-GBS claim. Petitioner is thus entitled to
compensation. I shall contact the parties shortly after issuance of this Ruling to hold a status
conference about damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
9

================================================================================
DOCUMENT 2: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01606-1
Date issued/filed: 2025-04-09
Pages: 11
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 03/12/2025) regarding 55 DECISION of Special Master. Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (mva) Service on parties made.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/09/25 Page 1 of 11
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 21-1606V
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*
TAYLOR WILLIAMS, * Chief Special Master Corcoran
*
*
Petitioner, * Filed: March 12, 2025
*
v. *
*
SECRETARY OF HEALTH *
AND HUMAN SERVICES, *
*
Respondent. *
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Nancy R. Meyers, Turning Point Litigation, Greensboro, NC, for Petitioner.
Colleen C. Hartley, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DAMAGES DECISION1
On July 22, 2021, Taylor Williams filed a petition for compensation under the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the “Vaccine Program”).2 Petition (ECF No. 1) at 1.
Petitioner alleged the Table Claim that an influenza (“flu”) vaccine she received on November 26,
2018, caused her to incur Guillain-Barré syndrome (“GBS”). Id. The matter was originally
assigned to the Special Processing Unit (the “SPU”), but the parties could not resolve the claim.
After the case was transferred out of SPU and to my individual docket, I determined Petitioner was
entitled to damages. See Ruling on Entitlement, dated Apr. 29, 2024 (ECF No. 43) (the
“Entitlement Ruling”).
1 Under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen (14) days within which to request redaction “of any information
furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or
confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the whole Decision will be available to the public
in its present form. Id.
2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660,
100 Stat. 3758, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 through 34 (2012) [hereinafter “Vaccine Act” or “the
Act”]. Individual section references hereafter will be to § 300aa of the Act (but will omit that statutory prefix).

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/09/25 Page 2 of 11
The parties were also unable to resolve damages on their own, and have now briefed their
respective positions. Petitioner’s Damages Brief, dated Aug. 13, 2024 (ECF No. 51) (“Br.”);
Respondent’s Brief on Damages, dated Oct. 22, 2024 (ECF No. 53) (“Opp.”); Petitioner’s Reply,
dated Nov. 19, 2024 (ECF No. 54) (“Reply”).
For the reasons set forth in greater detail below, I find that Petitioner is entitled to an
award of damages in the amount of $171,885.19, representing $170,000.00 for actual pain and
suffering, plus $1,885.19 in unreimbursed out-of-pocket expenses.
I. Brief Factual Summary
A more complete summary of the relevant medical history and factual background is
contained in the entitlement decision. See generally Entitlement Ruling at 2–4. I incorporate that
history herein. In short, Petitioner successfully established entitlement to damages for a Table-
GBS post-vaccination injury. Id. at 9.
On November 26, 2018, Petitioner (then 15-years-old), received the subject flu vaccine (as
well as another vaccine not herein alleged as causal of injury). Id. at 2; Ex. 1 at 74, 79–80. A
neurological exam performed at that time yielded normal results. Petitioner was taken to the
WakeMed Raleigh emergency department on January 2, 2019, thirty-seven days post-vaccination,
reporting numbness in her legs and fingers over the past two days and noting her previously
diagnosed bronchitis and antibiotic course. Entitlement Ruling at 2; Ex. 2 at 768–70. An exam
revealed lower extremity strength with diminished reflexes. Id.
Following admission for further neurologic evaluation, Petitioner underwent MRIs of her
spine and brain—both of which were unremarkable—as well as a nerve conduction study that
showed evidence of left tibial neuropathy with both axonal and demyelinating features. Ex. 2 at
799, 800. Petitioner’s treating neurologist opined that her overall clinical picture was most
consistent with GBS, although the clinical and testing results were not quite enough to confirm the
diagnosis. Entitlement Ruling at 3. Petitioner subsequently received a course of IVIG. Id.; Ex. 2 at
814. Petitioner was discharged on January 8, 2019, to an inpatient rehabilitation facility with a
diagnosis of GBS (although the nature of her presentation was not deemed consistent with the
“classic” definition of GBS). Entitlement Ruling at 3; Ex. 2 at 798.
Petitioner completed inpatient rehabilitation and was discharged on January 24, 2019.
Entitlement Ruling at 3; Ex. 2 at 152–53. Records indicate that following the completion of her
inpatient rehab, Petitioner was able to participate in school sports, but at a much more limited
capacity, and that she no longer experienced numbness or tingling in her lower extremities, and
even displayed moderate to full strength in her bilateral lower extremities. Id. She further
participated in eight outpatient physical therapy (“PT”) sessions, through February 28, 2019, and
2

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/09/25 Page 3 of 11
was deemed to have met her goals and discharged home with a home exercise program.
Entitlement Ruling at 3; Ex. 3 at 11.
On March 20, 2019, Petitioner saw Dr. Traci Sheaffer, a pediatric neurologist. Ex. 4 at 2.
A neurological examination was deemed normal, but for consistently absent deep tendon reflexes.
Dr. Sheaffer advised Petitioner to continue working with a personal trainer on her deficits and to
follow up for future neurologic treatment. Entitlement Ruling at 3; Ex. 4 at 2–5.
The records establish that Petitioner continued to seek additional medical treatment
throughout the remainder of 2019, both for her post-GBS sequelae a well as for unrelated matters.
Entitlement Ruling at 3; Ex. 4 at 7–10, 12–16, 21, 23, 28; Ex. 10 at 8–11. By October 2020,
Petitioner was still reporting some motor deficits thought to be related to her GBS, but her
headaches had improved—leading Dr. Sheaffer to propose additional PT for continued strength
building.
II. Parties’ Arguments
The parties agree that Petitioner is entitled to $1,885.19 for past unreimbursed medical
expenses. Br. at 20–21; Opp. at 1 n.1. Thus, the only matter to be determined is the appropriate
amount of a pain and suffering award.
Petitioner
Petitioner requests $225,000.00 in actual pain and suffering, emphasizing that she
experienced a severe GBS injury which was “profoundly and uniquely impactful due to her young
age.” Br. at 11. Throughout the course of her hospitalization and subsequent treatment, Petitioner
underwent an IVIG treatment; physical, occupational, and speech therapy; a lumbar puncture; an
MRI of her spine and brain; and a nerve conduction study. Id.; Ex. 2 at 798, 825, 833, 851, 917.
But despite this significant treatment course, she remained “severely below baseline” at the time
of her discharge—including struggles with certain activities of daily living, difficulty with speech
and swallowing, as well as limitations to her strength and range of motion. Br. at 11; Ex. 2 at 825,
833, 851, 881.
Although Petitioner acknowledges that by October 2019, her gait instability had essentially
resolved when contrasted with her onset, she maintains that some of her GBS-related symptoms
have persisted—noting that her legs do not respond the way they did prior to her GBS onset, she
is more fatigued, and that she can only do a fraction of the physical activity she could prior to her
GBS. Br. at 8. Moreover, Petitioner argues that her GBS “severely impacted” her emotional
wellbeing, and that despite counseling she continues to struggle with “severe social anxiety” and
3

