VICP Registry Case Source Bundle
Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01461
Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01461
Petitioner: Charles Walter
Filed: 2021-06-11
Decided: 2024-03-27
Vaccine: influenza
Vaccination date: 2018-08-22
Condition: Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS)
Outcome: compensated
Award amount USD: 131618

AI-assisted case summary:
Charles Walter, a 62-year-old adult, filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program on June 11, 2021. He alleged that he suffered Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS), a defined Table Injury, after receiving an influenza vaccine on August 22, 2018. The respondent, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, conceded entitlement to compensation on June 23, 2022, acknowledging that Mr. Walter met the criteria for a Table injury. Following the concession of entitlement, the parties were unable to resolve the issue of damages, leading to a briefing schedule ordered by the Special Master. Mr. Walter sought $140,000.00 for pain and suffering, emphasizing his delayed GBS diagnosis and early retirement. He also sought $1,618.16 for unreimbursed expenses, including mileage for medical appointments, calculated using the IRS business rate. The respondent argued for a lower pain and suffering award of $58,000.00, characterizing Mr. Walter's GBS as mild and disputing that his early retirement was solely attributable to the illness. The respondent also argued for a lower reimbursement rate for mileage. Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran reviewed the medical records, affidavits, and arguments presented. He found that Mr. Walter suffered a mild GBS illness with an acute phase lasting a few months, but his suffering was heightened by diagnostic difficulties. Mr. Walter experienced two hospitalizations, with the second resulting in a misdiagnosis of statin myopathy or peripheral neuropathy before he was correctly diagnosed with GBS thirteen days later. Although his symptoms improved with outpatient IVIG therapy, the Special Master did not find sufficient support for the claim that his early retirement was solely due to GBS, noting his age and other conditions likely played a role. In determining the award for pain and suffering, Special Master Corcoran considered comparable cases, particularly the case of Sand, where a similar delayed diagnosis and mild GBS resulted in a $130,000.00 award. He found this amount to be appropriate for Mr. Walter. Regarding expenses, the Special Master awarded the full amount of $1,618.16 requested by Mr. Walter, agreeing to use the IRS business mileage rate for reimbursement, consistent with prior program decisions. In conclusion, Chief Special Master Corcoran awarded Charles Walter a lump sum of $131,618.16, comprising $130,000.00 for actual pain and suffering and $1,618.16 for past unreimbursed expenses. The decision was issued on March 27, 2024.

Theory of causation field:
Petitioner Charles Walter, age 62, received an influenza vaccine on August 22, 2018, and subsequently developed Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS). GBS is a condition listed in the Vaccine Injury Table. The Respondent conceded entitlement, acknowledging that Petitioner met the criteria for a Table Injury. The case proceeded to damages. Petitioner sought $140,000 for pain and suffering and $1,618.16 for unreimbursed expenses, citing diagnostic delays and early retirement. Respondent proposed $58,000 for pain and suffering, characterizing the GBS as mild and disputing the necessity of early retirement. Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran awarded $130,000 for pain and suffering and $1,618.16 for expenses. The award for pain and suffering was based on the mild nature of the GBS, but also considered the heightened suffering due to diagnostic difficulties, referencing the comparable case of Sand. The expense award included mileage reimbursement at the IRS business rate. The decision was issued on March 27, 2024.

Public staged source text:

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DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01461-0
Date issued/filed: 2022-07-28
Pages: 2
Docket text: PUBLIC ORDER/RULING (Originally filed: 06/24/2022) regarding 31 Ruling on Entitlement, Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (nh) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 33 Filed 07/28/22 Page 1 of 2
CORRECTED
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 21-1461V
UNPUBLISHED
CHARLES WALTER, Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner, Filed: June 24, 2022
v.
Special Processing Unit (SPU);
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;
HUMAN SERVICES, Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;
Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS)
Respondent.
Ronald Craig Homer, Conway, Homer, P.C., Boston, MA, for Petitioner.
Emily H. Manoso, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1
On June 11, 2021, Charles Walter filed a petition for compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that he suffered Guillain-Barré Syndrome (“GBS”), a
defined Table Injury, after receiving an influenza vaccine on August 22, 2018. Petition at
1, ¶ 2. Petitioner further alleges that he received the vaccination in the United States,
that he suffered the residual effects of his GBS for more than six months and that neither
he nor any other party has filed a civil action or received compensation for her GBS,
alleged as vaccine caused. Id. at ¶¶ 25-27. The case was assigned to the Special
Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.
1 Because this unpublished Ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required
to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E-Government Act
of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the Ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance
with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information,
the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that
the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. §
300aa (2012).

Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 33 Filed 07/28/22 Page 2 of 2
On June 23, 2022, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes that
Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at 1.
Specifically, Respondent has concluded “that [P]etitioner has satisfied the criteria set forth
in the Vaccine Injury Table (“Table”) and the Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation
(“QAI”).” Id. at 6.
In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that
Petitioner is entitled to compensation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
2

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DOCUMENT 2: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01461-1
Date issued/filed: 2024-03-27
Pages: 9
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 02/27/2024) regarding 54 DECISION of Special Master, ( Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. )(mpj) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 58 Filed 03/27/24 Page 1 of 9
CORRECTED
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 21-1461V
CHARLES WALTER, Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner, Filed: February 27, 2024
v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
Ronald Craig Homer, Conway, Homer, P.C., Boston, MA, for Petitioner.
