VICP Registry Case Source Bundle
Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_20-vv-01321
Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_20-vv-01321
Petitioner: Latoya McCoy
Filed: 2020-10-05
Decided: 2024-10-15
Vaccine: influenza
Vaccination date: 2017-10-08
Condition: left shoulder pain / adhesive capsulitis alleged as SIRVA
Outcome: dismissed
Award amount USD: 

AI-assisted case summary:
On October 5, 2020, Latoya McCoy filed a petition alleging that an influenza vaccination on October 8, 2017 caused a left shoulder injury, later framed as SIRVA and adhesive capsulitis. The case did not resolve as a routine stipulation. Respondent opposed compensation, arguing that the records did not support a qualifying vaccine-caused shoulder injury.

The record described a complicated pre-vaccination picture. Ms. McCoy had prior bilateral shoulder and upper-extremity complaints in 2015 and 2016, including symptoms and treatment that made the timing of any post-vaccination injury important. Her later statements about when left shoulder pain began were inconsistent with contemporaneous records, and the SIRVA theory emerged long after the vaccination. Petitioner's expert, Dr. Michael Katz, opined that vaccination made preexisting degenerative shoulder changes symptomatic, but Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran found that opinion did not overcome the medical record problems.

On October 15, 2024, Chief Special Master Corcoran dismissed the case. He found that Ms. McCoy had not established Table SIRVA, causation-in-fact, or vaccine-related residual effects lasting more than six months. A later fee-and-costs dispute also went against petitioner: fees were denied for lack of reasonable basis, and Judge Kathryn C. Davis denied a motion for review on October 20, 2025. No vaccine-injury compensation was awarded.

Theory of causation field:
Influenza vaccine, October 8, 2017, alleged left SIRVA/adhesive capsulitis. DISMISSED. Petitioner relied on vaccine-related onset and expert Dr. Michael Katz, who opined vaccination made preexisting degenerative shoulder pathology symptomatic. Chief Special Master Corcoran found the record showed shoulder/upper-extremity symptoms before vaccination, inconsistent reporting, delayed SIRVA theory, and insufficient proof of Table criteria, causation-in-fact, and six-month vaccine-related sequelae. Entitlement dismissed October 15, 2024. Fee/costs later denied for lack of reasonable basis; Judge Kathryn C. Davis denied review on October 20, 2025. No compensation. Attorney Leah V. Durant; respondent Michael Bliley.

Public staged source text:

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DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_20-vv-01321-0
Date issued/filed: 2025-01-08
Pages: 16
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 10/15/2024) regarding 52 DECISION of Special Master. Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (af) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:20-vv-01321-KCD Document 54 Filed 01/08/25 Page 1 of 16
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 20-1321V
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
LATOYA MCCOY, * Chief Special Master Corcoran
*
*
*
Petitioner, * Filed: October 15, 2024
*
v. *
*
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND *
HUMAN SERVICES, *
*
Respondent. *
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Mark Sadaka, Law Offices of Sadaka Associates, LLC, Englewood, NJ, for Petitioner.
Felicia Langel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DECISION DISMISSING CASE1
On October 5, 2020, Latoya McCoy filed a petition for compensation under the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the “Vaccine Program”),2 ECF No. 1 (“Petition”).
Petitioner alleges that she experienced left shoulder pain and/or adhesive capsulitis after receiving
an influenza (“flu”) vaccine on October 8, 2017.
The matter was originally assigned to the Special Processing Unit (“SPU”), based on the
assumption that Petitioner had alleged something akin to the Table claim of a shoulder injury
1 Under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen (14) days within which to request redaction “of any information
furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or
confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the whole Decision will be available to the public
in its present form. Id.
2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660,
100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10–34 (2012)) (hereinafter “Vaccine Act” or “the Act”).
All subsequent references to sections of the Vaccine Act shall be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa.

Case 1:20-vv-01321-KCD Document 54 Filed 01/08/25 Page 2 of 16
related to vaccine administration, or “SIRVA,” suggesting in turn that it was likely to settle. But
intractable fact disputes resulted in the claim’s transfer to my docket.
Respondent has now moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that Petitioner cannot meet the
SIRVA Table elements, and otherwise has not established a viable causation-in-fact claim. Motion
to Dismiss, dated July 24, 2024 (ECF No. 49) (“Mot.”). Petitioner opposes the motion, maintaining
that she has established a prime facie case for a SIRVA-like injury, even if the facts do not meet
all of the Table elements. Opposition, dated August 29, 2024 (ECF No. 50) (“Opp.”).
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, I hereby determine (as discussed below) that
Petitioner has not offered sufficient evidence to meet either the Table SIRVA elements or to
establish a viable causation-in-fact claim – mainly, although not exclusively, due to the fact that
the record preponderates in favor of the conclusion that Petitioner’s injury predated vaccination.
For this reason, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.
I. Factual Background
Prior to receipt of the flu vaccine, Ms. McCoy had a history of intractable migraines. See
generally Ex. 3. Petitioner also reported bilateral shoulder pain in 2015 and 2016. Id. On October
8, 2017, Petitioner visited a Walgreens pharmacy and received the flu vaccine intramuscularly in
her left deltoid. Ex. 9 at 3.
There is no medical record evidence of any claimed immediate vaccine reaction. However,
Petitioner filed four declarations to support her claim that she experienced pain and weakness
immediately following the vaccine. In the first, Petitioner states that she noticed pain in her left
shoulder and arm one week after she received the flu vaccine. See Declaration of Latoya McCoy,
dated December 14, 2020 (ECF No. 9). In her second declaration, Petitioner explains that she
delayed seeking treatment for her arm because of her severe migraines, and the need to prioritize
their treatment. See Declaration of Latoya McCoy, dated October 28, 2022 (ECF No. 36).
Petitioner’s daughter also filed a declaration claiming that Petitioner complained of arm pain
“shortly after she received the [October 2017] flu vaccine,” and required assistance with holiday
preparations due to ongoing pain. See Declaration of Jondashia Mingo, dated September 14, 2022,
filed as Ex. 13 (ECF No. 36-1). And a declaration from Petitioner’s work colleague states that
Petitioner required assistance at work and missed workdays due to arm pain from “the flu vaccine
in October 2017.” See Declaration of Ashland Edwards, dated September 14, 2022, filed as Ex. 14
(ECF No. 36-2).
Despite the allegations set forth in these declarations, Petitioner’s first visit to any
physician following receipt of the vaccine occurred on November 30, 2017 – six weeks post-
2