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/09/25 Page 4 of 11
has even dropped out of college as a result. Id. at 8–9; Affidavit of Petitioner, dated July 11, 2024
(ECF No. 49-1) at ¶¶ 17–18, 26.
To support her proposed demand, Petitioner offers several cases she deems comparable to
the instant case, where claimants received awards ranging from $180,000.00 to $200,000.00. See,
e.g., Presley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-1888V, 2020 WL 1898856 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
Mstr. Mar. 23, 2020) (awarding $180,000.00 in pain and suffering); Hood v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 16-1042V, 2021 WL 5755324 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 19, 2021) (awarding
$200,000.00 for past pain and suffering where petitioner was hospitalized for six days and
completed two rounds of IVIG treatment, inpatient rehab, outpatient PT three times a week, but
was unable to return to his position as a butcher); Clemens v. Sec’y of health & Hum. Servs, No.
19-1547V, 2022 WL 2288515 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 17, 2022) (awarding $180,000.00 in pain
and suffering where petitioner was hospitalized for six days and required treatment that included
one course of IVIG treatment; inpatient and outpatient PT, OT, and speech therapy; an x-ray, EKG,
EMG, MRI, and a lumbar puncture).
Petitioner emphasizes the similarities between her own experience and that of the Clemens
and Hood petitioners—noting their approximate one-week hospital stay, receipt of IVIG treatment,
participation in PT, OT, and speech therapy (both in an inpatient and outpatient setting for
Petitioner in the instant matter), and that all underwent extensive testing (i.e., MRI, EMG, and
lumbar puncture (although the Hood petitioner only underwent an EMG)). However, she contends
that additional factors warrant a higher pain and suffering award in this case than what was
awarded in the aforementioned cases. Specifically, Petitioner notes the importance of
consideration of a claimant’s emotional well-being when awarding pain and suffering. Here,
Petitioner’s GBS had a significant impact on her, given her young age at the time of onset and the
lasting mental effects of her GBS, which caused her to struggle anxiety and depression. Br. at 20.
Thus, Petitioner maintains an award of $225,000.00 in pain and suffering is appropriate and
reasonable based on the facts and circumstances herein. Id. at 17.
Respondent
Respondent argues for a lesser award of $100,000.00. Opp. at 18. In support, Respondent
emphasizes Petitioner’s overall limited treatment, which included a six-day hospital stay, a round
of IVIG treatments, 16 days inpatient rehab, and eight outpatient therapy sessions. See Ex. 2 at
152–53, 798; Ex. 3 at 11. He further notes that at the time of her discharge from inpatient rehab,
Petitioner reported no numbness or tingling in her lower extremities and exhibited 4/5 strength in
her bilateral lower extremities. Opp. at 18; Ex. 2 at 152–53. Moreover, records indicate that at
three months post-vaccination, Petitioner returned to volleyball practice, was participating in
tournaments, and felt approximately 80% better. Opp. at 18; Ex. 3 at 11.
4

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/09/25 Page 5 of 11
While Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner underwent 14 medical evaluations for
headaches/migraines, fevers, and/or leg pain between May 2019 and March 2023—treatments
which Petitioner considers sequela of her GBS—these encounters were focused upon unrelated
ailments. Opp. at 18. Similarly, Respondent notes that not only has Petitioner not provided any
records memorializing visits for mental health counseling, but that her pre-vaccination medical
history reflects a history of anxiety. Id.; Br. at 8; Ex. 13 at 3; Ex. 1 at 61. Respondent thus argues
that Petitioner experienced a relatively mild course of GBS without significant sequela. Opp. at
18.
To support his preferred award sum, Respondent cites Granville and Koonce, which
involved awards of $92,500.00 and $70,000.00, respectively. See Granville v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 21-2098V, 2023 WL 6441388 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 30, 2023); Koonce v.
Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-1560V, 2024 WL 3567368 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 8,
2024). In Granville, the petitioner alleged a GBS injury following receipt of a flu vaccine leading
to a five-day hospitalization, five IVIG treatments, a lumbar puncture, and minimal outpatient
treatment. Granville, 2023 WL 6441388, at *4. Although the Granville petitioner missed almost
two weeks of work, she still achieved a relatively quick and full recovery. Id. Similarly, the Koonce
petitioner required a four-day hospitalization and received four IVIG treatments, 2023 WL
3567368, at *3–4. And that petitioner reported ongoing numbness from his feet to his knees
approximately two years post-vaccination, yet such numbness “did not interfere with [petitioner’s]
physical activities such as playing racquetball.” Id. at *4. Based on the facts herein and relying on
the above-mentioned comparable cases, Respondent argues that an award of $100,000.00 in pain
and suffering is reasonable and appropriate. Opp. at 20.
III. Relevant Law on Damages Determinations
A. General Considerations
A petitioner may recover “actual unreimbursable expenses incurred before the date of
judgment awarding such expenses which (i) resulted from the vaccine-related injury for which the
petitioner seeks compensation, (ii) were incurred by or on behalf of the person who suffered such
injury, and (iii) were for diagnosis, medical or other remedial care, rehabilitation . . . determined
to be reasonably necessary.” Section 15(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). The petitioner bears the burden of proof
with respect to each element of compensation requested. Brewer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 93-0092V, 1996 Wl 147722, at *22–23 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 18, 1996).
B. Pain and Suffering
Compensation awarded pursuant to the Vaccine Act shall include “[f]or actual and
projected pain and suffering and emotional distress from the vaccine-related injury, and award not
5

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/09/25 Page 6 of 11
to exceed $250,000.000.” Section 15(a)(4). There is no mathematic formula for assigning a
monetary value to a person’s pain and suffering and emotional distress. I.D. v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 14, 2013)
(“[a]wards for emotional distress are inherently subjective and cannot be determined by using a
mathematical formula”); Stansfield v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 93-0172V, 1996 WL
300594, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 22, 1996 (“the assessment of pain and suffering is
inherently a subjective evaluation”).
Factors to be considered when determining an award for pain and suffering include: 1)
awareness of the injury; 2) severity of the injury; and 3) duration of the suffering. I.D., 2013 WL
2448125, at *9 (citing McAllister v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 91-1037V, 1993 WL
777030, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 26, 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 70
F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). I may also consider prior pain and suffering awards to aid my
resolution of the appropriate amount of compensation for pain and suffering in this case. See, e.g.,
Doe 34 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 87 Fed. Cl. 758, 768 (2009) (finding that “there is
nothing improper in the chief special master’s decision to refer to damages for pain and suffering
awarded in other cases as an aid in determining the proper amount of damages in this case.”). And
of course, I may rely on my own experienced adjudicating similar claims. Hodges v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Congress contemplated that
the special masters would use their accumulated expertise in the field of vaccine injuries to judge
the merits of individual claims.
Although pain and suffering in the past was often determined based on a continuum, as
Respondent argues, that practice was cast into doubt by a decision from several years ago. Graves
v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 109 Fed. Cl. 579 (Fed. Cl. 2013). Graves maintained that to do
so resulted in “the forcing of all suffering awards into a global comparative scale in which the
individual petitioner’s suffering is compared to the most extreme cases and reduced accordingly.”
Id. at 590. Instead, Graves assessed pain and suffering by looking to the record evidence, prior
pain and suffering awards within the Vaccine Program, and a survey of similar injury claims
outside of the Vaccine Program. Id. at 595. Under this alternative approach, the statutory cap
merely cuts off higher pain and suffering awards—it does not shrink the magnitude of all possible
awards as falling within a spectrum that ends at the cap. Although Graves is not controlling of the
outcome in this case, it provides reasoned guidance in calculating pain and suffering awards.
C. Pain and Suffering in GBS Cases
Because Table claims alleging GBS after receipt of the flu vaccine are common in the SPU,
I include herein some discussion of the kinds of pain and suffering awards obtained in such cases.
As of July 1, 2024, on nearly every occasion that SPU has had to resolve the appropriate award for
GBS pain and suffering (49 cases), over $100,000.00 has been awarded in every case but one (and
6