Kimberly Shubert Davey, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES1
On June 11, 2021, Charles Walter filed a petition for compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that he experienced Guillain-Barré syndrome (“GBS”),
a defined Table Injury, due to an influenza vaccine received on August 22, 2018. Petition
at 1, ¶ 2. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit (“SPU”) of the Office of
Special Masters. After Respondent conceded entitlement, the parties were unable to
resolve damages on their own,3 so I ordered briefing on the matter.
1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made
publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or
at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government
Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In
accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other
information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I
agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. §
300aa (2018).
3 Nine months after Petitioner was determined to be entitled to compensation, he informed me that the
parties had reached an impasse in their damages discussions and proposed a briefing schedule. Status
Report, filed March 24, 2023, ECF No. 47.

Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 58 Filed 03/27/24 Page 2 of 9
For the reasons set forth below, I find that Petitioner is entitled to an award of
damages in the amount $130,000.00 for actual pain and suffering, plus $1,618.16 for
past unreimbursed expenses.
I. Legal Standard
Compensation awarded pursuant to the Vaccine Act shall include “[f]or actual and
projected pain and suffering and emotional distress from the vaccine-related injury, an
award not to exceed $250,000.” Section 15(a)(4). Additionally, a petitioner may recover
“actual unreimbursable expenses incurred before the date of judgment award such
expenses which (i) resulted from the vaccine-related injury for which petitioner seeks
compensation, (ii) were incurred by or on behalf of the person who suffered such injury,
and (iii) were for diagnosis, medical or other remedial care, rehabilitation . . . determined
to be reasonably necessary.” Section 15(a)(1)(B). The petitioner bears the burden of proof
with respect to each element of compensation requested. Brewer v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 93-0092V, 1996 WL 147722, at *22-23 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 18,
1996).
There is no mathematic formula for assigning a monetary value to a person’s pain
and suffering and emotional distress. I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 04-1593V,
2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 14, 2013) (“[a]wards for emotional
distress are inherently subjective and cannot be determined by using a mathematical
formula”); Stansfield v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 93-0172V, 1996 WL 300594,
at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 22, 1996) (“the assessment of pain and suffering is
inherently a subjective evaluation”). Factors to be considered when determining an award
for pain and suffering include: 1) awareness of the injury; 2) severity of the injury; and 3)
duration of the suffering. I.D., 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (quoting McAllister v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., No 91-1037V, 1993 WL 777030, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar.
26, 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 70 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
I may also consider prior pain and suffering awards to aid my resolution of the
appropriate amount of compensation for pain and suffering in this case. See, e.g., Doe
34 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 87 Fed. Cl. 758, 768 (2009) (finding that “there is
nothing improper in the chief special master’s decision to refer to damages for pain and
suffering awarded in other cases as an aid in determining the proper amount of damages
in this case.”). And, of course, I may rely on my own experience (along with my
predecessor Chief Special Masters) adjudicating similar claims.4 Hodges v. Sec’y of
4 From July 2014 until September 2015, the SPU was overseen by former Chief Special Master Vowell. For
the next four years, until September 30, 2019, all SPU cases, including the majority of GBS claims, were
assigned to former Chief Special Master Dorsey. In early October 2019, the majority of SPU cases were
reassigned to me as the current Chief Special Master.
2

Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 58 Filed 03/27/24 Page 3 of 9
Health & Hum. Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Congress
contemplated the special masters would use their accumulated expertise in the field of
vaccine injuries to judge the merits of individual claims).
II. The Parties’ Arguments
Emphasizing his delayed GBS diagnosis and forced early retirement, Petitioner
maintains he is entitled to a pain and suffering award in the amount of $140,000.00.
Petitioner’s Memorandum in Support of Damages (“Brief”), May 8, 2023, at 19-25, ECF
No 50. He also seeks $1,618.16, for unreimbursed expenses and mileage driving to and
from medical appointments. Id. at 16-17. In calculating the later, Petitioner utilizes the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) business rate, as opposed to the lower rate used for
medical expenses. Exhibit 32, Tab B, filed May 5, 2023, ECF No. 48-2.
To support the past pain and suffering award he seeks, Petitioner cites five
comparable cases: Castellanos, Sand, Shankar, Weil, and W.B.5 – in which awards
ranging from $125,000.00 to $155,000.00 were issued. Brief at 25-26. Acknowledging
that several of these petitioners experienced longer hospitalizations and required
inpatient rehabilitation, he argues that his hospitalization likely would have been longer,
and treatment more similar, but for his difficulty obtaining a correct GBS diagnosis earlier
in his course. Id. at 27-30. For example, he notes that he was discharged from his second
hospitalization after three days, and before undergoing a lumbar puncture, due to a
misdiagnosis of statin myopathy.6 Brief at 27-30.
Respondent counters that Petitioner’s past pain and suffering award should be
$58,000.00 – an amount less than half of the lower end of the range reflected in the five
cases cited by Petitioner. Respondent’s Brief on Damages (“Opp.”), filed June 26, 2023,
at 6, ECF No. 51. Characterizing Petitioner’s GBS illness as mild, Respondent
emphasizes the short duration of Petitioner’s hospitalizations (only one and three days,
respectively), the lack of any inpatient rehabilitation, the receipt of IVIG treatment on an
outpatient basis at home, and the quick recovery Petitioner experienced thereafter. Id. at
5 Castellanos v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 19-1710V, 2022 WL 1482497 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Mar. 30, 2022) (awarding $125,000.00 for actual pain and suffering); Sand v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 19-1104V, 2021 WL 4704665 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 31, 2021) (awarding $130,000.00 for actual
pain and suffering); Shankar v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18-1382V, 2022 WL 2196407 (Fed. Cl.