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vaccination. Ex. 5 at 19. At this visit, Petitioner complained to her primary care provider (“PCP”)
only about cellulitis in her left hand – and did not mention any shoulder pain or related discomfort.
Id. Then, on February 1, 2018 (now about four months after the vaccination – and two months
after her last treater visit), Petitioner went back to her PCP complaining of a tender “knot” in her
upper left arm that had been present for about a year (meaning before vaccination). Id. at 16-17.
An ultrasound indicated no abnormalities. Id. at 42.
Over the next seven months through September 2018, Petitioner reported to medical
providers for treatment of her unrelated migraines on six occasions. Ex. 2 at 11-15; Ex. 5 at 10-14.
She never mentioned arm pain at any of these appointments, and sought no independent treatment
for that admittedly-distinguishable condition.
Then, on January 7, 2019 (now well over a year after the vaccination date), Petitioner
presented to Urgent Care and complained of 4/10 rated pain in her left arm after “getting [a] flu
vaccine 3 years ago.” Ex. 2 at 3-4 (emphasis added). On exam, Petitioner displayed reduced range
of motion (“ROM”) and was diagnosed with bursitis3 and adhesive capsulitis.4 Id. at 5. One week
later, on January 16, 2019, Petitioner followed up with her PCP and reported “left arm pain and
weakness for at least 2 years,” along with “electric” pain in her left bicep since her October 2017
vaccination. Ex. 5 at 8-9 (emphasis added).
An electromyography (“EMG”) test performed on April 24, 2019, showed cubital tunnel
syndrome5 in both of Petitioner’s arms. Ex. 4 at 18-22. On May 29, 2019, Petitioner saw a
neurologist and was diagnosed with cervical radiculopathy (pinched nerve). Id. at 4. She was
referred to physical therapy and attended seven sessions. See generally Ex. 11.
On June 20, 2019, Petitioner’s orthopedist noted that her cubital tunnel syndrome did not
explain her left shoulder issue. Ex. 6 at 10. MRIs and X-rays of Petitioner’s left shoulder revealed
a large, calcific deposit in the supraspinatus tendon, tendinopathy, and bursitis. Id. at 11.
3 “Bursitis” is defined as “inflammation of a bursa [fluid-filled sac] occasionally accompanied by a calcific deposit in
the underlying tendon.” Bursitis, Dorland’s Medical Dictionary Online,
https://www.dorlandsonline.com/dorland/definition?id=7315&searchterm=bursitis (last visited Oct. 8, 2024).
4 “Adhesive capsulitis” is defined as “adhesive inflammation between the joint capsule and the peripheral articular
cartilage of the shoulder with obliteration of the subdeltoid bursa, characterized by shoulder pain of gradual onset,
with increasing pain, stiffness, and limitation of motion. Called also adhesive bursitis and frozen shoulder.” Adhesive
capsulitis, Dorland’s Medical Dictionary Online,
https://www.dorlandsonline.com/dorland/definition?id=62985&searchterm=adhesive+capsulitis (last visited Oct. 8,
2024).
5 Cubital tunnel syndrome occurs when the ulnar nerve, which passes through the cubital tunnel (a tunnel of muscle,
ligament, and bone) on the inside of the elbow, becomes inflamed, swollen, and irritated.” Cubital tunnel syndrome,
University of Rochester Medical Center Health Encyclopedia,
https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/encyclopedia/content.aspx?ContentTypeID=85&ContentID=P00908 (last visited
Oct. 8, 2024).
3

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Petitioner’s orthopedist diagnosed her with “[l]eft arm lateral deltoid pain, status post injection,
now 2 years out." Id. at 10, 75-77. On August 9, 2019, Petitioner underwent surgery on her left
shoulder for calcific tendinosis removal, a tear repair, and a rotator cuff repair. Ex. 6 at 52-53.
After surgery, Petitioner attended twelve PT sessions. See generally Ex. 10. At the October 21,
2019 PT session, Petitioner reported that her shoulder felt “good.” Id. at 41.
Petitioner reported to her PCP in October 2019 and April 2020 for a rash and allergic
rhinitis, but did not mention her left arm at either of these appointments. Ex. 5 at 3-6.
II. Petitioner’s Expert – Dr. Michael Katz
Dr. Katz,6 an orthopedic surgeon, prepared a single written report on behalf of Petitioner.
See Report, dated May 15, 2024, filed as Ex. 18 (ECF No. 48-1) (“Katz Report”). Dr. Katz opines
that it is more likely than not that the administration of the flu vaccine caused the nascent and
degenerative changes in Petitioner’s left shoulder to become symptomatic and disabling. Katz
Report at 7.
In his report, Dr. Katz proposes that the pain and weakness in Petitioner’s left arm began
almost immediately after she received the flu vaccine in October 2017. Katz Report at 5. Dr. Katz
explains that Petitioner likely waited to seek treatment because she was hoping the pain would
resolve on its own and was preoccupied with her severe migraines. Id. In Dr. Katz’s opinion,
Petitioner’s shoulder pain and eventual need for surgery was causally linked to the flu vaccine. Id.
at 7.
Dr. Katz goes on to explain that a SIRVA injury is the result of an inflammatory effect
from vaccine administration into the subdeltoid bursa. Katz Report at 6. He then opines that a
logical sequence of cause and effect exists to support the conclusion that the flu vaccine was the
reason for Petitioner’s SIRVA. Id. Dr. Katz also argues that there is a proximate temporal
relationship between the flu vaccine and the Petitioner’s injury. Id. He explains that studies show
an onset of symptoms occur immediately, within 2-8 hours, or within 48 hours following receipt
of a vaccine. Id. According to Dr. Katz, Petitioner’s onset of symptoms is consistent with this, and
it is no surprise that she delayed seeking medical attention, as this is common among individuals
injured by vaccination. Id. In Dr. Katz’s view, the sequence of events and onset of symptoms
supports a conclusion that the flu vaccine caused Petitioner’s shoulder injury. Id. at 7.
III. Procedural History
As noted above, this case was initiated in October 2020 and was assigned to the SPU on
April 5, 2021. After Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) Report contesting Petitioner’s right to
6 Petitioner did not file a CV for Dr. Katz.
4

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compensation (ECF No. 32), I issued a Show Cause Order instructing Petitioner to submit any
supplemental material or briefing explaining why the claim should not be dismissed for insufficient
evidence. ECF No. 33. Petitioner filed a response on October 31, 2022. ECF No. 40 (“Brief”). On
September 27, 2023, the case was reassigned to my chambers due to its increasing complexity
(ECF No. 41), and on May 14, 2024, Petitioner filed Dr. Katz’s expert report. Two months later,
on July 24, 2024, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Petitioner has not proven by
preponderant evidence that the flu vaccine caused her arm injury. The parties subsequently briefed
dismissal, and the matter is now ripe for resolution.
IV. Parties’ Arguments
A. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
Respondent contends that Petitioner cannot meet all three prongs of the causation test set
by Althen v. Sec'y of Health and Hum. Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Mot. at 6-7.
Respondent first argues that Petitioner has not alleged a cognizable injury. Mot. at 6.
Petitioner has described (in her earlier brief) “an arm injury that eventually limited her range of
motion along with a granuloma from the injection itself.” Id. at 7 (citing Brief at 6). But this is not
a defined and/or recognized injury, as required for an off-Table claim, and would not otherwise
meet the qualifications for a SIRVA Table injury. Id. at 6-7 (referencing 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(c)(10)).
Respondent gives particularly short shrift to a possible Table claim based on these facts, noting
that the record establishes that Petitioner did not suffer onset of pain within 48 hours of vaccine
administration, her pain and reduced ROM were not limited to the shoulder in which the vaccine
was administered, and that there are other conditions or abnormalities present that would explain
her symptoms. Id. at 7 n.3.
Respondent then turns to the Althen prongs applicable to a possibly-remaining non-Table
claim. Respondent argues that Petitioner’s medical theory – that the flu vaccine can cause SIRVA,
when a previous vaccine introduced into the shoulder joint gives rise to antibodies in the synovial
tissues that are related to the effects of a subsequent vaccination – is vague at best and does meet
the standard for a reliable theory under Althen prong one. Mot. at 7. Petitioner also has not
established a logical sequence of cause and effect under Althen prong two, despite the allegations
set forth in the four declarations she filed and her social media posts.7 Id. Petitioner did not link
the flu vaccine to her shoulder injury until she presented to Urgent Care on January 7, 2019, fifteen
months post-vaccination – and worse, complained of left arm pain after “getting [a] flu vaccine 3
years ago,” which would have been long before October 2017. Ex. 2 at 3-4. Also, a June 2019
notation by Petitioner’s orthopedist stating, “[l]eft arm lateral deltoid pain, status post injection,
7 On March 1 and September 26, 2019, Petitioner posted on social media that she had experienced two years of arm
weakness and pain due to the 2017 vaccination. See generally Ex. 12 (ECF No. 35).
5