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/09/25 Page 7 of 11
there only the slightly lesser sum of $92,500.00 was awarded). The first-quartile value is
$155,000.00, the median is $165,000.00, the third-quartile value is $178,000.00, and the largest
award was $192,500.00. Holmberg v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-1132V, 2024 WL
4607929, at *3–5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 7, 2024).
A consistent starting consideration in reaching these determinations is that “GBS pain and
suffering awards generally should be higher than those awarded to petitioners who have suffered
a less frightening and physically alarming injury, such as SIRVA.”3 Gross v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 19-0835V, 2021 WL 2666685, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 11, 2021); see
also Castellanos v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 19-1710V, 2022 WL 1482497, at *10 (Fed.
Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 30, 2022) (emphasizing recognition of “the seriousness of GBS as a general
matter,” in awarding a six-figure sum); Voeller v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1526V,
2023 WL 5019830, at *10 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 6, 2023) (noting GBS’s “frightening” nature).
But of course, not every GBS case is equally severe. Further details of the initial medical
course are considered—including any mistake or delay in diagnosing GBS; any in-patient
hospitalization and/or in-patient rehabilitation (and the duration of any such stays); diagnostic
procedures (e.g., bloodwork, lumbar punctures, electrodiagnostic studies, imaging); the severity
of symptoms at their nadir (e.g., involving incontinence or respiratory failure); the extent and
effectiveness of treatment (e.g., IVIg plasmapheresis, pain medications); other interventions (e.g.,
feeding tubes, breathing tubes, catheterization); and any complications (e.g., sepsis during
hospitalization).
Also relevant is a petitioner’s long-term course—as evidenced by out-patient therapies,
neurology evaluations, and other medical appointments concerning GBS; the results of repeat
electrodiagnostic studies and other relevant tests; medical providers’ assessments of the degree of
recovery achieved; ongoing reliance on assistive devices and medications; and relevant treatment
gaps. Previous opinions have recognized that “a substantial recovery does not mean that [an
individual] has fully recovered from his GBS and has no ongoing sequelae. It is common for
petitioners to experience ongoing symptoms of GBS, such as numbness and fatigue, even with a
good recovery.” Elenteny v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 19-1972V, 2023 WL 2447498, at
*5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 10, 2023). But symptoms of that nature are typically folded into a
“typical” past pain and suffering award, and will not justify a future component. See, e.g., id; Miller
v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-1559V, 2023 WL 2474322, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Feb. 10, 2023).
“The mere fact that a claimant had pre-vaccination comorbidities does not per se diminish
the impact of [the vaccine injury] on his life—especially one as alarming and potentially life-
altering as GBS—and therefore is not alone reason for a lower award.” Bircheat v. Sec’y of Health
3 Should injury related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”) is another Table injury. 42 C.F.R. §§ 100.3(a), (c)(10).
7

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/09/25 Page 8 of 11
& Hum. Servs., No. 19-1088V, 2021 WL 3026880, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 16, 2021).
However, a special master is statutorily required to consider to what extent a petitioner’s pain and
suffering is truly “from the vaccine-related injury,” Section 15(a)(4) (emphasis added), and nor
from any unrelated preexisting or subsequently-developed medical issues. See, e.g., Bircheat, 2021
WL 3026880, at *4; Gross, 2021 WL 2666685, at *5.
Also worthy of consideration are the injury’s impact on a petitioner’s personal
circumstances including his or her family and other personal obligations, and professional life
(whether or not lost wages are directly claimed). All of these facts are primarily gleaned from the
medical records—although sworn statements and/or other evidence may also be considered,
especially if they supplement, and do not contradict, the facts reflected in the medical records.
ANALYSIS
In this case, awareness of the injury is not disputed. Although not yet an adult, the record
reflects that at all times Petitioner was a competent teenager with no mental impairments that
would impact her awareness of her injury. Therefore, I analyze principally the severity and
duration of Petitioner’s injury. In performing this analysis, I have reviewed the record as a whole,
including the medical records, affidavits, and all assertions made by the parties in written
documents. I have also considered prior awards for pain and suffering issued in comparable cases,
although I ultimately base my determination on the circumstances of this case.
Here, Petitioner’s medical records and affidavits provide a substantive overview of her
GBS injury, with a moderately-severe acute phase requiring an emergency department visit within
approximately one month of vaccination; a six-day hospitalization; extensive PT (both inpatient
and outpatient), OT (inpatient and outpatient), and speech therapy; invasive testing including a
nerve conduction study, MRIs of her brain and spine, an unsuccessful lumbar puncture; and IVIG
treatment. Petitioner showed and reported some improvement after her initial treatment course.
See Ex. 2 at 798. However, the suffering Petitioner suffered during the acute phase of her GBS
illness was certainly exacerbated by some of the more unusual symptoms she experienced—
including becoming “intermittently hypertensive,” “develop[ing] slight chewing difficulty and
facial muscle involvement,” and requiring a peripheral IV.” Id. at 798, 804.
The record further demonstrates that following her discharge from outpatient PT and to her
home exercise program and personal trainer on February 28, 2019, Petitioner continued to “work
on building [her] endurance,” and reported feeling “80% better overall” despite her jumping ability
remaining only “55-60% improved.” Ex. 3 at 11. Thereafter, between October 2019 and November
2022, Petitioner had multiple visits with various providers regarding her gait, feelings of fatigue,
and lower extremity weakness. See, e.g., Ex. 6 at 29, 30 (noting Petitioner’s “gait instability had
not resolved since her GBS episode” during 10/23/2019 visit with Tida Lam, D.O.); Ex. 4 at 7
8

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/09/25 Page 9 of 11
(documenting visit with Dr. Scheaffer on 11/20/2019 and noting Petitioner’s complaints that her
“legs do [not] feels the same as before” and it is “as if she is ‘relearning how to walk”), 33
(reporting that her legs do not respond as they did prior to vaccination during 10/30/2022 visit);
Ex. 12 at 15 (complaining of “throbbing pain” in legs at 11/7/2022 visit). Nevertheless, the record
establishes that Petitioner’s recovery was largely good, and with no truly permanent deficits—
albeit characterized by the kinds of post-injury sequelae common to GBS patients.
I also give weight to circumstances particular to Petitioner’s case, such as the negative
effect of her GBS illness on her academic and athletic career and aspirations. Here, Petitioner was
15-years-old at the time of vaccination, a sophomore in high school, and an avid volleyball
player—participating on both her school and club teams. And the record demonstrates that prior
to her illness, Petitioner was a talented student and volleyball player. Affidavit of Allison Williams,
dated July 11, 2024 (ECF No. 49-2) (“Mother Aff.”) at ¶¶ 4, 13. However, the record further
supports that Petitioner’s academic and athletic success was impacted by her GBS illness, as she
not only missed “a majority of her spring semester” of her sophomore year, but she was unable to
return to play on her school’s volleyball and track and field teams—participating only on her club
team but in a very limited capacity. Id. at ¶ 14. Furthermore, Petitioner was granted several
accommodations and exempt for exams upon her return to class.
Based upon the forgoing, and considering the parties’ written arguments, I find that
Petitioner suffered a moderate GBS injury—although as a class, GBS injuries are distinguishable
from many other kinds of common Program vaccine injuries. Gross, 2021 WL 2666685, at *5.
Under such circumstances, an award higher than what Respondent proposes is appropriate—but
also lower than what Petitioner requests. I would generally award pain and suffering in excess of
$200,000.00 in a GBS case only where it had been shown that the claimant was left with a
permanent and life-altering physical deficit that could not be effectively treated, leaving the
individual only palliative care options. Kresl v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-0518V,
2024 WL 1931498, *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 1, 2024) (stating that “I may approach or surpass
an award of $200,000.00 for GBS pain and suffering in future cases [where] compelling facts
particularly of severe GBS residual effects” exists). In addition, other than the Petitioner’s age
(which I do give some weight to in my determination), this case does not present the kind of special
factors—like impact on a claimant’s ability to work at their favored employment position—that
have resulted in awards in the $180,000.00 range. See Dillenbeck v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 17-428V, 2019 WL 4072069, at *14 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 29, 2019). Petitioner has some
post-injury sequelae, but it cannot be concluded from the record that they will be permanent in her
life.
Here, an award somewhat below $180,000.00 is most appropriate. I find two cases not
referenced by either side particularly instructive. See Weidner v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 21-1554V, 2023 WL 8110729 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 13, 2023) (awarding $163,000.00 for
9

