VICP Registry Case Source Bundle Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01201 Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01201 Petitioner: James Quick Filed: 2021-04-13 Decided: 2025-04-09 Vaccine: influenza Vaccination date: 2018-10-11 Condition: chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy (CIDP) Outcome: compensated Award amount USD: 50000 AI-assisted case summary: On April 13, 2021, James Quick filed a petition alleging that an influenza vaccination administered on October 11, 2018 caused chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy. Respondent denied that the flu vaccine caused Mr. Quick's CIDP or any other injury or current condition. The public compensation decision is a stipulation decision and does not describe his first symptoms, neurologic workup, treatment, residual deficits, or expert opinions. Special Master Christian J. Moran adopted the stipulation on April 9, 2025. Mr. Quick received $50,000.00 as a lump sum through counsel's IOLTA account for all damages available under the Vaccine Act. Because the merits decision was a stipulation, it records the legal positions and payment terms rather than a medical finding that the flu vaccine caused CIDP. Separate June 2024 and November 2025 decisions addressed attorneys' fees and costs. Theory of causation field: Adult petitioner; influenza vaccine October 11, 2018; alleged CIDP. COMPENSATED by stipulation. Respondent denied causation; public merits text lacks clinical chronology. Award $50,000.00 lump sum. SM Moran April 9, 2025. Petition filed April 13, 2021. Public staged source text: ================================================================================ DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01201-cl-extra-10734827 Date issued/filed: 2024-07-08 Pages: 1 Docket text: Supplementary opinion from CourtListener cluster 10268237 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS ********************** JAMES QUICK, * No. 21-1201V * Petitioner, * * Special Master Christian J. Moran v. * * Filed: June 12, 2024 SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * ********************** Jessica Wallace, Sir & Glimstad, Aventura, FL, for petitioner; Isaiah Kalinowski, Bosson Legal Group, Fairfax, VA, former counsel of record for petitioner; Michael Lang, United States Dep’t of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. UNPUBLISHED DECISION AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ON AN INTERIM BASIS1 James Quick is seeking compensation through the Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. His former counsel of record has requested an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on an interim basis. Mr. Quick is awarded $41,791.98. * * * 1 Because this decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), the parties have 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Any changes will appear in the document posted on the website. Represented by Attorney Isaiah Kalinowski, Mr. Quick initiated this case by filing his petition on April 13, 2021. Mr. Quick submitted medical records periodically. Exhibits 1-26. Less than one year after the petition was filed, Mr. Quick requested an interim award of attorneys’ fees and costs for Mr. Kalinowski’s work. Pet’r’s Mot., filed Jan. 17, 2022. A reason was that Mr. Quick was changing attorneys. The Secretary opposed an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Resp’t’s Resp., filed Jan. 25, 2022. On January 18, 2022, Attorney Jessica Wallace became counsel of record for Mr. Quick. Ms. Wallace continues to represent Mr. Quick. Since January 2023, the parties have been exploring an informal resolution. * * * As to whether Mr. Quick should receive an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on an interim basis, the parties’ briefs raise a series of sequential questions, each of which requires an affirmative answer to the previous question. First, whether Mr. Quick has submitted evidence that makes him eligible to receive an award of attorneys’ fees and costs? Second, whether, as a matter of discretion, Mr. Quick should be awarded his attorneys’ fees and costs on an interim basis? Third, what is a reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees and costs? These questions are addressed below. 1. Eligibility for An Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs A petitioner who has not received compensation may be awarded “compensation to cover petitioner’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs incurred in any proceeding on such petition if the special master or court determines that the petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1). More than two years ago, the Secretary interposed a concern about reasonable basis. Resp’t’s Resp. at 4. Since then, Mr. Quick has identified statements from treating doctors that link the flu vaccine to his neurologic problems. See Pet’r’s Status Rep., filed Oct. 11, 2022. This evidence carries Mr. Quick’s burden regarding reasonable basis. 