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now 2 years out,’ reflects only a possible temporal association and does not imply vaccine
causation. Mot. at 8 (citing Ex. 6 at 11).
Respondent concludes by arguing that Petitioner has failed to present preponderant
evidence of a proximate temporal relationship between the flu vaccination and her left arm pain
under Althen prong three. Mot. at 8. Although Petitioner’s declarations suggest she experienced
an immediate reaction to the vaccine, this is in stark contrast to her medical records – when
Petitioner visited her PCP for right hand cellulitis, 53 days post-vaccination, she failed to mention
any arm pain. Ex. 5 at 19. In fact, Petitioner did not report left arm pain until February 1, 2018,
and at that time noted a different problem: a knot in her upper arm that had been there for about
one year, and hence before the October 2017 vaccination. Ex. 5 at 17. It is possible, in fact, that
Petitioner’s reported timelines are jumbled because she was actually referring to an even earlier,
2016 flu vaccine that is not the subject of this case. Mot. at 8 (referencing Ex. 1 at 5). Because the
timing of Petitioner’s arm pain pre-dates the vaccination at issue, she cannot establish a proximate
temporal association. Id. at 9.
B. Petitioner’s Response
Petitioner argues that she has alleged a cognizable injury and maintains she has proffered
sufficient evidence of causation under all three Althen prongs for the case to go forward. Opp. at
4-5. Petitioner clarifies the nature of her claim, alleging that she suffered from adhesive capsulitis
with left shoulder pain and a loss of ROM – in effect, a SIRVA (even if she cannot meet all of the
Table elements) that can be analyzed as a non-Table claim. Id. at 3.
Thus, after receiving the flu vaccine, Petitioner experienced immediate soreness in her arm,
that progressively worsened into a presentation that Dr. Katz concluded was consistent with
SIRVA. Opp. at 4. According to Dr. Katz, the flu vaccine triggered symptomatic and disabling
degenerative changes in her shoulder. Id. Petitioner argues that Dr. Katz’s expert report supports
all three Althen prongs. Id. at 6. She also acknowledges some delay in treatment but blames her
preexisting debilitating migraines as the reason. Id. at 5. Once Petitioner started new medications
in November 2018, her migraines improved, and she felt well enough to seeks treatment for her
shoulder injury. Id. (citing Ex. 5 at 31). In conclusion, Petitioner argues that the medical record,
social media posts, and declarations all point to the flu vaccine as the cause of her arm injury. Id.
at 6.
V. Applicable Legal Standards
A. Petitioner’s Overall Burden in Vaccine Program Cases
To receive compensation in the Vaccine Program, a petitioner must prove either: (1) that
he suffered a “Table Injury”—i.e., an injury falling within the Vaccine Injury Table—
6

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corresponding to one of the vaccinations in question within a statutorily prescribed period of time
or, in the alternative, (2) that his illnesses were actually caused by a vaccine (a “Non-Table
Injury”). See Sections 13(a)(1)(A), 11(c)(1), and 14(a), as amended by 42 C.F.R. § 100.3; §
11(c)(1)(C)(ii)(I); see also Moberly v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 592 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); Capizzano v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 440 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006).8
For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance
of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). That is, a petitioner must offer evidence that
leads the “trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence
before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the judge of the fact’s
existence.” Moberly, 592 F.3d at 1322 n.2; see also Snowbank Enter. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct.
476, 486 (1984) (mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient under a preponderance standard).
Proof of medical certainty is not required. Bunting v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 931 F.2d
867, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In particular, a petitioner must demonstrate that the vaccine was “not
only [the] but-for cause of the injury but also a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.”
Moberly, 592 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Shyface v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 165 F.3d 1344,
1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Pafford v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 451 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2006). A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions;
rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent
physician. Section 13(a)(1).
In attempting to establish entitlement to a Vaccine Program award of compensation for a
Non-Table claim, a petitioner must satisfy all three of the elements established by the Federal
Circuit in Althen v. Sec'y of Health and Hum. Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005): “(1) a
medical theory causally connecting the vaccination and the injury; (2) a logical sequence of cause
and effect showing that the vaccination was the reason for the injury; and (3) a showing of
proximate temporal relationship between vaccination and injury.”
Each Althen prong requires a different showing. Under Althen prong one, petitioners must
provide a “reputable medical theory,” demonstrating that the vaccine received can cause the type
of injury alleged. Pafford, 451 F.3d at 1355–56 (citations omitted). To satisfy this prong, a
petitioner’s theory must be based on a “sound and reliable medical or scientific explanation.”
Knudsen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 35 F.3d 543, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Such a theory must
only be “legally probable, not medically or scientifically certain.” Id. at 549.
8 Decisions of special masters (some of which I reference in this ruling) constitute persuasive but not binding authority.
Hanlon v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 40 Fed. Cl. 625, 630 (1998). By contrast, Federal Circuit rulings concerning
legal issues are binding on special masters. Guillory v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 59 Fed. Cl. 121, 124 (2003),
aff’d 104 F. App’x. 712 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Spooner v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 13-159V, 2014 WL
504728, at *7 n.12 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 16, 2014).
7

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Petitioners may satisfy the first Althen prong without resort to medical literature,
epidemiological studies, demonstration of a specific mechanism, or a generally accepted medical
theory. Andreu v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 569 F.3d 1367, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing
Capizzano, 440 F.3d at 1325–26). Special masters, despite their expertise, are not empowered by
statute to conclusively resolve what are essentially thorny scientific and medical questions, and
thus scientific evidence offered to establish Althen prong one is viewed “not through the lens of
the laboratorian, but instead from the vantage point of the Vaccine Act’s preponderant evidence
standard.” Id. at 1380. Accordingly, special masters must take care not to increase the burden
placed on petitioners in offering a scientific theory linking vaccine to injury. Contreras, 121 Fed.
Cl. at 245 (“[p]lausibility . . . in many cases may be enough to satisfy Althen prong one” (emphasis
in original)).
In discussing the evidentiary standard applicable to the first Althen prong, the Federal
Circuit has consistently rejected the contention that it can be satisfied merely by establishing the
proposed causal theory’s scientific or medical plausibility. See Kalajdzic v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 2023-1321, 2024 WL 3064398, at *2 (Fed. Cir. June 20, 2024) (arguments “for
a less than preponderance standard” deemed “plainly inconsistent with our precedent” (citing
Moberly, 592 F.3d at 1322)); Boatmon v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 941 F.3d 1351, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 2023 WL 4117370, at *4
(Fed. Cl. May 18, 2023) (“[t]he standard has been preponderance for nearly four decades”), aff’d,
2024 WL 2873301 (Fed. Cir. June 7, 2024) (unpublished). And petitioners always have the
ultimate burden of establishing their overall Vaccine Act claim with preponderant evidence. W.C.
v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 704 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); Tarsell
v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 782, 793 (2017) (noting that Moberly “addresses the petitioner’s
overall burden of proving causation-in-fact under the Vaccine Act” by a preponderance standard).
The second Althen prong requires proof of a logical sequence of cause and effect, usually
supported by facts derived from a petitioner’s medical records. Althen, 418 F.3d at 1278; Andreu,
569 F.3d at 1375–77; Capizzano, 440 F.3d at 1326; Grant v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 956
F.2d 1144, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In establishing that a vaccine “did cause” injury, the opinions
and views of the injured party’s treating physicians are entitled to some weight. Andreu, 569 F.3d
at 1367; Capizzano, 440 F.3d at 1326 (“medical records and medical opinion testimony are favored
in vaccine cases, as treating physicians are likely to be in the best position to determine whether a
‘logical sequence of cause and effect show[s] that the vaccination was the reason for the injury’”)
(quoting Althen, 418 F.3d at 1280). Medical records are generally viewed as particularly
trustworthy evidence, since they are created contemporaneously with the treatment of the patient.
Cucuras v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 993 F.2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Medical records and statements of a treating physician, however, do not per se bind the
special master to adopt the conclusions of such an individual, even if they must be considered and
8