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/09/25 Page 10 of 11
pain and suffering); Maxwell v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-1877V, 2024 WL 1343007
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 27, 2024) (awarding $140,000.00 for pain and suffering).
In Weidner, the petitioner was 19-years-old, working as a nursing assistance/aide, and had
a one-year-old child at the time of vaccination. 2023 WL 8110729, at *1. She similarly presented
to an ER within one month of vaccination, remained in the hospital for six-days, underwent
multiple diagnostic procedures (i.e., MRIs, an EMG, CT, lumbar puncture, and one five-day course
of IVIG), as well as participated in in-home PT/OT. Id. at *4. Approximately two months after her
hospital discharge, the Weidner petitioner exhibited normal strength and DTRs—although I found
her assertions of continued ongoing sequelae of GBS, such as numbness and tingling throughout
her body, to be credible. Id. Here, I acknowledge that Petitioner was not a mother to a one-year-
old child at the time of vaccination, nor was she working in the same capacity as the Weidner
petitioner. However, both petitioners were young and in school (high school and nursing school)
at the time, had to take leave from school (including work for the Weidner petitioner) because of
their injury, and they returned to their academic and professional obligations in a more limited
capacity as they were unable to perform their duties as they did prior to receipt of their subject
vaccines.4
Maxwell involved a17-year-old high school student who dreamed of playing lacrosse at a
collegiate level and becoming a Navy Seal. 2024 WL 1343007, at *2. The petitioner was
hospitalized for nine days, during which time he received a five-day course of IVIG and required
PT, OT, and speech therapy. Id. at *4. He was subsequently transferred to an inpatient rehab
facility for seven days and then completed three outpatient PT sessions before being “cleared for
‘a gradual return to his sport.’” Id. The Maxwell petitioner returned to school approximately two
and a half months post-vaccination, albeit pursuant to an individual accommodation plan. Id.
However, I “recognize[d] that any heightened difficulty or complete loss of an opportunity is
disappointing” and noting further that “the timing of Petitioner’s GBS illness, during his crucial
junior year of high school, no doubt caused him additional anguish and frustration.” Id.
Accordingly, I find an award above Weidner appropriate, to account for Petitioner’s
personal considerations and the toll such a frightening injury had upon her. I therefore award
$170,000.00 in actual pain and suffering.
CONCLUSION
Based on the record as a whole and arguments of the parties, I award Petitioner a lump sum
payment of $171,885.19 (representing $170,000.00 for Petitioner’s past pain and suffering, and
4 I note, however, that the Weidner petitioner was able to return to work within a few months of onset, whereas, here,
Petitioner’s affidavit demonstrates that she had to miss a majority of her spring semester before returning to class.
10

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/09/25 Page 11 of 11
$1,885.19 for past unreimbursed medical expenses), to be paid through an ACH deposit to
Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement. This amount represents
compensation for all damages that would be available under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a).
In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the Clerk of the
Court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with the terms of this Decision.5
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
5 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment if (jointly or separately) they file notices
renouncing their right to seek review.
11

================================================================================
DOCUMENT 3: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01606-2
Date issued/filed: 2025-04-15
Pages: 11
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 03/12/2025) regarding 55 DECISION of Special Master. Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (mva) Service on parties made.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 63 Filed 04/15/25 Page 1 of 11
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 21-1606V
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*
TAYLOR WILLIAMS, * Chief Special Master Corcoran
*
*
Petitioner, * Filed: March 12, 2025
*
v. *
*
SECRETARY OF HEALTH *
AND HUMAN SERVICES, *
*
Respondent. *
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Nancy R. Meyers, Turning Point Litigation, Greensboro, NC, for Petitioner.
Colleen C. Hartley, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DAMAGES DECISION1
On July 22, 2021, Taylor Williams filed a petition for compensation under the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the “Vaccine Program”).2 Petition (ECF No. 1) at 1.
Petitioner alleged the Table Claim that an influenza (“flu”) vaccine she received on November 26,
2018, caused her to incur Guillain-Barré syndrome (“GBS”). Id. The matter was originally
assigned to the Special Processing Unit (the “SPU”), but the parties could not resolve the claim.
After the case was transferred out of SPU and to my individual docket, I determined Petitioner was
entitled to damages. See Ruling on Entitlement, dated Apr. 29, 2024 (ECF No. 43) (the
“Entitlement Ruling”).
1 Under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen (14) days within which to request redaction “of any information
furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or
confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the whole Decision will be available to the public
in its present form. Id.
2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660,
100 Stat. 3758, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 through 34 (2012) [hereinafter “Vaccine Act” or “the
Act”]. Individual section references hereafter will be to § 300aa of the Act (but will omit that statutory prefix).

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 63 Filed 04/15/25 Page 2 of 11
The parties were also unable to resolve damages on their own, and have now briefed their
respective positions. Petitioner’s Damages Brief, dated Aug. 13, 2024 (ECF No. 51) (“Br.”);
Respondent’s Brief on Damages, dated Oct. 22, 2024 (ECF No. 53) (“Opp.”); Petitioner’s Reply,
dated Nov. 19, 2024 (ECF No. 54) (“Reply”).
For the reasons set forth in greater detail below, I find that Petitioner is entitled to an
award of damages in the amount of $171,885.19, representing $170,000.00 for actual pain and
suffering, plus $1,885.19 in unreimbursed out-of-pocket expenses.
I. Brief Factual Summary
A more complete summary of the relevant medical history and factual background is
contained in the entitlement decision. See generally Entitlement Ruling at 2–4. I incorporate that
history herein. In short, Petitioner successfully established entitlement to damages for a Table-
GBS post-vaccination injury. Id. at 9.
On November 26, 2018, Petitioner (then 15-years-old), received the subject flu vaccine (as
well as another vaccine not herein alleged as causal of injury). Id. at 2; Ex. 1 at 74, 79–80. A
neurological exam performed at that time yielded normal results. Petitioner was taken to the
WakeMed Raleigh emergency department on January 2, 2019, thirty-seven days post-vaccination,
reporting numbness in her legs and fingers over the past two days and noting her previously
diagnosed bronchitis and antibiotic course. Entitlement Ruling at 2; Ex. 2 at 768–70. An exam
revealed lower extremity strength with diminished reflexes. Id.
Following admission for further neurologic evaluation, Petitioner underwent MRIs of her
spine and brain—both of which were unremarkable—as well as a nerve conduction study that
showed evidence of left tibial neuropathy with both axonal and demyelinating features. Ex. 2 at
799, 800. Petitioner’s treating neurologist opined that her overall clinical picture was most
consistent with GBS, although the clinical and testing results were not quite enough to confirm the
diagnosis. Entitlement Ruling at 3. Petitioner subsequently received a course of IVIG. Id.; Ex. 2 at
814. Petitioner was discharged on January 8, 2019, to an inpatient rehabilitation facility with a
diagnosis of GBS (although the nature of her presentation was not deemed consistent with the
“classic” definition of GBS). Entitlement Ruling at 3; Ex. 2 at 798.
Petitioner completed inpatient rehabilitation and was discharged on January 24, 2019.
Entitlement Ruling at 3; Ex. 2 at 152–53. Records indicate that following the completion of her
inpatient rehab, Petitioner was able to participate in school sports, but at a much more limited
capacity, and that she no longer experienced numbness or tingling in her lower extremities, and
even displayed moderate to full strength in her bilateral lower extremities. Id. She further
participated in eight outpatient physical therapy (“PT”) sessions, through February 28, 2019, and
2