Spec. Mstr. May 5, 2022) (awarding $135,000.00 for actual pain and suffering); Weil v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 21-0831V, 2023 WL 1778281 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 6, 2023) (awarding $140,000.00
for actual pain and suffering); W.B. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18-1634V, 2020 WL 5509686
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 7, 2020) (awarding $155,000.00 for actual pain and suffering).
6 Myopathy is “any disease of a muscle.” DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 1224 (32nd ed.
2012).
3

Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 58 Filed 03/27/24 Page 4 of 9
6-8. Respondent insists that Petitioner’s assertions related to his shorter hospitalizations
(that they resulted, in part, from his misdiagnosis) and to his premature retirement (that it
can be attributed to his GBS illness) are speculative. Id. at 7-9.
Respondent also repeats arguments, previously made in other SPU cases, related
to the importance of past proffered amounts and the appropriate rate to use when
calculating mileage reimbursements. Opp. at 10, 12-17. Asserting that I should rely
primarily on amounts he has proffered in past cases when ascertaining the appropriate
award in this case, Respondent insists that the amount he proposes is fair. Id. at 10. He
also reiterates his past assertion that, when calculating the amount to be reimbursed for
mileage traveled to and from medical appointments, I should utilize the lower IRS medical
mileage rate, rather than IRS business rate which generally has been used in the Vaccine
Program. Id. at 13-17; see infra Section IV (for a further discussion of the caselaw cited
by Respondent).
On reply, Petitioner counters Respondent’s arguments that a delayed diagnosis is
common in GBS cases, and thus should not dictate a higher pain and suffering award,
that his GBS illness resolved quickly and did not necessitate his early retirement, and that
past proffered awards are the most accurate gauge of what should be awarded in this
case. Petitioner’s Reply to Opp., filed July 7, 2023, at 3-10, ECF No. 52. While not
disputing Respondent’s characterization of his GBS illness as mild, Petitioner stresses
that other petitioners with similarly-mild GBS symptoms have received past pain and
suffering awards in the same range as he now seeks. Id. at 2-3. Regarding the parties’
mileage rate dispute, Petitioner argues that I should continue to follow the carefully
considered and sound reasoning in Williams. Id. at 10-14 (discussing Williams v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-2239V, 1996 WL 608455 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 10,
1996) (holding the IRS business mileage rate should be used in vaccine cases).
III. Appropriate Compensation for Petitioner’s Pain and Suffering
In this case, awareness of the injury is not disputed. The record reflects that at all
times Petitioner was a competent adult with no impairments that would impact his
awareness of his injury. Therefore, I analyze principally the severity and duration of
Petitioner’s injury.
In performing this analysis, I have reviewed the record as a whole, including the
medical records, affidavits, and all assertions made by the parties in written documents.
I considered prior awards for pain and suffering in both SPU and non-SPU GBS cases
and rely upon my experience adjudicating these cases.7 However, I ultimately base my
7 Statistical data for all GBS cases resolved in SPU by proffered amounts from inception through January
1, 2024 reveals the median amount awarded to be $171,133.72. The awards in these cases - totaling 364,
4

Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 58 Filed 03/27/24 Page 5 of 9
determination on the circumstances of this case.
The evidence shows that Petitioner – age 62 when vaccinated - suffered a mild
GBS illness, with an acute phase lasting only a few months. However, his suffering during
the first months of his illness was heightened by the difficulties he encountered obtaining
an accurate GBS diagnosis. After his first, brief hospitalization (from September 3-4,
2018), Petitioner was discharged with instructions to follow-up with the neurologist who
treated him a week later, and to return if his symptoms worsened. Exhibit 11 at 17. His
diagnosis was listed as either GBS or diabetic amyotrophy. Id. at 28. The next day,
Petitioner called his primary care physician reporting that he was returning to the hospital
because he fell and was unable to get up. Exhibit 2 at 201. When he returned to the
emergency room on September 6, 2018, Petitioner was hospitalized again - this time for
three days, and misdiagnosed as not having GBS, but rather statin myopathy or moderate
peripheral neuropathy. Exhibit 6 at 22. Petitioner was not correctly diagnosed with GBS
until seen by the neurologist who treated him during his initial hospitalization, thirteen
days thereafter, and undergoing EMG testing on September 25, 2018. Exhibit 2 at 376,
395-396.
Although his earlier pain had resolved by the time of his GBS diagnosis,
Petitioner’s weakness had progressed. Exhibit 2 at 391, 394. Still, Petitioner’s symptoms
were still mild enough, even then, to allow for treatment on an outpatient basis. From
October 9 through 13, 2018, Petitioner received IVIG therapy at home. Exhibit 12. And
he showed significant improvement thereafter. At a follow-up appointment with his
neurologist on October 23, 2018, it was noted that Petitioner had “responded well to IVIG
therapy, [that his] lower extremity [and] strength had improved, [and that his] pain and
paresthesias ha[d] also essentially resolved.” Exhibit 7 at 13.
Petitioner maintains that he was forced to retire earlier than planned from his job
as a supply manager at Total Oil and Gas, but the record does not support his assertion.