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carefully evaluated. Section 13(b)(1) (providing that “[a]ny such diagnosis, conclusion, judgment,
test result, report, or summary shall not be binding on the special master or court”); Snyder v. Sec’y
of Health & Hum. Servs., 88 Fed. Cl. 706, 746 n.67 (2009) (“there is nothing . . . that mandates
that the testimony of a treating physician is sacrosanct—that it must be accepted in its entirety and
cannot be rebutted”). As with expert testimony offered to establish a theory of causation, the
opinions or diagnoses of treating physicians are only as trustworthy as the reasonableness of their
suppositions or bases. The views of treating physicians should be weighed against other, contrary
evidence also present in the record—including conflicting opinions among such individuals.
Hibbard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 100 Fed. Cl. 742, 749 (2011) (not arbitrary or capricious
for special master to weigh competing treating physicians’ conclusions against each other), aff’d,
698 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Veryzer v. Sec’y of Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 06-522V,
2011 WL 1935813, at *17 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 29, 2011), mot. for review den’d, 100 Fed.
Cl. 344, 356 (2011), aff’d without opinion, 475 F. Appx. 765 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
The third Althen prong requires establishing a “proximate temporal relationship” between
the vaccination and the injury alleged. Althen, 418 F.3d at 1281. That term has been equated to the
phrase “medically-acceptable temporal relationship.” Id. A petitioner must offer “preponderant
proof that the onset of symptoms occurred within a timeframe which, given the medical
understanding of the disorder’s etiology, it is medically acceptable to infer causation.” de Bazan
v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 539 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The explanation for what
is a medically acceptable timeframe must align with the theory of how the relevant vaccine can
cause an injury (Althen prong one’s requirement). Id. at 1352; Shapiro v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 101 Fed. Cl. 532, 542 (2011), recons. den’d after remand, 105 Fed. Cl. 353 (2012), aff’d
mem., 503 F. Appx. 952 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Koehn v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 11-355V,
2013 WL 3214877 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 30, 2013), mot. for rev. den’d (Fed. Cl. Dec. 3,
2013), aff’d, 773 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
B. Legal Standards Governing Factual Determinations
The process for making determinations in Vaccine Program cases regarding factual issues
begins with consideration of the medical records. Section 11(c)(2). The special master is required
to consider “all [ ] relevant medical and scientific evidence contained in the record,” including
“any diagnosis, conclusion, medical judgment, or autopsy or coroner's report which is contained
in the record regarding the nature, causation, and aggravation of the petitioner's illness, disability,
injury, condition, or death,” as well as the “results of any diagnostic or evaluative test which are
contained in the record and the summaries and conclusions.” Section 13(b)(1)(A). The special
master is then required to weigh the evidence presented, including contemporaneous medical
records and testimony. See Burns v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 415, 417 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (determining that it is within the special master's discretion to determine whether to afford
greater weight to contemporaneous medical records than to other evidence, such as oral testimony
9