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 63 Filed 04/15/25 Page 3 of 11
was deemed to have met her goals and discharged home with a home exercise program.
Entitlement Ruling at 3; Ex. 3 at 11.
On March 20, 2019, Petitioner saw Dr. Traci Sheaffer, a pediatric neurologist. Ex. 4 at 2.
A neurological examination was deemed normal, but for consistently absent deep tendon reflexes.
Dr. Sheaffer advised Petitioner to continue working with a personal trainer on her deficits and to
follow up for future neurologic treatment. Entitlement Ruling at 3; Ex. 4 at 2–5.
The records establish that Petitioner continued to seek additional medical treatment
throughout the remainder of 2019, both for her post-GBS sequelae a well as for unrelated matters.
Entitlement Ruling at 3; Ex. 4 at 7–10, 12–16, 21, 23, 28; Ex. 10 at 8–11. By October 2020,
Petitioner was still reporting some motor deficits thought to be related to her GBS, but her
headaches had improved—leading Dr. Sheaffer to propose additional PT for continued strength
building.
II. Parties’ Arguments
The parties agree that Petitioner is entitled to $1,885.19 for past unreimbursed medical
expenses. Br. at 20–21; Opp. at 1 n.1. Thus, the only matter to be determined is the appropriate
amount of a pain and suffering award.
Petitioner
Petitioner requests $225,000.00 in actual pain and suffering, emphasizing that she
experienced a severe GBS injury which was “profoundly and uniquely impactful due to her young
age.” Br. at 11. Throughout the course of her hospitalization and subsequent treatment, Petitioner
underwent an IVIG treatment; physical, occupational, and speech therapy; a lumbar puncture; an
MRI of her spine and brain; and a nerve conduction study. Id.; Ex. 2 at 798, 825, 833, 851, 917.
But despite this significant treatment course, she remained “severely below baseline” at the time
of her discharge—including struggles with certain activities of daily living, difficulty with speech
and swallowing, as well as limitations to her strength and range of motion. Br. at 11; Ex. 2 at 825,
833, 851, 881.
Although Petitioner acknowledges that by October 2019, her gait instability had essentially
resolved when contrasted with her onset, she maintains that some of her GBS-related symptoms
have persisted—noting that her legs do not respond the way they did prior to her GBS onset, she
is more fatigued, and that she can only do a fraction of the physical activity she could prior to her
GBS. Br. at 8. Moreover, Petitioner argues that her GBS “severely impacted” her emotional
wellbeing, and that despite counseling she continues to struggle with “severe social anxiety” and
3

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 63 Filed 04/15/25 Page 4 of 11
has even dropped out of college as a result. Id. at 8–9; Affidavit of Petitioner, dated July 11, 2024
(ECF No. 49-1) at ¶¶ 17–18, 26.
To support her proposed demand, Petitioner offers several cases she deems comparable to
the instant case, where claimants received awards ranging from $180,000.00 to $200,000.00. See,
e.g., Presley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-1888V, 2020 WL 1898856 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
Mstr. Mar. 23, 2020) (awarding $180,000.00 in pain and suffering); Hood v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 16-1042V, 2021 WL 5755324 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 19, 2021) (awarding
$200,000.00 for past pain and suffering where petitioner was hospitalized for six days and
completed two rounds of IVIG treatment, inpatient rehab, outpatient PT three times a week, but
was unable to return to his position as a butcher); Clemens v. Sec’y of health & Hum. Servs, No.
19-1547V, 2022 WL 2288515 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 17, 2022) (awarding $180,000.00 in pain
and suffering where petitioner was hospitalized for six days and required treatment that included
one course of IVIG treatment; inpatient and outpatient PT, OT, and speech therapy; an x-ray, EKG,
EMG, MRI, and a lumbar puncture).
Petitioner emphasizes the similarities between her own experience and that of the Clemens
and Hood petitioners—noting their approximate one-week hospital stay, receipt of IVIG treatment,
participation in PT, OT, and speech therapy (both in an inpatient and outpatient setting for
Petitioner in the instant matter), and that all underwent extensive testing (i.e., MRI, EMG, and
lumbar puncture (although the Hood petitioner only underwent an EMG)). However, she contends
that additional factors warrant a higher pain and suffering award in this case than what was
awarded in the aforementioned cases. Specifically, Petitioner notes the importance of
consideration of a claimant’s emotional well-being when awarding pain and suffering. Here,
Petitioner’s GBS had a significant impact on her, given her young age at the time of onset and the
lasting mental effects of her GBS, which caused her to struggle anxiety and depression. Br. at 20.
Thus, Petitioner maintains an award of $225,000.00 in pain and suffering is appropriate and
reasonable based on the facts and circumstances herein. Id. at 17.
Respondent
Respondent argues for a lesser award of $100,000.00. Opp. at 18. In support, Respondent
emphasizes Petitioner’s overall limited treatment, which included a six-day hospital stay, a round
of IVIG treatments, 16 days inpatient rehab, and eight outpatient therapy sessions. See Ex. 2 at
152–53, 798; Ex. 3 at 11. He further notes that at the time of her discharge from inpatient rehab,
Petitioner reported no numbness or tingling in her lower extremities and exhibited 4/5 strength in
her bilateral lower extremities. Opp. at 18; Ex. 2 at 152–53. Moreover, records indicate that at
three months post-vaccination, Petitioner returned to volleyball practice, was participating in
tournaments, and felt approximately 80% better. Opp. at 18; Ex. 3 at 11.
4