See Exhibit 22 at ¶¶ 1, 6 (Petitioner’s affidavit). Although some residual GBS symptoms
such as ongoing fatigue undoubtedly played some part in Petitioner’s decision, his age
and other unrelated conditions likely did as well. Furthermore, Petitioner did not retire until
July 2019, more than six months after returning to work at the end of December 2018,
and well after his GBS symptoms had greatly improved. And he did so pursuant to an
have typically ranged from $128,645.56 to $256,835.75, representing cases between the first and third
quartiles and awards comprised of all categories of compensation – including lost wages. 47 cases include
the creation of an annuity to provide for future expenses.
Past pain and suffering amounts awarded in substantive decisions issued in 34 SPU GBS cases range
from $92,500.00 to $192,500.00, with an additional case involving annuity payments. The median amount
past pain and suffering award in these 35 cases was $165,000.00, with awards falling within the first and
third quartiles ranging from $155,000.00 to $180,000.00.
5

Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 58 Filed 03/27/24 Page 6 of 9
agreement which provided him with a lump sum amount equivalent of almost a year of
his salary. Exhibit 31 at 17-26.
Still, the amount proposed by Respondent ($58,000.00) is clearly too low. As I
have explained previously during expedited “Motions Day” hearings, GBS pain and
suffering awards generally should be higher than in matters involving a less frightening
and physically-alarming injury, such as SIRVA. And as noted by Petitioner, I have
routinely rejected Respondent’s contention that proffered amounts offer better guidance
than reasoned decisions by a judicial neutral. Sakovits v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 17-1028V, 2020 WL 3729420, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 4, 2020) (discussing
the difference between cases in which damages are agreed upon by the parties and
cases in which damages are determined by a special master).
Out of the cases cited by Petitioner, I find Sand offers the best comparison to the
facts and circumstances suffered by Petitioner. Like Mr. Walter, the Sand petitioner’s
condition was initially attributed to another cause, cervical radiculopathy, and he was not
properly diagnosed with GBS until five months after his initial symptoms. Sand, 2021 WL
4704665, at *6. However, the Sand petitioner’s GBS illness was still described as mild,
and his most severe symptom (back pain) resolved within four months, albeit with
Gabapentin, rather than IVIG therapy. Id. Furthermore, the cases cited by Petitioner
involving greater pain and suffering awards all involved some inpatient habilitation and/or
outpatient physical therapy. Shankar, 2022 WL 2196407, at *5; Weil, 2023 WL 1778281,
at *4-5; and W.B., 2020 WL 5509686, at *4-5. Thus, I find the same amount awarded in
the Sand case, $130,000.00, constitutes an appropriate past pain and suffering
award in this case.
IV. Appropriate Compensation for Past Unreimbursed Expenses
Respondent argues I should award $1,473.60 for past unreimbursed expenses,
$144.56 less than the $1,618.16 requested by Petitioner. Opp. at 17. Although a portion
of this discrepancy is due to the different mileage rates employed by the parties,
Respondent maintains Petitioner has not provided sufficient documentation to support the
reimbursement request for some out-of-pocket expenses. Id. at 13
To support this later argument, Respondent cites exact page numbers containing
these entries. Id. (citing Exhibit 32 at 13, 16-20 (containing examples such as a
handwritten note indicating $5.00 was paid)). He does not, however, identify the exact
amounts he disputes. Given the de minimis amount of the handwritten entry ($5.00) and
billing records which clearly show Petitioner’s copay amounts, I will reimburse all amounts
sought in this case.
6

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Regarding the question of mileage rate, Respondent argues that the reasoning
articulated in Williams - that the business mileage rate is a more accurate reflection of the
true cost of any driven mileage because it is employed in a more dollar-to-dollar deduction
for tax purposes, is flawed. Opp. at 14-15 (citing Williams, 1996 WL 608455, at *2). He
also maintains that the Williams special master failed to consider the Vaccine Act’s
requirement that “a claimed expense must be ‘reasonably necessary,’ [which] constitutes
a limitation on the Program’s generosity to petitioners.” Id. at 16 (citing Williams, 1996 WL
608455, at *2; Section 15(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I)). By focusing on the true cost of any driven
mileage, Respondent insists Williams ignores the requirement that compensation not
optimize a person’s quality of life, but only be reasonably necessary. Id. at 16 (citing Earls
v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-0070V, 1991 WL 444454, at *3 (Fed Cl. Spec.
Mstr. Mar. 18, 1991)).
In his reply, Petitioner maintains that “the special master in Williams properly
evoked the reasonably necessary requirement of [Section] 15(a)(1)(B) with respect to
travel costs.” Reply at 12. He “urges [me] to not diverge from the already established
sound determination of Williams, Ashe-Robinson, and Gibson[8].” Reply at 14.
Contrary to Respondent’s argument, application of the business rate does not
amount in an optimized award, but rather than one that is consistent with the Act’s
emphasis on “reasonable” damages. An example of an “optimized” award might be
providing compensation for a petitioner to rent, or buy, a luxury vehicle for more
comfortable travel to their vaccine injury related medical appointments, as opposed to
using their own vehicle – and indeed such an award would be prohibited. But the same
is not true simply because a higher rate (which best captures the actual vehicle usage
costs) is appropriate.
Furthermore, other than disagreeing with the reasoning of Williams, Respondent
has not offered evidence or legal citation supporting application of the lower medical rate
herein. He has not, for example, shown that any other federal compensatory statutory
frameworks apply the lower medical rate in comparable circumstances, and/or follow the
I.R.C. differentiation of rates.