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surrounding the events in question that was given at a later date, provided that such determination
is evidenced by a rational determination).
As noted by the Federal Circuit, “[m]edical records, in general, warrant consideration as
trustworthy evidence.” Cucuras, 993 F.2d at 1528; Doe/70 v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 95
Fed. Cl. 598, 608 (2010) (“[g]iven the inconsistencies between petitioner's testimony and his
contemporaneous medical records, the special master's decision to rely on petitioner's medical
records was rational and consistent with applicable law”), aff'd, Rickett v. Sec'y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 468 F. App’x 952 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (non-precedential opinion). A series of linked
propositions explains why such records deserve some weight: (i) sick people visit medical
professionals; (ii) sick people attempt to honestly report their health problems to those
professionals; and (iii) medical professionals record what they are told or observe when examining
their patients in as accurate a manner as possible, so that they are aware of enough relevant facts
to make appropriate treatment decisions. Sanchez v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 11–685V,
2013 WL 1880825, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 10, 2013); Cucuras v. Sec'y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 26 Cl. Ct. 537, 543 (1992), aff'd, 993 F.2d at 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[i]t strains reason to
conclude that petitioners would fail to accurately report the onset of their daughter's symptoms”).
Accordingly, if the medical records are clear, consistent, and complete, then they should
be afforded substantial weight. Lowrie v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 03–1585V, 2005 WL
6117475, at *20 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 12, 2005). Indeed, contemporaneous medical records
are often found to be deserving of greater evidentiary weight than oral testimony—especially
where such testimony conflicts with the record evidence. Cucuras, 993 F.2d at 1528; see also
Murphy v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 23 Cl. Ct. 726, 733 (1991), aff'd per curiam, 968 F.2d
1226 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. den'd, Murphy v. Sullivan, 506 U.S. 974 (1992) (citing United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 396 (1947) (“[i]t has generally been held that oral
testimony which is in conflict with contemporaneous documents is entitled to little evidentiary
weight.”)).
However, the Federal Circuit has also noted that there is no formal “presumption” that
records are accurate or superior on their face to other forms of evidence. Kirby v. Sec’y of Health
& Hum. Servs., 997 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2021). There are certainly situations in which
compelling oral or written testimony (provided in the form of an affidavit or declaration) may be
more persuasive than written records, such as where records are deemed to be incomplete or
inaccurate. Campbell v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 69 Fed. Cl. 775, 779 (2006) (“like any
norm based upon common sense and experience, this rule should not be treated as an absolute and
must yield where the factual predicates for its application are weak or lacking”); Lowrie, 2005 WL
6117475, at *19 (“[w]ritten records which are, themselves, inconsistent, should be accorded less
deference than those which are internally consistent”) (quoting Murphy, 23 Cl. Ct. at 733)).
Ultimately, a determination regarding a witness's credibility is needed when determining the
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weight that such testimony should be afforded. Andreu, 569 F.3d at 1379; Bradley v. Sec'y of
Health & Hum. Servs., 991 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
When witness testimony is offered to overcome the presumption of accuracy afforded to
contemporaneous medical records, such testimony must be “consistent, clear, cogent, and
compelling.” Sanchez, 2013 WL 1880825, at *3 (citing Blutstein v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 90–2808V, 1998 WL 408611, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 30, 1998)). In determining the
accuracy and completeness of medical records, the Court of Federal Claims has listed four possible
explanations for inconsistencies between contemporaneously created medical records and later
testimony: (1) a person's failure to recount to the medical professional everything that happened
during the relevant time period; (2) the medical professional's failure to document everything
reported to her or him; (3) a person's faulty recollection of the events when presenting testimony;
or (4) a person's purposeful recounting of symptoms that did not exist. La Londe v. Sec'y of Health
& Hum. Servs., 110 Fed. Cl. 184, 203–04 (2013), aff'd, 746 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In making
a determination regarding whether to afford greater weight to contemporaneous medical records
or other evidence, such as testimony at hearing, there must be evidence that this decision was the
result of a rational determination. Burns, 3 F.3d at 417.
C. Analysis of Expert Testimony
Establishing a sound and reliable medical theory often requires a petitioner to present
expert testimony in support of his claim. Lampe v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 219 F.3d 1357,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Vaccine Program expert testimony is usually evaluated according to the
factors for analyzing scientific reliability set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 594–96 (1993). See Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 617 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (citing Terran v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Under Daubert, the factors for analyzing the reliability of testimony are:
(1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;
(3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error and whether there are
standards for controlling the error; and (4) whether the theory or technique
enjoys general acceptance within a relevant scientific community.
Terran, 195 F.3d at 1316 n.2 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–95).
In the Vaccine Program the Daubert factors play a slightly different role than they do when
applied in other federal judicial settings, like the district courts. Typically, Daubert factors are
employed by judges (in the performance of their evidentiary gatekeeper roles) to exclude evidence
that is unreliable or could confuse a jury. By contrast, in Vaccine Program cases these factors are
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used in the weighing of the reliability of scientific evidence proffered. Davis v. Sec'y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 94 Fed. Cl. 53, 66–67 (2010) (“uniquely in this Circuit, the Daubert factors have
been employed also as an acceptable evidentiary-gauging tool with respect to persuasiveness of
expert testimony already admitted”). The flexible use of the Daubert factors to evaluate the
persuasiveness and reliability of expert testimony has routinely been upheld. See, e.g., Snyder, 88
Fed. Cl. at 742–45. In this matter (as in numerous other Vaccine Program cases), Daubert has not
been employed at the threshold, to determine what evidence should be admitted, but instead to
determine whether expert testimony offered is reliable and/or persuasive.
Respondent frequently offers one or more experts in order to rebut a petitioner’s case.
Where both sides offer expert testimony, a special master's decision may be “based on the
credibility of the experts and the relative persuasiveness of their competing theories.”
Broekelschen v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 618 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing
Lampe, 219 F.3d at 1362). However, nothing requires the acceptance of an expert's conclusion
“connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert,” especially if “there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Snyder, 88 Fed. Cl. at 743
(quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 146 (1997)); see also Isaac v. Sec'y of Health & Hum.
Servs., No. 08–601V, 2012 WL 3609993, at *17 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 30, 2012), mot. for
review den'd, 108 Fed. Cl. 743 (2013), aff'd, 540 F. App’x. 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Cedillo,
617 F.3d at 1339). Weighing the relative persuasiveness of competing expert testimony, based on
a particular expert's credibility, is part of the overall reliability analysis to which special masters
must subject expert testimony in Vaccine Program cases. Moberly, 592 F.3d at 1325–26
(“[a]ssessments as to the reliability of expert testimony often turn on credibility determinations”);
see also Porter v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 663 F.3d 1242, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“this court
has unambiguously explained that special masters are expected to consider the credibility of expert
witnesses in evaluating petitions for compensation under the Vaccine Act”).
D. Consideration of Medical Literature
Both parties filed medical and scientific literature in this case, but not all such items factor
into the outcome of this decision. While I have reviewed all the medical literature submitted, I
discuss only those articles that are most relevant to my determination and/or are central to
Petitioner’s case—just as I have not exhaustively discussed every individual medical record filed.
Moriarty v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 2015–5072, 2016 WL 1358616, at *5 (Fed. Cir.
Apr. 6, 2016) (“[w]e generally presume that a special master considered the relevant record
evidence even though he does not explicitly reference such evidence in his decision”) (citation
omitted); see also Paterek v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 527 F. App’x 875, 884 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (“[f]inding certain information not relevant does not lead to—and likely undermines—the
conclusion that it was not considered”).
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E. Resolution of Matter Without Hearing
I am resolving Petitioner’s claim on the filed record. The Vaccine Act and Rules not only