2 2. Appropriateness of an Interim Award When a petitioner meets the eligibility requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on an interim basis, the special master has discretion to make such an award. See Rehn v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 126 Fed. Cl. 86, 92 (2016) (even after good faith and reasonable basis have been established, the special master must determine “whether to exercise his or her discretion to award attorneys’ fees and costs”); cf. Avera, Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that even though permitted under the Vaccine Act, an interim award was not appropriate in that case). When determining the appropriateness of an interim award, the Federal Circuit has considered such factors as protracted proceedings, costly experts, and undue hardship. Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 609 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352. In January 2022, the Secretary disputed whether an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs was not warranted because this case did not involve any of the Avera factors. Resp’t’s Resp. at 3. Although the Secretary’s arguments had some force in January 2022, the passage of time has diminished their value. Although the parties are currently still attempting to resolve the case informally, the case has continued for several years. Thus, an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on an interim basis is appropriate. 3. Reasonableness of Requested Amounts Mr. Quick seeks $44,791.98 in total. This amount is comprised of $43,888.98 in attorneys’ fees and costs for the firm with which Mr. Kalinowski was initially associated and $903.00 in attorneys’ fees for the firm with which Mr. Kalinowski is presently associated. Under the Vaccine Act, a special master may award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1). Reasonable attorneys’ fees are calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by a reasonable number of hours expended on litigation, the lodestar approach. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1347-48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)); Saxton ex rel. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A petitioner’s counsel in the Vaccine Program is paid the forum rate unless the bulk of the work is performed in a locale other than the forum (District of Columbia) and the local rate is significantly lower than the forum rate. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1349. If these 3 two requirements are met, the Davis exception applies, and that petitioner’s counsel is paid according to the local rate. Id.; see Davis Cty. Solid Waste Mgmt. and Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 169 F.3d 755, 757-60 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In light of the Secretary’s lack of objection, the undersigned has reviewed the fee application for its reasonableness. See McIntosh v. Secʼy of Health & Human Servs., 139 Fed. Cl. 238 (2018). A. Reasonable Hourly Rate Mr. Quick has requested compensation for attorneys and their paralegals at rates previously awarded. Southern v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18- 116V, 2023 WL 3577894, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 22, 2023). Thus, they are accepted as reasonable here. B. Reasonable Number of Hours The second factor in the lodestar formula is a reasonable number of hours. Reasonable hours are not excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. See Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Secretary also did not directly challenge any of the requested hours as unreasonable. In general, the timesheets provide sufficient information to assess the reasonableness of the activity. Nearly all the activities are reasonable.2 The primary entries of concern are relatively long entries made by Mr. Kalinowski. See, e.g., entries from Mar. 31, 2021 through Apr. 12, 2021. Mr. Kalinowski has previously been advised to avoid block-billing. Parmer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-880V, 2020 WL 1672909, at *5 n.5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 11, 2020). An adjustment in the amount of $3,000 is appropriate. 2 Paralegals frequently communicated with medical providers to obtain medical records. Although the number of communications appears high, the number is not excessively high in that it appears medical providers did not respond to earlier attempts to obtain medical records. See Exhibit 30 (Mr. Kalinowski’s affidavit) ¶ 13. 4 The work Mr. Kalinowski performed at his second firm is reasonable. See Exhibit 30. Mr. Quick is awarded the amount requested. C. Costs Mr. Quick asks for $1,854.48 in costs. They are derived from obtaining medical records and filing the petition. The requested costs are reasonable. Conclusion An interim award of attorneys’ fees and costs is appropriate at this time. Mr. Quick is awarded a total of $41,791.98. This amount shall be paid: An amount of $40,888.98 as a lump sum in the form of a check jointly payable to Mr. Quick and Mr. Quick’s former counsel, Isaiah Kalinowski. This amount is intended to compensate Mr. Quick for attorneys’ fees and costs while he was represented by Maglio, Christopher & Toale. An amount of $903.00 as lump sum in the form of a check jointly payable to Mr. Quick and Mr. Quick’s former counsel, Isaiah Kalinowski. This amount is intended to compensate Mr. Quick for attorneys’ fees and costs while he was represented by Bosson Legal Group. In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment herewith. IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Christian J. Moran Christian J. Moran Special Master 5 ================================================================================ DOCUMENT 2: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01201-1 Date issued/filed: 2025-11-07 Pages: 7 Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 04/09/2025) regarding 99 DECISION Stipulation/Proffer, Signed by Special Master Christian J. Moran. (ceo) Service on parties made. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Case 1:21-vv-01201-UNJ Document 107 Filed 11/07/25 Page 1 of 7 In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * JAMES QUICK, * No. 21-1201V * Petitioner, * * Special Master Christian J. Moran v. * * Filed: April 9, 2025 SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Jessica Wallace, Siri & Glimstad, LLP, Aventura, FL, for Petitioner; Lynn Christina Schlie, United States Dep’t of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. UNPUBLISHED DECISION1 On April 7, 2025, the parties filed a joint stipulation concerning the petition for compensation filed by James Quick on April 13, 2021. Petitioner alleged that the influenza vaccine he received on October 11, 2018 which is contained in the Vaccine Injury Table (the “Table”), 42 C.F.R. §100.3(a), caused him to suffer from chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy (“CIDP”). Petitioner represents that there has been no prior award or settlement of a civil action for damages on his behalf as a result of his condition. 1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), the parties have 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Any changes will appear in the document posted on the website. Case 1:21-vv-01201-UNJ Document 107 Filed 11/07/25 Page 2 of 7 Respondent denies that the flu vaccine caused petitioner to suffer CIDP, and further denies that the vaccine caused him to suffer any other injury or his current condition. Nevertheless, the parties agree to the joint stipulation, attached hereto. The undersigned finds said stipulation reasonable and adopts it as the decision of the Court in awarding damages, on the terms set forth therein. Damages awarded in that stipulation include: A lump sum payment of $50,000.00, to be paid through an ACH deposit to petitioner's counsel's IOLTA account for prompt disbursement to petitioner. This amount represents compensation for all damages that would be available under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-l 5(a). In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC, Appendix B, the clerk is directed to enter judgment according to this decision and the attached stipulation.2 IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Christian J. Moran Christian J. Moran Special Master 2 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties can expedite entry of judgment by each party filing a notice renouncing the right to seek review by a United States Court of Federal Claims judge. 2 Case 1:21-vv-01201-UNJ Document 107 Filed 11/07/25 Page 3 of 7 Case 1:21-vv-01201-UNJ Document 107 Filed 11/07/25 Page 4 of 7 Case 1:21-vv-01201-UNJ Document 107 Filed 11/07/25 Page 5 of 7 Case 1:21-vv-01201-UNJ Document 107 Filed 11/07/25 Page 6 of 7 Case 1:21-vv-01201-UNJ Document 107 Filed 11/07/25 Page 7 of 7 ================================================================================ DOCUMENT 3: USCOURTS-cofc-1_21-vv-01201-cl-extra-11215647 Date issued/filed: 2025-12-05 Pages: 1 Docket text: Supplementary opinion from CourtListener cluster 10749062 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS ************************* JAMES QUICK, * No. 21-1201V * Petitioner, * * Special Master Christian J. Moran v. * * Filed: November 7, 2025 SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * ************************* Jessica Wallace, Siri & Glimstad, LLP, Aventura, FL, for Petitioner; Lynn Christina Schlie, United States Dep’t of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. PUBLISHED DECISION AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1 Pending is petitioner James Quick’s motion for final attorneys’ fees and costs. He is awarded a total of $63,848.26. I. Procedural History Represented by Attorney Isaiah Kalinowski, Mr. Quick alleged that an influenza vaccine caused him to develop Guillain-Barré syndrome and/or chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy. Pet., filed Apr. 13, 2021. Mr. Kalinowski was replaced as counsel of record January 18, 2022 by Attorney Jessica Wallace, who has continued as counsel of record. Relatively early in the litigation, the Secretary expressed an interest in attempting to resolve the case informally. Resp’t’s Status Rep., filed Jan. 9, 2023. Thereafter, Ms. Wallace and other people at her law firm developed the case. Part of this process involved retaining Dr. 1 Because this published decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the undersigned is required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This posting means the decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), the parties have 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access. Staci Schonbrun at Labor Market Consulting Services to