A petitioner’s actual travel expenses when using their own vehicle include not only
the operating costs for the mileage incurred, but also the fixed costs for the mileage
incurred. Clearly, each mile driven in a vehicle increases wear and tear, thereby
increasing fixed costs (i.e., depreciation, repairs, etc.). Thus, an award based only upon
8 Williams v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-2239V, 1996 WL 608455 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 10,
1996); Ashe-Robinson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 94-1096V, 1997 WL 54350 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
Mstr. Jan. 23, 1997); Gibson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-0243V, 2022 WL 17820891, at *12
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 5, 2022).
7

Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 58 Filed 03/27/24 Page 8 of 9
the operating costs of the vehicle would not represent a petitioner’s “actual” expenses
incurred.
Moreover, while the Tax Code may reasonably distinguish between levels of
deduction for vehicle usage, based upon whether the car was used for a business
purpose or not, that same distinction may not be proper in the context of a Vaccine Act
award. This seems, to some extent, to have been the thinking of the Williams special
master. Application of the higher rate is ultimately consistent with the Act’s language.
Accordingly, and in keeping with my own prior decisions, I find that Petitioner’s travel
expenses should be reimbursed using the IRS business mileage rate employed in
Williams. See Kleinschmidt v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-0680V, 2023 WL
9119039, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 5, 2023); Gibson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., No. 20-0243V, 2022 WL 17820891, at *12 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 5, 2022). I
award the full amount Petitioner requests for his actual unreimbursed expenses,
$1,618.16.
Conclusion
For all of the reasons discussed above and based on consideration of the record
as a whole, I find that $130,000.00 represents a fair and appropriate amount of
compensation for Petitioner’s past/actual pain and suffering.9 Additionally, I find
he is entitled to the amount of past/actual unreimbursed expenses he requests,
$1,618.16.
I therefore award Petitioner a lump sum payment of $131,618.16,
representing compensation in the amounts of $130,000.00 for actual pain and
suffering and $1,618.16 for actual unreimbursable expenses in the form of a check
payable to Petitioner. This amount represents compensation for all damages that would
be available under Section 15(a).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this
Decision.10
9 Since this amount is being awarded for actual, rather than projected, pain and suffering, no reduction to
net present value is required. See Section 15(f)(4)(A); Childers v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 96-
0194V, 1999 WL 159844, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 5, 1999) (citing Youngblood v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 32 F.3d 552 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
10 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by the parties’ joint filing of notice
renouncing the right to seek review.
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Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 58 Filed 03/27/24 Page 9 of 9
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
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DOCUMENT 3: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01461-2
Date issued/filed: 2024-04-03
Pages: 9
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 02/27/2024) regarding 54 DECISION of Special Master, Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (nh) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/03/24 Page 1 of 9
CORRECTED
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 21-1461V
CHARLES WALTER, Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner, Filed: February 27, 2024
v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
Ronald Craig Homer, Conway, Homer, P.C., Boston, MA, for Petitioner.
Kimberly Shubert Davey, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES1
On June 11, 2021, Charles Walter filed a petition for compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that he experienced Guillain-Barré syndrome (“GBS”),
a defined Table Injury, due to an influenza vaccine received on August 22, 2018. Petition
at 1, ¶ 2. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit (“SPU”) of the Office of
Special Masters. After Respondent conceded entitlement, the parties were unable to
resolve damages on their own,3 so I ordered briefing on the matter.
1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made
publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or
at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government
Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In
accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other
information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I
agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. §
300aa (2018).
3 Nine months after Petitioner was determined to be entitled to compensation, he informed me that the
parties had reached an impasse in their damages discussions and proposed a briefing schedule. Status
Report, filed March 24, 2023, ECF No. 47.

Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/03/24 Page 2 of 9
For the reasons set forth below, I find that Petitioner is entitled to an award of
damages in the amount $130,000.00 for actual pain and suffering, plus $1,618.16 for
past unreimbursed expenses.
I. Legal Standard
Compensation awarded pursuant to the Vaccine Act shall include “[f]or actual and
projected pain and suffering and emotional distress from the vaccine-related injury, an
award not to exceed $250,000.” Section 15(a)(4). Additionally, a petitioner may recover
“actual unreimbursable expenses incurred before the date of judgment award such
expenses which (i) resulted from the vaccine-related injury for which petitioner seeks
compensation, (ii) were incurred by or on behalf of the person who suffered such injury,
and (iii) were for diagnosis, medical or other remedial care, rehabilitation . . . determined
to be reasonably necessary.” Section 15(a)(1)(B). The petitioner bears the burden of proof
with respect to each element of compensation requested. Brewer v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 93-0092V, 1996 WL 147722, at *22-23 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 18,
1996).
There is no mathematic formula for assigning a monetary value to a person’s pain
and suffering and emotional distress. I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 04-1593V,
2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 14, 2013) (“[a]wards for emotional
distress are inherently subjective and cannot be determined by using a mathematical
formula”); Stansfield v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 93-0172V, 1996 WL 300594,
at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 22, 1996) (“the assessment of pain and suffering is
inherently a subjective evaluation”). Factors to be considered when determining an award
for pain and suffering include: 1) awareness of the injury; 2) severity of the injury; and 3)
duration of the suffering. I.D., 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (quoting McAllister v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., No 91-1037V, 1993 WL 777030, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar.