contemplate but encourage special masters to decide petitions on the papers where (in the exercise
of their discretion) they conclude that doing so will properly and fairly resolve the case. Section
12(d)(2)(D); Vaccine Rule 8(d). The decision to rule on the record in lieu of hearing has been
affirmed on appeal. Kreizenbeck v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 945 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2020); see also Hooker v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 02-472V, 2016 WL 3456435, at *21
n.19 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 19, 2016) (citing numerous cases where special masters decided
case on the papers in lieu of hearing and that decision was upheld). I am simply not required to
hold a hearing in every matter, no matter the preferences of the parties. Hovey v. Sec’y of Health
& Hum. Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 397, 402–03 (1997) (determining that special master acted within his
discretion in denying evidentiary hearing); Burns, 3 F.3d at 417; Murphy v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 90-882V, 1991 WL 71500, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 19, 1991).
ANALYSIS
Petitioner appears to argue that she experienced an injury that is often thought to fall under
the SIRVA umbrella – adhesive capsulitis, also known as “frozen shoulder”, with left shoulder
pain and a loss of range of motion. Opp. at 3. Although she maintains enough evidence exists to
at least justify the case going forward, review of the record reveals a claim that cannot succeed,
whether analyzed as a Table SIRVA or as a causation-in-fact matter.
Although Petitioner does not formally attempt to show that she can meet the SIRVA Table
elements, Respondent is correct that the existing record reveals such a claim would not be tenable.
The Table Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation (“QAI”) for SIRVA require a petitioner
alleging a SIRVA to affirmatively establish the following: (1) no history of pain, inflammation, or
dysfunction of the affected shoulder prior to intramuscular vaccine administration; (2) pain occurs
within 48 hours of the vaccine administration; (3) pain and reduced range of motion are limited to
the shoulder in which the intramuscular vaccine was administered; and (4) no other condition or
abnormality is present that would explain Petitioner's symptoms. See 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(10).
Here, Petitioner complained of bilateral shoulder pain in the years leading up to the
vaccine. See generally Ex. 3. Thus, there is already some evidence of a “history of pain” that could
explain her alleged post-vaccination injury. In addition, the record reveals pain and other
complaints outside of the relevant shoulder. Thus, in January 2019, Petitioner reported “electric
pain” in her left biceps, limited ROM in her left shoulder and elbow, and weakness from her
shoulder to her hand. Ex. 5 at 8-9. An EMG later performed on April 24, 2019, showed that
Petitioner had cubital tunnel syndrome, resulting from nerve compression at the elbow. Ex. 4 at
18-22.
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In addition, when Petitioner visited a P.A. in May 2019, she complained of back and neck
pain, and the doctor diagnosed her with cervical radiculopathy, which occurs when a pinched
nerve in the neck leads to pain that can spread into the arms –an express SIRVA exclusionary
factor. Id. at 3; 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(10)(iv). And during a PT session in June 2019, Petitioner’s
physical therapist noted that there was palpable adhesion near Petitioner’s left biceps with severe
pain on palpitation. Ex. 11 at 43. Thus, Petitioner’s medical records show that her pain extended
well beyond her shoulder; indeed, it appears her entire arm, particularly her elbow and bicep, were
affected. This is not a case where such non-shoulder complaints can be differentiated from the
SIRVA. Compare Masters v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1640V, 2023 WL 9424779
at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 18, 2023) (finding Petitioner’s sole report of neck soreness and
radiating pain to be inconsequential when left shoulder pain was the focus of Petitioner’s
complaints).
Most detrimental to Petitioner’s claim, however, is the timing of the onset of symptoms.
For (as noted above) the evidence not only preponderates against a finding that her onset began
within 48 hours of receipt of the flu vaccine (as the Table requires), but supports the conclusion
that any shoulder-specific issues more likely than not preceded vaccination. Thus, the first two
times she ever reported shoulder pain (at treatment visits, it bears noting, that occurred well after
the October 2017 vaccination), Petitioner identified pre-vaccination onset dates. See e.g., Ex 5 at
16-17 (February 1, 2018 visit); Ex. 2 at 3-4 (January 7, 2019 visit); Ex. 5 at 8 (January 16, 2019
visit).
To overcome this record, Petitioner offers four witness statements9 and two social media
posts. But this evidence is unconvincing, taken on its own terms. Petitioner’s first social media
post, for example, places the onset of symptoms before the October 2017 flu vaccine, while the
second post says nothing about onset. See Ex. 12.10 Furthermore, the witness statements (all of
which were filed and created years after Petitioner received the vaccine), lack record corroboration,
and do not explain why Petitioner reported onsets before vaccination. Petitioner’s self-described
timeline, as detailed in the medical records, is confusing and inconsistent, and certainly does not
support a finding that her symptoms began after the October 2017 vaccination.11
9 Petitioner’s first declaration (ECF No. 9) was filed in December 2020. Petitioner’s second declaration (ECF No. 36),
the declaration from her colleague (ECF No. 36-2), and the declaration from her daughter (ECF No. 36-1) were filed
in October 2022.
10 In the first social media post, from March 1, 2019, Petitioner claims she has been experiencing two years of arm
pain due to the flu vaccine (which would be March 2017). Even if the reference to “two years” is taken broadly, this
is still only weakly supportive of her onset contentions. In the second social media post, from September 26, 2019,
Petitioner warns against the flu vaccine generally. See Ex. 12 (ECF No. 35).
11 I also do not give significant weight to Petitioner’s arguments that her debilitating migraines caused her to delay
treatment. Opp. at 5. Although it is reasonable to contend that concerns about a more pressing health issue might lead
an individual to downplay other legitimate health matters, statements Petitioner made to medical treaters when she did
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This otherwise is not a case in which witness statements merit greater weight than medical
records, or where the statements provide missing context or add details that add nuance to the
disputed onset issue. When reviewing evidence in a case, special masters (already empowered to
weigh evidence) may give greater weight to medical records. Rickett v. Sec'y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 468 F. App'x 952, *958 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As this court explained in Cucuras v. Sec'y of
Health & Human Servs.:
“[t]he Supreme Court counsels that oral testimony in conflict with contemporaneous
documentary evidence deserves little weight. United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 396, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948) .... Medical records, in general,
warrant consideration as trustworthy evidence. The records contain information supplied
to or by health professionals to facilitate diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions.
With proper treatment hanging in the balance, accuracy has an extra premium. These
records are also generally contemporaneous to the medical events.” 993 F.2d 1525, 1528
(Fed.Cir.1993).
The foregoing is true even though witness statements can be offered to vary or supplement medical
record evidence, and although records are not “presumptively” correct. Kirby, 997 F.3d at 1383.
In this case, the statements in Petitioner’s declarations conflict with the contents of Petitioner’s
medical records – but no compelling reason has been provided by Petitioner not to favor the
contemporaneous record and what it suggests about onset.
Because Petitioner cannot preponderantly show her pain did not precede vaccination,12 she
cannot succeed under any form of the claim, Table or not. This by itself is grounds for the claim’s
dismissal – although it is not the only reason to find the claim is not tenable. For even if I merely
determined a Table claim could not be advanced, I would still be able to find that a causation
theory could “work.” Dr. Katz’s opinion largely seeks to argue that Petitioner experienced a
SIRVA, despite all of the fact issues pointed out above with that conclusion. Opp. at 4. His
conclusory opinion does not set forth a reliable theory for how the flu vaccine could cause or
worsen a shoulder injury given the facts, or some kind of condition involving Petitioner’s
presentation, which went well beyond her complaints of shoulder pain.
seek treatment for her shoulder place the onset of symptoms before receipt of the 2017 flu vaccine. Thus, these delay
explanations do not account for such symptoms reporting.
12 The Vaccine Act does permit petitioners to attempt to establish that vaccination worsened a condition or illness that
preceded a vaccine’s administration. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–11(c)(1)(C)(i) -(ii). But Petitioner has not raised a significant
aggravation claim in this case or in the present briefing, and Dr. Katz does not propose that the vaccine aggravated an
existing shoulder injury.
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CONCLUSION
Claimants must carry their burden of proof. Because Petitioner cannot show by
preponderant evidence that the flu vaccine likely caused her shoulder injury, I deny entitlement.
In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the Clerk of the
Court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with the terms of this Decision.13
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
13 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment if (jointly or separately) they file notices
renouncing their right to seek review.
16