assist with calculating lost earnings and future medical expenses. The parties reached an agreement. An entitlement decision, issued April 9, 2025, incorporated the parties’ stipulation, awarding Mr. Quick $50,000.00. On May 22, 2025, Mr. Quick filed a motion for final attorneys’ fees and costs (“Fees App.”). Mr. Quick requests attorneys’ fees of $57,676.35 and attorneys’ costs of $16,021.91, for a total request of $73,698.26. Fees App. at 2. Mr. Quick did not incur any costs personally. On May 27, 2025, respondent responded to petitioner’s motion with his boilerplate response. Respondent argues that “[n]either the Vaccine Act nor Vaccine Rule 13 contemplates any role for respondent in the resolution of a request by a petitioner for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.” Response at 1. Respondent adds, however that he “is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case.” Id at 2. Additionally, he recommends “that the Court exercise its discretion” when determining a reasonable award for attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 3. II. Eligibility for Attorneys’ Fees Mr. Quick received compensation. Therefore, he is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs by right. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1). III. Reasonable Amount of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs In light of the Secretary’s lack of objection, the undersigned has reviewed the fee application for its reasonableness. See McIntosh v. Secʼy of Health & Human Servs., 139 Fed. Cl. 238 (2018). Mr. Quick’s application is divided into two components: attorneys’ fees and attorneys’ costs. A. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees The Federal Circuit has approved the lodestar approach to determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the Vaccine Act. This is a two-step process. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008). First, a court determines an “initial estimate … by ‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. at 1347-48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Second, the court may make an upward or downward departure from the initial calculation of the fee award based on specific findings. Id. at 1348. Here, because the lodestar process yields a reasonable result, no additional adjustments are required. Instead, the analysis focuses on the elements of the lodestar formula, a reasonable hourly rate and a reasonable number of hours. Mr. Quick is requesting $57,676.35 in attorneys’ fees. 1. Reasonable Hourly Rates Under the Vaccine Act, special masters, in general, should use the forum (District of Columbia) rate in the lodestar calculation. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1349. There is, however, an exception (the so-called Davis County exception) to this general rule when the bulk of the work is done outside the District of Columbia and the attorneys’ rates are substantially lower. Id. 1349 2 (citing Davis Cty. Solid Waste Mgmt. and Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 169 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). In this case, all the attorneys’ work was done outside of the District of Columbia. The requested rates are consistent with what the attorneys of Siri & Glimstad have previously been awarded for their Vaccine Program work, and the proposed hourly rates are reasonable for work performed in the instant case. See Jones v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 22-1281V, 2025 WL 2925101 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sep. 16, 2025). 2. Reasonable Number of Hours The second factor in the lodestar formula is a reasonable number of hours. Reasonable hours are not excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. See Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Secretary also did not directly challenge any of the requested hours as unreasonable. Nevertheless, three topics merit attention. a) Paralegals Billing for Clerical Work Under various fee-shifting regimes, attorneys may charge for tasks performed by paralegals. The justification is that the paralegal is stepping in for an attorney and charging a lower hourly rate for work an attorney would otherwise perform. However, attorneys may not charge for clerical tasks because the attorney’s hourly rate reflects overhead expenses, such as employing a secretary. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989); Bennett v. Dep’t of Navy, 699 F.2d 1140, 1145 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Guy v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 403, 407-08 (1997). The dichotomy between paralegal activities (billable) and clerical activities (non-billable) is often announced. However, a general principle to differentiate them is somewhat elusive. To qualify as a paralegal, a person needs special training and experience. See Impresa Construzioni Geom. Demenico Garufi v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 750, 768 (2011); see also Pressly v. United States, No. 18-1964, 2025 WL 1780947, at *12 (Fed. Cl. May 12, 2025). Thus, one way to categorize whether activities can be billed is to ask whether the activity required special skills. A typical example of a duty paralegals perform is the summarization of