26, 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 70 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
I may also consider prior pain and suffering awards to aid my resolution of the
appropriate amount of compensation for pain and suffering in this case. See, e.g., Doe
34 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 87 Fed. Cl. 758, 768 (2009) (finding that “there is
nothing improper in the chief special master’s decision to refer to damages for pain and
suffering awarded in other cases as an aid in determining the proper amount of damages
in this case.”). And, of course, I may rely on my own experience (along with my
predecessor Chief Special Masters) adjudicating similar claims.4 Hodges v. Sec’y of
4 From July 2014 until September 2015, the SPU was overseen by former Chief Special Master Vowell. For
the next four years, until September 30, 2019, all SPU cases, including the majority of GBS claims, were
assigned to former Chief Special Master Dorsey. In early October 2019, the majority of SPU cases were
reassigned to me as the current Chief Special Master.
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Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/03/24 Page 3 of 9
Health & Hum. Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Congress
contemplated the special masters would use their accumulated expertise in the field of
vaccine injuries to judge the merits of individual claims).
II. The Parties’ Arguments
Emphasizing his delayed GBS diagnosis and forced early retirement, Petitioner
maintains he is entitled to a pain and suffering award in the amount of $140,000.00.
Petitioner’s Memorandum in Support of Damages (“Brief”), May 8, 2023, at 19-25, ECF
No 50. He also seeks $1,618.16, for unreimbursed expenses and mileage driving to and
from medical appointments. Id. at 16-17. In calculating the later, Petitioner utilizes the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) business rate, as opposed to the lower rate used for
medical expenses. Exhibit 32, Tab B, filed May 5, 2023, ECF No. 48-2.
To support the past pain and suffering award he seeks, Petitioner cites five
comparable cases: Castellanos, Sand, Shankar, Weil, and W.B.5 – in which awards
ranging from $125,000.00 to $155,000.00 were issued. Brief at 25-26. Acknowledging
that several of these petitioners experienced longer hospitalizations and required
inpatient rehabilitation, he argues that his hospitalization likely would have been longer,
and treatment more similar, but for his difficulty obtaining a correct GBS diagnosis earlier
in his course. Id. at 27-30. For example, he notes that he was discharged from his second
hospitalization after three days, and before undergoing a lumbar puncture, due to a
misdiagnosis of statin myopathy.6 Brief at 27-30.
Respondent counters that Petitioner’s past pain and suffering award should be
$58,000.00 – an amount less than half of the lower end of the range reflected in the five
cases cited by Petitioner. Respondent’s Brief on Damages (“Opp.”), filed June 26, 2023,
at 6, ECF No. 51. Characterizing Petitioner’s GBS illness as mild, Respondent
emphasizes the short duration of Petitioner’s hospitalizations (only one and three days,
respectively), the lack of any inpatient rehabilitation, the receipt of IVIG treatment on an
outpatient basis at home, and the quick recovery Petitioner experienced thereafter. Id. at
5 Castellanos v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 19-1710V, 2022 WL 1482497 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Mar. 30, 2022) (awarding $125,000.00 for actual pain and suffering); Sand v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 19-1104V, 2021 WL 4704665 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 31, 2021) (awarding $130,000.00 for actual
pain and suffering); Shankar v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18-1382V, 2022 WL 2196407 (Fed. Cl.
Spec. Mstr. May 5, 2022) (awarding $135,000.00 for actual pain and suffering); Weil v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 21-0831V, 2023 WL 1778281 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 6, 2023) (awarding $140,000.00
for actual pain and suffering); W.B. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18-1634V, 2020 WL 5509686
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 7, 2020) (awarding $155,000.00 for actual pain and suffering).
6 Myopathy is “any disease of a muscle.” DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 1224 (32nd ed.
2012).
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Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/03/24 Page 4 of 9
6-8. Respondent insists that Petitioner’s assertions related to his shorter hospitalizations
(that they resulted, in part, from his misdiagnosis) and to his premature retirement (that it
can be attributed to his GBS illness) are speculative. Id. at 7-9.
Respondent also repeats arguments, previously made in other SPU cases, related
to the importance of past proffered amounts and the appropriate rate to use when
calculating mileage reimbursements. Opp. at 10, 12-17. Asserting that I should rely
primarily on amounts he has proffered in past cases when ascertaining the appropriate
award in this case, Respondent insists that the amount he proposes is fair. Id. at 10. He
also reiterates his past assertion that, when calculating the amount to be reimbursed for
mileage traveled to and from medical appointments, I should utilize the lower IRS medical
mileage rate, rather than IRS business rate which generally has been used in the Vaccine
Program. Id. at 13-17; see infra Section IV (for a further discussion of the caselaw cited
by Respondent).
On reply, Petitioner counters Respondent’s arguments that a delayed diagnosis is
common in GBS cases, and thus should not dictate a higher pain and suffering award,
that his GBS illness resolved quickly and did not necessitate his early retirement, and that
past proffered awards are the most accurate gauge of what should be awarded in this
case. Petitioner’s Reply to Opp., filed July 7, 2023, at 3-10, ECF No. 52. While not
disputing Respondent’s characterization of his GBS illness as mild, Petitioner stresses
that other petitioners with similarly-mild GBS symptoms have received past pain and
suffering awards in the same range as he now seeks. Id. at 2-3. Regarding the parties’
mileage rate dispute, Petitioner argues that I should continue to follow the carefully
considered and sound reasoning in Williams. Id. at 10-14 (discussing Williams v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-2239V, 1996 WL 608455 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 10,
1996) (holding the IRS business mileage rate should be used in vaccine cases).