================================================================================
DOCUMENT 2: USCOURTS-cofc-1_20-vv-01321-2
Date issued/filed: 2025-11-04
Pages: 15
Docket text: JUDGE VACCINE REPORTED OPINION (PUBLIC VERSION) re: 63 Order on Motion for Review, Judge Vaccine Order/Opinion. Signed by Judge Kathryn C. Davis. (mt) Service on parties made.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Case 1:20-vv-01321-KCD Document 65 Filed 11/04/25 Page 1 of 15
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
______________________________________
)
LATOYA McCOY, )
)
Petitioner, ) No. 20-1321
)
v. ) Filed: October 20, 2025
)
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND ) Re-issued: November 4, 2025
HUMAN SERVICES, )
)
Respondent. )
______________________________________ )
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Latoya McCoy (“Petitioner”) asks this Court to set aside the Chief Special
Master’s ruling denying an award of attorney’s fees and costs following her unsuccessful petition
for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
10, et seq. (“Vaccine Act”). According to Petitioner, an influenza (“flu”) vaccine administered in
October 2017 injured her left shoulder. The Chief Special Master found that Petitioner failed to
establish a reasonable basis for her Vaccine Act claim and thus was not entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees and costs. In accordance with Rules 23 and 24 of the Vaccine Rules of the United
States Court of Federal Claims (“Vaccine Rules”), Petitioner filed a Motion for Review in this
Court, arguing that the Chief Special Master’s decision was erroneous and unsupported by the law.
After considering the arguments presented by the parties, the Court finds that the Chief Special
Master properly applied the reasonable basis standard and did not abuse his discretion. Therefore,
the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Review.
 The Court issued this opinion under seal on October 20, 2025, and directed the parties to
file any proposed redactions by November 3, 2025. As the parties do not propose any redactions,
the Court reissues the opinion publicly in full.

Case 1:20-vv-01321-KCD Document 65 Filed 11/04/25 Page 2 of 15
I. BACKGROUND
A. Petitioner’s Medical History, Vaccination, and Symptoms
On October 8, 2017, Petitioner received the flu vaccine in her left shoulder. See Pet. ¶ 2,
ECF No. 1. Petitioner alleges that immediately following administration of the vaccine, she
experienced pain and weakness in her left shoulder and arm. See id. ¶ 3; McCoy Decl. ¶¶ 5–6,
ECF No. 9-1. Prior to this vaccination, Petitioner had reported bilateral shoulder pain twice: first
in 2015 and again in 2016. Pet’r’s Ex. 3, ECF No. 6-3.
Although there is no medical record documenting an immediate reaction to Petitioner’s
October 2017 flu vaccine, Petitioner’s daughter and coworker both submitted statements declaring
that Petitioner suffered pain in her left arm shortly after receiving the vaccine. See Mingo Decl.,
ECF No. 36-1; Edwards Decl., ECF No. 36-2. Petitioner also filed her own declaration stating
that she first suffered pain in her left shoulder and arm one week after receiving the vaccine. ECF
No. 9-1 ¶ 5.
The first time Petitioner reported left arm pain to a physician post-vaccination was when
she visited her primary care provider approximately four months later, on February 1, 2018. See
Pet’r’s Ex. 5 at 16, ECF No. 6-5. At that appointment, she identified a “tender ‘knot’ in her upper
left arm that had been present for about a year (meaning before vaccination).” Dec. Dismissing
Pet. at 3, ECF No. 52 (emphasis in original) (citing ECF No. 6-5 at 16–17). Petitioner had
previously visited a physician following her vaccination but did not mention left shoulder or arm
pain at that appointment. See ECF No. 6-5 at 19. Petitioner claims that she delayed receiving
medical care for her arm because she needed to focus on treating her severe migraines. McCoy
Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 39-1.
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Nearly one year later, on January 7, 2019, Petitioner went to urgent care complaining of
“pain in her left arm after ‘getting [a] flu vaccine 3 years ago.’” ECF No. 52 at 3 (alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (quoting Pet’r’s Ex. 2 at 3–4, ECF No. 6-2). At that visit, Petitioner
was diagnosed with bursitis and adhesive capsulitis. ECF No. 6-2 at 5. One week later, Petitioner
again visited her primary care physician “and reported ‘left arm pain and weakness for at least two
years,’ along with ‘electric’ pain in her left bicep since her October 2017 vaccination.” ECF No.
52 at 3 (emphasis added) (quoting ECF No. 6-5 at 8–9). Due to continuing issues with her left
shoulder, Petitioner visited an orthopedist on June 20, 2019, who ultimately diagnosed her with
“[l]eft arm lateral deltoid pain, status post injection now 2 years out.” Pet’r’s Ex. 6 at 10–11, ECF
No. 6-6. Petitioner underwent surgery and attended physical therapy to alleviate the issues in her
left shoulder and arm. Id. at 52–53; Pet’r’s Ex. 10, ECF No. 24-1; Pet’r’s Ex. 11, ECF No. 29-1.
On May 14, 2024, Petitioner submitted an expert report from orthopedic surgeon Dr.
Michael Katz. See Katz Report, ECF No. 48. In his report, Dr. Katz opined that Petitioner’s
October 2017 flu vaccine likely “caused the nascent and asymptomatic degenerative changes [in
Petitioner’s] left shoulder to become symptomatic and disabling.” Id. at 7. According to Dr. Katz,
the onset of Petitioner’s symptoms combined with the sequence of events led him to believe that
the flu vaccine caused Petitioner’s left shoulder injury. Id.
B. Procedural History
Petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the Vaccine Act on October 5, 2020. See
ECF No. 1. In the Petition, she alleged that her October 2017 flu vaccine caused her left shoulder
pain and injury. See id. ¶ 15. Petitioner’s case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit on
April 5, 2021. ECF No. 17. Although the case initially seemed likely to settle, see ECF No. 52 at
1–2, on July 1, 2022, Respondent filed a Rule 4(c) Report opposing Petitioner’s right to
3