medical records. See Fields for Estate of Lawrence v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-1056V, 2022 WL 3569300, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 27, 2022) (reducing attorney’s fees by approximately $17,000 because an attorney, not a paralegal, summarized medical records), mot. for rev. denied, 2022 WL 4100173 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 23, 2022). The person reading and condensing the medical records must have knowledge of the claim and how specific medical records could be relevant to a claim. Paralegals at Siri & Glimstead spent hours summarizing medical records. Time spent summarizing medical records is reasonable. However, paralegals also performed tasks that do not require any special training. For example, they spent time filing documents. To be clear, some clerical tasks are essential, such as filing documents. But, the employment of the person who can perform clerical tasks is built into the attorneys’ high hourly rate as part of overhead. See Pickens v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-187V, 2020 WL 414442 at *4 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 9, 2020) (denying motion for review of a decision reducing attorneys’ fees and stating “legal training is not required to notify the 3 Court that a document is being filed”); Guerrero v Secʼy of Health & Human Servs., No. 12- 689V, 2015 WL 3745354, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 22, 2015) (citing cases), mot. for rev. den’d in relevant part and granted in non-relevant part, 124 Fed. Cl. 153, 160 (2015), app. dismissed, No. 2016-1753 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 22, 2016). To eliminate excessive charges, $800.00 is removed. Other examples of clerical work include assembling documents, transmitting basic information such as a client’s address, and downloading documents from CM/ECF. These items are typically not billed in the undersigned’s experience. This category also includes two occasions on which Attorney Wallace billed (at one-half the usual hourly rate) for mailing documents. Legal training is not necessary to go to the post office. To eliminate excessive charges, $450 is removed. b) Attorneys Billing for Paralegal Tasks at Attorney Rates Just as paralegals should not bill for work that secretaries can perform, attorneys should not charge their full hourly rate for work that a paralegal can perform. When an attorney does the work of a paralegal or administrative assistant, he or she should be paid a rate commensurate with the nature of the work. See Valdes v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 415, 425 (2009) (noting that “the Special Master exercised appropriate discretion in denying requested costs for work performed by Petitioner’s counsel’s associate” when the special master determined “that the associate’s time spent obtaining medical records was more consistent with paralegal duties.”). Here, in January 2024, Attorney Wallace sorted out-of-pocket receipts. In the undersigned’s experience, this work is more often performed by paralegals. Although the time is accepted as reasonable, the hourly rate is reduced by approximately half, resulting in a deduction of $1,200.00. c) Activities taking an Excessive Amount of Time Excessive billing is not consistent with superior quality legal work. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 566-67 (1986). Here, relatively early in the litigation, the amount of time spent on routine motions for enlargement of time surpassed the amount of time typically spent. To eliminate the excessive charges, $400.00 is removed. The undersigned notes that to the firm’s credit, more recent entries are more restrained. Another activity with an excessive amount of time concerns the preparation of the pending application for attorneys’ fees and costs. A paralegal spent nearly 7 hours of time (worth more than $1,300) on “review and revise” motion for attorneys’ fees. It is not readily apparent what was being done as the motion is relatively standard motion with some case specific information (such as amounts) added. The paralegal’s time described above does not include 0.5 hours drafting affidavits for Attorney Wallace and another attorney. These affidavits, too, contain general information about the attorneys’ background and seem not to have been drafted for this case specifically. Ms. Wallace also spent more than 2 hours on the fee application. Overall, the entries regarding the preparation for the pending motion for attorneys’ 4 fees and costs do not establish a persuasive basis for awarding the amounts sought. Accordingly, $600.00 is removed. Other activities that were billed at higher-than-normal time include spending more than four hours of attorney time on helping Mr. Quick complete an affidavit about damages. Another example is spending 0.3 hours to review a status report, which was two pages. See entry for Nov. 8, 2022. To adjust for these charges, $1,000 is removed. d) Summary on Attorneys’ Fees Amount requested $57,676.35 Deduction for charging for filing documents -$800.00 Deduction for other clerical work -$450.00 Deduction for attorney rates for paralegal task -$1,200.00 Deduction for excessive time for motions for enlargement of time -$400.00 Deduction for excessive time on fees application -$600.00 Deduction for excessive time on damages affidavit -$1,000.00 TOTAL $53,226.35 Mr. Quick is therefore awarded $53,226.35 in attorneys’ fees. This is a deduction of approximately 8 percent. B. Costs Incurred Like attorneys’ fees, a request for reimbursement of costs must be reasonable. Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (Fed. Cl. 1992), aff’d, 33 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Petitioner requests a total of $16,021.91 in attorneys’ costs. A small portion consists of routine items, such as costs of acquiring medical records and postage costs. Petitioner has provided adequate documentation supporting the requested costs and all are reasonable. A larger portion ($15,142) derives from the costs associated with Staci Schonbrun of Labor Marketing Consulting Services from Tucson, Arizona. Exhibit 32 at 62-66. The invoice does not justify this charge.2 Like other professionals such as attorneys and doctors, life care planners are reimbursed based upon a lodestar formula in which a reasonable hourly rate is multiplied by a reasonable number of hours. D.S. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 10-77V, 2017 WL 6397826, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 20, 2017); see also Caves v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 111 2 Because the parties resolved this case informally and the cases did not enter the damages phase, Mr. Quick did not submit the life care plan Dr. Schonbrun prepared. However, Mr. Quick could have submitted the life care plan as part of the application for attorneys’ fees and costs. See Vaccine Rule 13. In any event, the parties agreed to compensate Mr. Quick without directly incorporating a life care plan. 5 Fed. Cl. 774, 779 (2013). Here, Dr. Schonbrun has charged $200.00 per hour, which is a reasonable, if lower-than-normal, rate. The problem, however, is that the invoice does not adequately describe the activities. For example, a typical entry reads “Research – Research, 0.5 @ $200.” But, no information was provided as to what is being researched. It seems likely that Attorney Wallace also had some questions about the invoice. See entries for May 20-21, 2025. The billing information from Labor Marketing Consulting Services includes a “Billing Addendum” defining various terms. For example, the term “Work Up,” means “drafting opinions, formulation of opinions, writing the draft of the report, research, review of statistics, articles and other publications and calculations.” Exhibit 32 at 66. This addendum is not particularly helpful in assessing the reasonableness of the time charged for various activities. For example, on May 10, 2023, how much of the 2.5 hours charged for “Work Up” was devoted to research (and if so, what was being researched), how much of the 2.5 hours was devoted to reviewing statistics (and if so, statistics about what topic), how much of the 2.5 hours was devoted to reviewing articles (and if so, articles about what topic)? To account for the vagueness and lack of clarity in the invoice, $3,000 is deducted. A more specific point concerns the amount billed for traveling. In May 2023, Dr. Schonbrun spent 24 hours traveling from Tucson to Birmingham round trip. It is not readily apparent why Attorney Wallace hired a life care planner based so far away. Even so, travel time is typically billed at one-half the professional’s hourly rate. Zumwalt v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 16-994V, 2018 WL 6975184, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 27, 2018) (“[E]xpert travel time is compensated at one-half the expert’s standard hourly rate absent a showing that they spent their travel time working on the matter in question.”). This results in a reduction of $2,400.00. Dr. Schonbrun has been advised of this problem. See Banks v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-0719V, 2021 WL 6285651 at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2021). These reductions for Dr. Schonbrun’s work are not intended as a critique of her work as a life care planner. The life care plan may be good, bad, or somewhere in between. Regardless of the quality of the life care plan, the quality of the invoicing was deficient and did not present a persuasive basis for compensating at the proposed amount. Accordingly, Mr. Quick is awarded $10,621.91 ($16,021.91 - $3,000.00 - $2,400) in attorneys’ costs. IV. Conclusion The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e). A reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees and costs is $63,848.26 (representing $53,226.35 in attorneys’ fees and $10,621.91 in attorneys’ costs) to be paid through an ACH deposit to petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement. 6 In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC, Appendix B, the clerk is directed to enter judgment according to this decision and the attached stipulation.3 IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Christian J. Moran Christian J. Moran Special Master 3 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties can expedite entry of judgment by each party filing a notice renouncing the right to seek review by a United States Court of Federal Claims judge. 7