III. Appropriate Compensation for Petitioner’s Pain and Suffering
In this case, awareness of the injury is not disputed. The record reflects that at all
times Petitioner was a competent adult with no impairments that would impact his
awareness of his injury. Therefore, I analyze principally the severity and duration of
Petitioner’s injury.
In performing this analysis, I have reviewed the record as a whole, including the
medical records, affidavits, and all assertions made by the parties in written documents.
I considered prior awards for pain and suffering in both SPU and non-SPU GBS cases
and rely upon my experience adjudicating these cases.7 However, I ultimately base my
7 Statistical data for all GBS cases resolved in SPU by proffered amounts from inception through January
1, 2024 reveals the median amount awarded to be $171,133.72. The awards in these cases - totaling 364,
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determination on the circumstances of this case.
The evidence shows that Petitioner – age 62 when vaccinated - suffered a mild
GBS illness, with an acute phase lasting only a few months. However, his suffering during
the first months of his illness was heightened by the difficulties he encountered obtaining
an accurate GBS diagnosis. After his first, brief hospitalization (from September 3-4,
2018), Petitioner was discharged with instructions to follow-up with the neurologist who
treated him a week later, and to return if his symptoms worsened. Exhibit 11 at 17. His
diagnosis was listed as either GBS or diabetic amyotrophy. Id. at 28. The next day,
Petitioner called his primary care physician reporting that he was returning to the hospital
because he fell and was unable to get up. Exhibit 2 at 201. When he returned to the
emergency room on September 6, 2018, Petitioner was hospitalized again - this time for
three days, and misdiagnosed as not having GBS, but rather statin myopathy or moderate
peripheral neuropathy. Exhibit 6 at 22. Petitioner was not correctly diagnosed with GBS
until seen by the neurologist who treated him during his initial hospitalization, thirteen
days thereafter, and undergoing EMG testing on September 25, 2018. Exhibit 2 at 376,
395-396.
Although his earlier pain had resolved by the time of his GBS diagnosis,
Petitioner’s weakness had progressed. Exhibit 2 at 391, 394. Still, Petitioner’s symptoms
were still mild enough, even then, to allow for treatment on an outpatient basis. From
October 9 through 13, 2018, Petitioner received IVIG therapy at home. Exhibit 12. And
he showed significant improvement thereafter. At a follow-up appointment with his
neurologist on October 23, 2018, it was noted that Petitioner had “responded well to IVIG
therapy, [that his] lower extremity [and] strength had improved, [and that his] pain and
paresthesias ha[d] also essentially resolved.” Exhibit 7 at 13.
Petitioner maintains that he was forced to retire earlier than planned from his job
as a supply manager at Total Oil and Gas, but the record does not support his assertion.
See Exhibit 22 at ¶¶ 1, 6 (Petitioner’s affidavit). Although some residual GBS symptoms
such as ongoing fatigue undoubtedly played some part in Petitioner’s decision, his age
and other unrelated conditions likely did as well. Furthermore, Petitioner did not retire until
July 2019, more than six months after returning to work at the end of December 2018,
and well after his GBS symptoms had greatly improved. And he did so pursuant to an
have typically ranged from $128,645.56 to $256,835.75, representing cases between the first and third
quartiles and awards comprised of all categories of compensation – including lost wages. 47 cases include
the creation of an annuity to provide for future expenses.
Past pain and suffering amounts awarded in substantive decisions issued in 34 SPU GBS cases range
from $92,500.00 to $192,500.00, with an additional case involving annuity payments. The median amount
past pain and suffering award in these 35 cases was $165,000.00, with awards falling within the first and
third quartiles ranging from $155,000.00 to $180,000.00.
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Case 1:21-vv-01461-UNJ Document 59 Filed 04/03/24 Page 6 of 9
agreement which provided him with a lump sum amount equivalent of almost a year of
his salary. Exhibit 31 at 17-26.
Still, the amount proposed by Respondent ($58,000.00) is clearly too low. As I
have explained previously during expedited “Motions Day” hearings, GBS pain and
suffering awards generally should be higher than in matters involving a less frightening
and physically-alarming injury, such as SIRVA. And as noted by Petitioner, I have
routinely rejected Respondent’s contention that proffered amounts offer better guidance
than reasoned decisions by a judicial neutral. Sakovits v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 17-1028V, 2020 WL 3729420, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 4, 2020) (discussing
the difference between cases in which damages are agreed upon by the parties and
cases in which damages are determined by a special master).
Out of the cases cited by Petitioner, I find Sand offers the best comparison to the
facts and circumstances suffered by Petitioner. Like Mr. Walter, the Sand petitioner’s
condition was initially attributed to another cause, cervical radiculopathy, and he was not
properly diagnosed with GBS until five months after his initial symptoms. Sand, 2021 WL
4704665, at *6. However, the Sand petitioner’s GBS illness was still described as mild,
and his most severe symptom (back pain) resolved within four months, albeit with
Gabapentin, rather than IVIG therapy. Id. Furthermore, the cases cited by Petitioner
involving greater pain and suffering awards all involved some inpatient habilitation and/or
outpatient physical therapy. Shankar, 2022 WL 2196407, at *5; Weil, 2023 WL 1778281,
at *4-5; and W.B., 2020 WL 5509686, at *4-5. Thus, I find the same amount awarded in
the Sand case, $130,000.00, constitutes an appropriate past pain and suffering
award in this case.