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 63 Filed 04/15/25 Page 5 of 11
While Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner underwent 14 medical evaluations for
headaches/migraines, fevers, and/or leg pain between May 2019 and March 2023—treatments
which Petitioner considers sequela of her GBS—these encounters were focused upon unrelated
ailments. Opp. at 18. Similarly, Respondent notes that not only has Petitioner not provided any
records memorializing visits for mental health counseling, but that her pre-vaccination medical
history reflects a history of anxiety. Id.; Br. at 8; Ex. 13 at 3; Ex. 1 at 61. Respondent thus argues
that Petitioner experienced a relatively mild course of GBS without significant sequela. Opp. at
18.
To support his preferred award sum, Respondent cites Granville and Koonce, which
involved awards of $92,500.00 and $70,000.00, respectively. See Granville v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 21-2098V, 2023 WL 6441388 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 30, 2023); Koonce v.
Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-1560V, 2024 WL 3567368 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 8,
2024). In Granville, the petitioner alleged a GBS injury following receipt of a flu vaccine leading
to a five-day hospitalization, five IVIG treatments, a lumbar puncture, and minimal outpatient
treatment. Granville, 2023 WL 6441388, at *4. Although the Granville petitioner missed almost
two weeks of work, she still achieved a relatively quick and full recovery. Id. Similarly, the Koonce
petitioner required a four-day hospitalization and received four IVIG treatments, 2023 WL
3567368, at *3–4. And that petitioner reported ongoing numbness from his feet to his knees
approximately two years post-vaccination, yet such numbness “did not interfere with [petitioner’s]
physical activities such as playing racquetball.” Id. at *4. Based on the facts herein and relying on
the above-mentioned comparable cases, Respondent argues that an award of $100,000.00 in pain
and suffering is reasonable and appropriate. Opp. at 20.
III. Relevant Law on Damages Determinations
A. General Considerations
A petitioner may recover “actual unreimbursable expenses incurred before the date of
judgment awarding such expenses which (i) resulted from the vaccine-related injury for which the
petitioner seeks compensation, (ii) were incurred by or on behalf of the person who suffered such
injury, and (iii) were for diagnosis, medical or other remedial care, rehabilitation . . . determined
to be reasonably necessary.” Section 15(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). The petitioner bears the burden of proof
with respect to each element of compensation requested. Brewer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 93-0092V, 1996 Wl 147722, at *22–23 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 18, 1996).
B. Pain and Suffering
Compensation awarded pursuant to the Vaccine Act shall include “[f]or actual and
projected pain and suffering and emotional distress from the vaccine-related injury, and award not
5

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 63 Filed 04/15/25 Page 6 of 11
to exceed $250,000.000.” Section 15(a)(4). There is no mathematic formula for assigning a
monetary value to a person’s pain and suffering and emotional distress. I.D. v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 14, 2013)
(“[a]wards for emotional distress are inherently subjective and cannot be determined by using a
mathematical formula”); Stansfield v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 93-0172V, 1996 WL
300594, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 22, 1996 (“the assessment of pain and suffering is
inherently a subjective evaluation”).
Factors to be considered when determining an award for pain and suffering include: 1)
awareness of the injury; 2) severity of the injury; and 3) duration of the suffering. I.D., 2013 WL
2448125, at *9 (citing McAllister v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 91-1037V, 1993 WL
777030, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 26, 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 70
F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). I may also consider prior pain and suffering awards to aid my
resolution of the appropriate amount of compensation for pain and suffering in this case. See, e.g.,
Doe 34 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 87 Fed. Cl. 758, 768 (2009) (finding that “there is
nothing improper in the chief special master’s decision to refer to damages for pain and suffering
awarded in other cases as an aid in determining the proper amount of damages in this case.”). And
of course, I may rely on my own experienced adjudicating similar claims. Hodges v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Congress contemplated that
the special masters would use their accumulated expertise in the field of vaccine injuries to judge
the merits of individual claims.
Although pain and suffering in the past was often determined based on a continuum, as
Respondent argues, that practice was cast into doubt by a decision from several years ago. Graves
v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 109 Fed. Cl. 579 (Fed. Cl. 2013). Graves maintained that to do
so resulted in “the forcing of all suffering awards into a global comparative scale in which the
individual petitioner’s suffering is compared to the most extreme cases and reduced accordingly.”
Id. at 590. Instead, Graves assessed pain and suffering by looking to the record evidence, prior
pain and suffering awards within the Vaccine Program, and a survey of similar injury claims
outside of the Vaccine Program. Id. at 595. Under this alternative approach, the statutory cap
merely cuts off higher pain and suffering awards—it does not shrink the magnitude of all possible
awards as falling within a spectrum that ends at the cap. Although Graves is not controlling of the
outcome in this case, it provides reasoned guidance in calculating pain and suffering awards.
C. Pain and Suffering in GBS Cases
Because Table claims alleging GBS after receipt of the flu vaccine are common in the SPU,
I include herein some discussion of the kinds of pain and suffering awards obtained in such cases.
As of July 1, 2024, on nearly every occasion that SPU has had to resolve the appropriate award for
GBS pain and suffering (49 cases), over $100,000.00 has been awarded in every case but one (and
6

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 63 Filed 04/15/25 Page 7 of 11
there only the slightly lesser sum of $92,500.00 was awarded). The first-quartile value is
$155,000.00, the median is $165,000.00, the third-quartile value is $178,000.00, and the largest
award was $192,500.00. Holmberg v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-1132V, 2024 WL
4607929, at *3–5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 7, 2024).
A consistent starting consideration in reaching these determinations is that “GBS pain and
suffering awards generally should be higher than those awarded to petitioners who have suffered
a less frightening and physically alarming injury, such as SIRVA.”3 Gross v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 19-0835V, 2021 WL 2666685, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 11, 2021); see
also Castellanos v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 19-1710V, 2022 WL 1482497, at *10 (Fed.
Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 30, 2022) (emphasizing recognition of “the seriousness of GBS as a general
matter,” in awarding a six-figure sum); Voeller v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1526V,
2023 WL 5019830, at *10 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 6, 2023) (noting GBS’s “frightening” nature).
But of course, not every GBS case is equally severe. Further details of the initial medical
course are considered—including any mistake or delay in diagnosing GBS; any in-patient
hospitalization and/or in-patient rehabilitation (and the duration of any such stays); diagnostic
procedures (e.g., bloodwork, lumbar punctures, electrodiagnostic studies, imaging); the severity
of symptoms at their nadir (e.g., involving incontinence or respiratory failure); the extent and
effectiveness of treatment (e.g., IVIg plasmapheresis, pain medications); other interventions (e.g.,
feeding tubes, breathing tubes, catheterization); and any complications (e.g., sepsis during
hospitalization).
Also relevant is a petitioner’s long-term course—as evidenced by out-patient therapies,
neurology evaluations, and other medical appointments concerning GBS; the results of repeat
electrodiagnostic studies and other relevant tests; medical providers’ assessments of the degree of
recovery achieved; ongoing reliance on assistive devices and medications; and relevant treatment
gaps. Previous opinions have recognized that “a substantial recovery does not mean that [an
individual] has fully recovered from his GBS and has no ongoing sequelae. It is common for
petitioners to experience ongoing symptoms of GBS, such as numbness and fatigue, even with a
good recovery.” Elenteny v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 19-1972V, 2023 WL 2447498, at
*5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 10, 2023). But symptoms of that nature are typically folded into a
“typical” past pain and suffering award, and will not justify a future component. See, e.g., id; Miller
v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-1559V, 2023 WL 2474322, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Feb. 10, 2023).
“The mere fact that a claimant had pre-vaccination comorbidities does not per se diminish
the impact of [the vaccine injury] on his life—especially one as alarming and potentially life-
altering as GBS—and therefore is not alone reason for a lower award.” Bircheat v. Sec’y of Health
3 Should injury related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”) is another Table injury. 42 C.F.R. §§ 100.3(a), (c)(10).
7