IV. Appropriate Compensation for Past Unreimbursed Expenses
Respondent argues I should award $1,473.60 for past unreimbursed expenses,
$144.56 less than the $1,618.16 requested by Petitioner. Opp. at 17. Although a portion
of this discrepancy is due to the different mileage rates employed by the parties,
Respondent maintains Petitioner has not provided sufficient documentation to support the
reimbursement request for some out-of-pocket expenses. Id. at 13
To support this later argument, Respondent cites exact page numbers containing
these entries. Id. (citing Exhibit 32 at 13, 16-20 (containing examples such as a
handwritten note indicating $5.00 was paid)). He does not, however, identify the exact
amounts he disputes. Given the de minimis amount of the handwritten entry ($5.00) and
billing records which clearly show Petitioner’s copay amounts, I will reimburse all amounts
sought in this case.
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Regarding the question of mileage rate, Respondent argues that the reasoning
articulated in Williams - that the business mileage rate is a more accurate reflection of the
true cost of any driven mileage because it is employed in a more dollar-to-dollar deduction
for tax purposes, is flawed. Opp. at 14-15 (citing Williams, 1996 WL 608455, at *2). He
also maintains that the Williams special master failed to consider the Vaccine Act’s
requirement that “a claimed expense must be ‘reasonably necessary,’ [which] constitutes
a limitation on the Program’s generosity to petitioners.” Id. at 16 (citing Williams, 1996 WL
608455, at *2; Section 15(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I)). By focusing on the true cost of any driven
mileage, Respondent insists Williams ignores the requirement that compensation not
optimize a person’s quality of life, but only be reasonably necessary. Id. at 16 (citing Earls
v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-0070V, 1991 WL 444454, at *3 (Fed Cl. Spec.
Mstr. Mar. 18, 1991)).
In his reply, Petitioner maintains that “the special master in Williams properly
evoked the reasonably necessary requirement of [Section] 15(a)(1)(B) with respect to
travel costs.” Reply at 12. He “urges [me] to not diverge from the already established
sound determination of Williams, Ashe-Robinson, and Gibson[8].” Reply at 14.
Contrary to Respondent’s argument, application of the business rate does not
amount in an optimized award, but rather than one that is consistent with the Act’s
emphasis on “reasonable” damages. An example of an “optimized” award might be
providing compensation for a petitioner to rent, or buy, a luxury vehicle for more
comfortable travel to their vaccine injury related medical appointments, as opposed to
using their own vehicle – and indeed such an award would be prohibited. But the same
is not true simply because a higher rate (which best captures the actual vehicle usage
costs) is appropriate.
Furthermore, other than disagreeing with the reasoning of Williams, Respondent
has not offered evidence or legal citation supporting application of the lower medical rate
herein. He has not, for example, shown that any other federal compensatory statutory
frameworks apply the lower medical rate in comparable circumstances, and/or follow the
I.R.C. differentiation of rates.
A petitioner’s actual travel expenses when using their own vehicle include not only
the operating costs for the mileage incurred, but also the fixed costs for the mileage
incurred. Clearly, each mile driven in a vehicle increases wear and tear, thereby
increasing fixed costs (i.e., depreciation, repairs, etc.). Thus, an award based only upon
8 Williams v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-2239V, 1996 WL 608455 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 10,
1996); Ashe-Robinson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 94-1096V, 1997 WL 54350 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
Mstr. Jan. 23, 1997); Gibson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-0243V, 2022 WL 17820891, at *12
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 5, 2022).
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the operating costs of the vehicle would not represent a petitioner’s “actual” expenses
incurred.
Moreover, while the Tax Code may reasonably distinguish between levels of
deduction for vehicle usage, based upon whether the car was used for a business
purpose or not, that same distinction may not be proper in the context of a Vaccine Act
award. This seems, to some extent, to have been the thinking of the Williams special
master. Application of the higher rate is ultimately consistent with the Act’s language.
Accordingly, and in keeping with my own prior decisions, I find that Petitioner’s travel
expenses should be reimbursed using the IRS business mileage rate employed in
Williams. See Kleinschmidt v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-0680V, 2023 WL
9119039, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 5, 2023); Gibson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., No. 20-0243V, 2022 WL 17820891, at *12 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 5, 2022). I
award the full amount Petitioner requests for his actual unreimbursed expenses,
$1,618.16.
Conclusion
For all of the reasons discussed above and based on consideration of the record
as a whole, I find that $130,000.00 represents a fair and appropriate amount of
compensation for Petitioner’s past/actual pain and suffering.9 Additionally, I find
he is entitled to the amount of past/actual unreimbursed expenses he requests,
$1,618.16.
I therefore award Petitioner a lump sum payment of $131,618.16,
representing compensation in the amounts of $130,000.00 for actual pain and
suffering and $1,618.16 for actual unreimbursable expenses in the form of a check
payable to Petitioner. This amount represents compensation for all damages that would
be available under Section 15(a).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this
Decision.10
9 Since this amount is being awarded for actual, rather than projected, pain and suffering, no reduction to
net present value is required. See Section 15(f)(4)(A); Childers v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 96-
0194V, 1999 WL 159844, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 5, 1999) (citing Youngblood v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 32 F.3d 552 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
10 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by the parties’ joint filing of notice
renouncing the right to seek review.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
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