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 63 Filed 04/15/25 Page 8 of 11
& Hum. Servs., No. 19-1088V, 2021 WL 3026880, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 16, 2021).
However, a special master is statutorily required to consider to what extent a petitioner’s pain and
suffering is truly “from the vaccine-related injury,” Section 15(a)(4) (emphasis added), and nor
from any unrelated preexisting or subsequently-developed medical issues. See, e.g., Bircheat, 2021
WL 3026880, at *4; Gross, 2021 WL 2666685, at *5.
Also worthy of consideration are the injury’s impact on a petitioner’s personal
circumstances including his or her family and other personal obligations, and professional life
(whether or not lost wages are directly claimed). All of these facts are primarily gleaned from the
medical records—although sworn statements and/or other evidence may also be considered,
especially if they supplement, and do not contradict, the facts reflected in the medical records.
ANALYSIS
In this case, awareness of the injury is not disputed. Although not yet an adult, the record
reflects that at all times Petitioner was a competent teenager with no mental impairments that
would impact her awareness of her injury. Therefore, I analyze principally the severity and
duration of Petitioner’s injury. In performing this analysis, I have reviewed the record as a whole,
including the medical records, affidavits, and all assertions made by the parties in written
documents. I have also considered prior awards for pain and suffering issued in comparable cases,
although I ultimately base my determination on the circumstances of this case.
Here, Petitioner’s medical records and affidavits provide a substantive overview of her
GBS injury, with a moderately-severe acute phase requiring an emergency department visit within
approximately one month of vaccination; a six-day hospitalization; extensive PT (both inpatient
and outpatient), OT (inpatient and outpatient), and speech therapy; invasive testing including a
nerve conduction study, MRIs of her brain and spine, an unsuccessful lumbar puncture; and IVIG
treatment. Petitioner showed and reported some improvement after her initial treatment course.
See Ex. 2 at 798. However, the suffering Petitioner suffered during the acute phase of her GBS
illness was certainly exacerbated by some of the more unusual symptoms she experienced—
including becoming “intermittently hypertensive,” “develop[ing] slight chewing difficulty and
facial muscle involvement,” and requiring a peripheral IV.” Id. at 798, 804.
The record further demonstrates that following her discharge from outpatient PT and to her
home exercise program and personal trainer on February 28, 2019, Petitioner continued to “work
on building [her] endurance,” and reported feeling “80% better overall” despite her jumping ability
remaining only “55-60% improved.” Ex. 3 at 11. Thereafter, between October 2019 and November
2022, Petitioner had multiple visits with various providers regarding her gait, feelings of fatigue,
and lower extremity weakness. See, e.g., Ex. 6 at 29, 30 (noting Petitioner’s “gait instability had
not resolved since her GBS episode” during 10/23/2019 visit with Tida Lam, D.O.); Ex. 4 at 7
8

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 63 Filed 04/15/25 Page 9 of 11
(documenting visit with Dr. Scheaffer on 11/20/2019 and noting Petitioner’s complaints that her
“legs do [not] feels the same as before” and it is “as if she is ‘relearning how to walk”), 33
(reporting that her legs do not respond as they did prior to vaccination during 10/30/2022 visit);
Ex. 12 at 15 (complaining of “throbbing pain” in legs at 11/7/2022 visit). Nevertheless, the record
establishes that Petitioner’s recovery was largely good, and with no truly permanent deficits—
albeit characterized by the kinds of post-injury sequelae common to GBS patients.
I also give weight to circumstances particular to Petitioner’s case, such as the negative
effect of her GBS illness on her academic and athletic career and aspirations. Here, Petitioner was
15-years-old at the time of vaccination, a sophomore in high school, and an avid volleyball
player—participating on both her school and club teams. And the record demonstrates that prior
to her illness, Petitioner was a talented student and volleyball player. Affidavit of Allison Williams,
dated July 11, 2024 (ECF No. 49-2) (“Mother Aff.”) at ¶¶ 4, 13. However, the record further
supports that Petitioner’s academic and athletic success was impacted by her GBS illness, as she
not only missed “a majority of her spring semester” of her sophomore year, but she was unable to
return to play on her school’s volleyball and track and field teams—participating only on her club
team but in a very limited capacity. Id. at ¶ 14. Furthermore, Petitioner was granted several
accommodations and exempt for exams upon her return to class.
Based upon the forgoing, and considering the parties’ written arguments, I find that
Petitioner suffered a moderate GBS injury—although as a class, GBS injuries are distinguishable
from many other kinds of common Program vaccine injuries. Gross, 2021 WL 2666685, at *5.
Under such circumstances, an award higher than what Respondent proposes is appropriate—but
also lower than what Petitioner requests. I would generally award pain and suffering in excess of
$200,000.00 in a GBS case only where it had been shown that the claimant was left with a
permanent and life-altering physical deficit that could not be effectively treated, leaving the
individual only palliative care options. Kresl v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-0518V,
2024 WL 1931498, *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 1, 2024) (stating that “I may approach or surpass
an award of $200,000.00 for GBS pain and suffering in future cases [where] compelling facts
particularly of severe GBS residual effects” exists). In addition, other than the Petitioner’s age
(which I do give some weight to in my determination), this case does not present the kind of special
factors—like impact on a claimant’s ability to work at their favored employment position—that
have resulted in awards in the $180,000.00 range. See Dillenbeck v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 17-428V, 2019 WL 4072069, at *14 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 29, 2019). Petitioner has some
post-injury sequelae, but it cannot be concluded from the record that they will be permanent in her
life.
Here, an award somewhat below $180,000.00 is most appropriate. I find two cases not
referenced by either side particularly instructive. See Weidner v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 21-1554V, 2023 WL 8110729 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 13, 2023) (awarding $163,000.00 for
9

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 63 Filed 04/15/25 Page 10 of 11
pain and suffering); Maxwell v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-1877V, 2024 WL 1343007
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 27, 2024) (awarding $140,000.00 for pain and suffering).
In Weidner, the petitioner was 19-years-old, working as a nursing assistance/aide, and had
a one-year-old child at the time of vaccination. 2023 WL 8110729, at *1. She similarly presented
to an ER within one month of vaccination, remained in the hospital for six-days, underwent
multiple diagnostic procedures (i.e., MRIs, an EMG, CT, lumbar puncture, and one five-day course
of IVIG), as well as participated in in-home PT/OT. Id. at *4. Approximately two months after her
hospital discharge, the Weidner petitioner exhibited normal strength and DTRs—although I found
her assertions of continued ongoing sequelae of GBS, such as numbness and tingling throughout
her body, to be credible. Id. Here, I acknowledge that Petitioner was not a mother to a one-year-
old child at the time of vaccination, nor was she working in the same capacity as the Weidner
petitioner. However, both petitioners were young and in school (high school and nursing school)
at the time, had to take leave from school (including work for the Weidner petitioner) because of
their injury, and they returned to their academic and professional obligations in a more limited
capacity as they were unable to perform their duties as they did prior to receipt of their subject
vaccines.4
Maxwell involved a17-year-old high school student who dreamed of playing lacrosse at a
collegiate level and becoming a Navy Seal. 2024 WL 1343007, at *2. The petitioner was
hospitalized for nine days, during which time he received a five-day course of IVIG and required
PT, OT, and speech therapy. Id. at *4. He was subsequently transferred to an inpatient rehab
facility for seven days and then completed three outpatient PT sessions before being “cleared for
‘a gradual return to his sport.’” Id. The Maxwell petitioner returned to school approximately two
and a half months post-vaccination, albeit pursuant to an individual accommodation plan. Id.
However, I “recognize[d] that any heightened difficulty or complete loss of an opportunity is
disappointing” and noting further that “the timing of Petitioner’s GBS illness, during his crucial
junior year of high school, no doubt caused him additional anguish and frustration.” Id.
Accordingly, I find an award above Weidner appropriate, to account for Petitioner’s
personal considerations and the toll such a frightening injury had upon her. I therefore award
$170,000.00 in actual pain and suffering.
CONCLUSION
Based on the record as a whole and arguments of the parties, I award Petitioner a lump sum
payment of $171,885.19 (representing $170,000.00 for Petitioner’s past pain and suffering, and
4 I note, however, that the Weidner petitioner was able to return to work within a few months of onset, whereas, here,
Petitioner’s affidavit demonstrates that she had to miss a majority of her spring semester before returning to class.
10

Case 1:21-vv-01606-UNJ Document 63 Filed 04/15/25 Page 11 of 11
$1,885.19 for past unreimbursed medical expenses), to be paid through an ACH deposit to
Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement. This amount represents
compensation for all damages that would be available under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a).
In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the Clerk of the
Court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with the terms of this Decision.5
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
5 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment if (jointly or separately) they file notices
renouncing their right to seek review.
11

================================================================================
DOCUMENT 4: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01606-cl-extra-11053873
Date issued/filed: 2025-05-20
Pages: 1
Docket text: Supplementary opinion from CourtListener cluster 10587285
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In the United States Court of Federal Claims
                                   OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
                                           No. 21-1606V

*************************
                        *
TAYLOR WILLIAMS,        *                                               Chief Special Master Corcoran
                        *
                        *
          Petitioner,   *                                               Filed: April 16, 2025
                        *
          v.            *
                        *
SECRETARY OF HEALTH     *
AND HUMAN SERVICES,     *
                        *
          Respondent.   *
                        *
*************************

Nancy R. Meyers, Turning Point Litigation, Greensboro, NC, for Petitioner.

Colleen C. Hartley, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

    DECISION GRANTING FINAL AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS1

        On July 22, 2021, Taylor Williams filed a petition for compensation under the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the “Vaccine Program”).2 Petition (ECF No. 1) at 1.
Petitioner alleged the Table Claim that an influenza (“flu”) vaccine she received on November 26,
2018, caused her to incur Guillain-Barré syndrome. Id. The matter was originally assigned to the
Special Processing Unit (“SPU”), but the parties could not resolve the claim. After the case was
transferred out of SPU and to my individual docket, I ruled in favor of Petitioner and granted
entitlement. See Ruling on Entitlement, dated April 29, 2024 (ECF No. 43). I subsequently
awarded damages on March 12, 2025. See Damages Decision (ECF No. 55).


1
  Under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen (14) days within which to request redaction “of any information
furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or
confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the whole Decision will be available to the public
in its present form. Id.
2
 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660,
100 Stat. 3758, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 through 34 (2012) [hereinafter “Vaccine Act” or “the
Act”]. Individual section references hereafter will be to § 300aa of the Act (but will omit that statutory prefix).
        Petitioner has now filed a motion for a final award of attorney’s fees and costs. Motion,
dated April 9, 2025 (ECF No. 60) (“Fees Mot.”). This is the first fees decision filed in this case.
Petitioner requests a total of $51,068.00 ($49,980.50 in fees and $1,087.50 in costs) for the work
of the attorneys and support staff at Turning Point Litigation. Fees Mot. at 1; ECF No. 60-1 at 21.
Respondent reacted to the motion on April 10, 2025. (ECF No. 61). Respondent is satisfied the
statutory requirements for an award of attorney’s fees and costs were met in this case, and requests
that I exercise discretion in calculating the amount to be awarded. ECF No. 61 at 2, 4. On April
10, 2025, Petitioner filed a reply, concurring with Respondent’s recommendation. ECF No. 62.

        For the reasons set forth below, I hereby GRANT Petitioner’s motion, awarding fees and
costs in the total amount of $51,068.00.


   I.      Calculation of Fees

        Because Petitioner’s claim was successful, she is entitled to a fees and costs award—
although only “reasonable” fees or costs may be awarded in the Program. Determining the
appropriate amount of the fees award is a two-part process. The first part involves application of
the lodestar method—“multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
times a reasonable hourly rate.” Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347–48
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). The second part involves
adjusting the lodestar calculation up or down to take relevant factors into consideration. Id. at
1348. This standard for calculating a fee award is considered applicable in most cases where a fee
award is authorized by federal statute. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429–37 (1983).

        An attorney’s reasonable hourly rate is determined by the “forum rule,” which bases the
proper hourly rate to be awarded on the forum in which the relevant court sits (Washington, D.C.,
for Vaccine Act cases), except where an attorney’s work was not performed in the forum and there
is a substantial difference in rates (the so-called “Davis exception”). Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348
(citing Davis Cty. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 169 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). A 2015 decision established the hourly rate ranges
for attorneys with different levels of experience who are entitled to the forum rate in the Vaccine
Program. See McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323, at
*19 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015).




                                                 2
       Petitioner requests the following rates for her attorneys and support staff, based on the
years work was performed:

                             2020         2021            2022        2023           2024          2025

     Nancy Myers           $400.00      $430.00       $460.00       $490.00        $530.00        $530.00
      (Attorney)

    Tyler Nullmeyer           __            __        $275.00       $290.00        $290.00        $350.00
      (Attorney)

    Taylor Barrett         $150.00      $155.00       $160.00       $165.00        $180.00        $180.00
     (Paralegal)

     Janelle Tharp            __            __        $160.00       $165.00        $180.00        $180.00
      (Paralegal)

ECF No. 60-1 at 1.

        The attorneys at Turning Point Litigation practice in Greensboro, NC—a jurisdiction that
has been deemed “in forum.” Accordingly, they should be paid forum rates as established in
McCulloch. See Stone v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18-634V, 2023 WL 8895692 (Fed.
Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 29, 2023). The hourly rates requested through 2024 are consistent with what
has previously been awarded these attorneys, in accordance with the Office of Special Masters’s
fee schedule.3 Wessinger v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-518V, 2024 WL 3176348, at
*2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 30, 2024). In addition, the requested rates for 2025 are consistent
with the OSM fee schedule and are commensurate with the relevant attorneys’ experience, and do
not reflect unreasonable increases. I thus find no cause to reduce them in this instance. And I deem
the time devoted to the matter to be reasonable. I will therefore award all fees requested without
adjustment.

     II.    Calculation of Costs

       Just as they are required to establish the reasonableness of requested fees, petitioners must
also demonstrate that requested litigation costs are reasonable. Presault v. United States, 52 Fed.
Cl. 667, 670 (2002): Perreira v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992).
Reasonable costs include the costs of obtaining medical records and expert time incurred while
working on a case. Fester v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 10-243V, 2013 WL 5367670, at
*16 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 27, 2013). When petitioners fail to substantiate a cost item, such as
by not providing appropriate documentation to explain the basis for a particular cost, special

3
 OSM Attorneys’ Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedule, https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/node2914 (last visited Apr. 16,
2025).

                                                      3
masters have refrained from paying the cost at issue. See, e.g., Gardner-Cook v. Sec’y of Health
& Hum. Servs., No. 99-480V, 2005 WL 6122520, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 30, 2005).

        Petitioner seeks $1,087.50 in attorney’s costs, including mailing costs, medical record
retrieval costs, and costs for legal research. Fees Mot. at 20-21. The requested costs are the sort
commonly incurred in the Vaccine Program, and are reasonably awarded herein.


                                                 CONCLUSION

       Based on the foregoing, and in the exercise of the discretion afforded to me in determining
the propriety of a final fees award, I GRANT Petitioner’s Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees
and Costs, awarding a total amount of $51,068.00, reflecting $49,980.50 in attorney’s fees and
$1,087.50 in costs, to be paid through an ACH deposit to Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account
for prompt disbursement.

       In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the Clerk of the
Court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with the terms of this Decision.4


         IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                                 s/ Brian H. Corcoran
                                                                 Brian H. Corcoran
                                                                 Chief Special Master




4
  Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment if (jointly or separately) they file notices
renouncing their right to seek review.

                                                           4