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compensation, Resp’t’s Rule 4(c) Report, ECF No. 32. Following Respondent’s Report, the Chief
Special Master issued a Show Cause Order requiring Petitioner to submit supplemental material
or briefing in order to avoid dismissal for insufficient evidence. O.S.C., ECF No. 33. Petitioner
filed her response on October 31, 2022. Pet’r’s Resp. to O.S.C., ECF No. 40. Due to factual
disputes, the case was reassigned to the Chief Special Master. ECF No. 52 at 2; see also ECF No.
42. Respondent subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 49), which the Chief Special
Master granted on October 15, 2024. See ECF No. 52. Petitioner did not appeal that decision.
On March 12, 2025, Petitioner filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. Pet’r’s Mot.
for Att’y’s Fees and Costs, ECF No. 55. After finding that Petitioner lacked a reasonable basis for
her compensation claim, the Chief Special Master denied her motion. See Dec. Den. Award of
Att’y’s Fees and Costs, ECF No. 58. Petitioner filed a Motion for Review of that decision on June
5, 2025, and Respondent filed a response on July 1, 2025. See Pet’r’s Mot. for Review, ECF No.
60; Resp’t’s Resp. to Mot. for Review, ECF No. 62. The Motion for Review is now ripe for
adjudication.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. This Court’s Standard of Review
Under the Vaccine Act, this Court has jurisdiction to review a special master’s decision
upon the timely request of either party. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2). A court deciding a motion
for review may:
(A) uphold the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the special master and
sustain the special master’s decision,
(B) set aside any findings of fact or conclusion of law of the special master found
to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law and issue its own findings of fact and conclusions of law,
or
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(C) remand the petition to the special master for further action in accordance with
the court’s direction.
Id. § 300aa-12(e)(2)(A)–(C); accord Vaccine Rule 27(a)–(c). The Court reviews factual findings
under the arbitrary and capricious standard; discretionary rulings under the abuse of discretion
standard; and conclusions of law under the “not in accordance with law” standard, which is de
novo review. Munn v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 970 F.2d 863, 870 n.10 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
The decision to grant or deny attorney’s fees and costs is discretionary. See James-
Cornelius v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 984 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[E]ven when
[the statutory] requirements are satisfied, a special master retains discretion to grant or deny
attorneys’ fees.”). Accordingly, the Court reviews the Chief Special Master’s decision under an
abuse of discretion standard. Chuisano v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 283–84 (2014). “An
abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; is based on
an erroneous conclusion of law; rests on clearly erroneous fact findings; or involves a record that
contains no evidence on which [a special master] could base [his] decision.” Cottingham v. Sec’y
of Health & Hum. Servs., 971 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing In re Durance, 891 F.3d
991, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). A special master’s failure to consider the objective evidence
presented by the petitioner in support of a reasonable basis similarly constitutes an abuse of
discretion. Id.
When reviewing for an abuse of discretion, the Court owes the special master’s fact-finding
great deference. See Flores v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 115 Fed. Cl. 157, 165 (2014), aff’d,
586 F. App’x 588 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Court must not “reweigh the factual evidence, assess
whether the special master correctly evaluated the evidence, or examine the probative value of the
evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” Porter v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 663 F.3d
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1242, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In short, the Court does not “second guess” the special master’s
factual conclusions. Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 617 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (quoting Hodges v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir.
1993)). This restraint is particularly important where, as here, the case involves a dispute over the
medical evidence of causation. Id. It is the role of the special master, and not this Court, to
examine the weight of the evidence and determine whether that evidence establishes a reasonable
basis for the claim. Cottingham, 971 F.3d at 1347.
B. The Reasonable Basis Standard
Under the Vaccine Act, an unsuccessful petitioner may nevertheless be awarded attorney’s
fees and costs “if the special master or court determines that the petition was brought in good faith
and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” 42 U.S.C. §
300aa–15(e)(1). In this case, Petitioner’s good faith is not at issue. The only question before the
Chief Special Master was whether Petitioner had a reasonable basis for her claim. See ECF No.
58 at 2–3 n.3.
The reasonable basis standard is “an objective test, satisfied through objective evidence.”
Cottingham, 971 F.3d at 1344 (citing Simmons, 875 F.3d at 635). Although the “burden of proof
to establish reasonable basis for attorney fees . . . is lower than the preponderant evidence standard
required to prove entitlement to compensation,” it requires “more than a mere scintilla” of
evidence. Id. at 1346. Accordingly, the petitioner must submit at least “some evidence” to support
each element of the claim. Chuisano, 116 Fed. Cl. at 288; see also Sheller v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 121 F.4th 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“To establish entitlement to attorneys’ fees
pursuant to a Vaccine Act claim, a petitioner must have a reasonable basis to support each of the
five statutorily required elements of the petition . . . .”). Beyond this broad definition, however,
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the reasonable basis standard is largely undefined. Wirtshafter v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
155 Fed. Cl. 665, 672 (2021); Carter v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 132 Fed. Cl. 372, 379
(2017).
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner lays out four objections to the Chief Special Master’s decision declining to award
her attorney’s fees and costs. According to Petitioner, the Chief Special Master: (1) applied a
legally erroneous standard, ECF No. 60 at 5; (2) imposed a heightened evidentiary burden, id. at
7; (3) failed to evaluate whether a reasonable basis for her claim existed at the time of filing, id.;
and (4) disregarded medical and affidavit evidence, id. All four objections fail. Therefore, the
Court upholds the Chief Special Master’s fee decision in full.
A. The Chief Special Master Correctly Applied the Reasonable Basis Standard.
Petitioner argues that the Chief Special Master misapplied the legal standard by
“improperly dismiss[ing] objective evidence,” including witness statements, an expert report, and
the temporal connection between Petitioner’s flu vaccine and her shoulder injury. Id. at 6.
According to Petitioner, the Chief Special Master’s “refusal to credit” this evidence “improperly
elevated the evidentiary threshold and failed to consider the totality of the circumstances at the
time of filing.” Id. at 6–7.
Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Chief Special Master did not apply a legally
erroneous standard. In a thorough summary, the Chief Special Master correctly explained the
reasonable basis standard as set forth in the statute and further articulated in the relevant case law.
ECF No. 58 at 2–3. He went on to consider and discuss the evidence presented by Petitioner,
ultimately determining that Petitioner did not meet her burden of establishing a reasonable basis
for her claim. Id. at 4–5. Contrary to her contention, in doing so, the Chief Special Master did not
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dismiss Petitioner’s witness statements and expert report. Instead, he specifically found that
“Petitioner’s witness[] statements . . . lack corroboration from the medical records and do not seek
to rectify the inconsistencies regarding a pre-vaccination onset date.” Id. at 4. Although the Chief
Special Master did not give much weight to the witness statements, he expressly acknowledged
them and explained why he did not find them credible. A special master’s credibility evaluations
“are virtually unchallengeable on appeal.” Lampe v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 219 F.3d
1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This grant of discretion is appropriate considering the special
masters’ congressionally designated role and “accumulated expertise in the field.” Hodges, 9 F.3d
at 961. Accordingly, this Court defers to the Chief Special Master’s determination that the witness
statements lacked credibility and therefore failed to correct the deficiencies in Petitioner’s claim.
As for Petitioner’s expert report, it is true that the Chief Special Master did not explicitly
refer to the report in the analysis section of his decision. However, special masters are not required
to “discuss every item of evidence in the record.” Snyder v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., 36 Fed. Cl. 461, 466 (1996), aff’d, 117 F.3d 545 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Indeed, the Court
“generally presume[s] that a special master considered the relevant record evidence even though
he does not explicitly reference such evidence in his decision.” Moriarty v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 844 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Hazlehurst v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 604 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). This presumption may be overcome if the special
master indicates otherwise, id., but here, the Chief Special Master made no statement implying
that he refused to consider the report. See generally ECF No. 58 at 4. Indeed, he referenced the
expert report as a piece of evidence relied on by Petitioner to substantiate her fee request. See id.
at 4 (“Petitioner maintains that her filed affidavits and expert report are additional pieces of
evidence that provide ample and objective support for the decision to file and pursue the claim in
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good faith.”). Considering this, the Court will not overturn the Chief Special Master’s decision
based on Petitioner’s assertion that he failed to consider her expert report.
Similarly, Petitioner’s recital of her evidence does not convince this Court that the Chief
Special Master erred in his analysis of her claim. As the Chief Special Master correctly stated, to
establish a reasonable basis for a vaccine injury claim, at least some objective evidence must be
furnished to support each element. See id. at 2–3. And here, the record “lacks objective evidence
demonstrating that Petitioner’s alleged shoulder injury occurred after vaccination—a critical
element of any Program claim not alleging significant aggravation.” Id. at 4 (emphasis in original)
(noting record evidence of Petitioner’s “history of pain” and her own testimony identifying a
“symptom onset that preceded her vaccination” (quoting ECF No. 52 at 13)). Finding that
Petitioner failed to produce credible evidence demonstrating causation does not “elevate[] the
evidentiary threshold,” as Petitioner argues. ECF No. 60 at 7. It merely maintains it, as Petitioner
is required to produce some evidence of causation to establish a reasonable basis for her claim.
See Cottingham, 971 F.3d at 1346 (“Because causation is a necessary element of a petition, [the
petitioner] must point to evidence of a causal relationship between the administration of the
vaccine and her injuries . . . .”).
Petitioner references two cases—James-Cornelius and Sheller—to additionally argue that
medical records and affidavit testimony may establish a reasonable basis even where
inconsistencies exist. See ECF No. 60 at 6–7. In James-Cornelius, the Federal Circuit overturned
a special master’s decision denying attorney’s fees and costs because the special master refused to
consider affidavit testimony, incorrectly finding it to be “categorically not objective.” 984 F.3d at
1380–81 (quotation omitted). Petitioner argues that the error in James-Cornelius was a failure to
credit affidavit testimony “due to inconsistencies without sufficient justification and requiring
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corroborating evidence beyond what is mandated by statute or precedent.” ECF No. 60 at 6. That
mischaracterizes the Federal Circuit’s opinion. The Federal Circuit did not overturn the special
master’s decision because the Court disagreed with the special master’s review of the petitioner’s
affidavits; the Court overturned the special master’s decision because the special master failed to
review the affidavits at all. See James-Cornelius, 984 F.3d at 1380. Here, the Chief Special
Master did not refuse to consider Petitioner’s witness testimony. Instead, he appropriately
evaluated the witness statements and found they “lack[ed] corroboration” and failed to “rectify the
inconsistencies” in the record. ECF No. 58 at 4. This evaluation may not be what Petitioner would
prefer, but it is not legal error.
The second case Petitioner relies upon similarly fails to support Petitioner’s argument.1 In
Sheller, the Federal Circuit reversed a special master’s denial of attorney’s fees and costs after
finding that the special master failed to consider whether the petitioner’s causation theory was
reasonable at the time of filing. 121 F.4th at 1308. Here, the Chief Special Master considered
Petitioner’s attempt to explain the inconsistency in the record but found that Petitioner’s
explanation failed to outweigh the evidence that demonstrated a pre-vaccination onset of
symptoms. ECF No. 58 at 4. This balancing of the evidence is squarely within the role of a special
master, see Cottingham, 971 F.3d at 1347, and does not serve to “elevate[] the evidentiary
threshold” beyond requiring a reasonable basis, ECF No. 60 at 6–7. Because the Chief Special
1 The case Petitioner cites is Sheller v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 2024 WL
1495476 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 29, 2024). That citation is unconnected to any opinion this
Court could find. The 2024 WL 1495476 Westlaw citation leads to a complaint filed in a Florida
state court contract case. And while the Office of the Special Masters did adjudicate a case with
the caption Sheller v. Secretary of Health of Health & Human Services, no opinion issued on March
29, 2024. See generally Ct. Docket, No. 18-696 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 17, 2018). Respondent
presumed that Petitioner intended to reference the Federal Circuit’s opinion in that case, Sheller v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services, 121 F.4th 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2024). See ECF No. 62 at 10
n.3. This Court will do the same.
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Master did not fail to consider the evidence presented, but instead found it to lack credibility and
consistency, he did not abuse his discretion by misapplying the reasonable basis standard.
B. The Chief Special Master Did Not Impose a Heightened Evidentiary Burden on
Petitioner.
Petitioner’s second objection is largely indistinguishable from her first. Compare id. at 6–
7 (“The refusal to credit Petitioner’s affidavits and expert report due to perceived inconsistencies
improperly elevated the evidentiary threshold and failed to consider the totality of [the]
circumstances at the time of filing.” (emphasis added)) with id. at 7 (“The Special Master’s
disregard of these submissions effectively imposed a heightened evidentiary burden inconsistent
with Vaccine Act precedent.” (emphasis added)). For similar reasons, this argument also fails.
Petitioner argues that “the record contained ‘more than a scintilla’ of objective evidence,”
and thus she satisfied her evidentiary burden. Id. at 7 (capitalization removed). But “a petitioner
does not automatically satisfy the reasonable basis standard by producing ‘more than a mere
scintilla’ of evidence in support of a claim.” Cottingham v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 159
Fed. Cl. 328, 333 (2022) (quoting Cottingham, 971 F.3d at 1346), aff’d, No. 2022-1737, 2023 WL
7545047 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2023). Instead, the special master retains discretion to require
evidence that exceeds a mere scintilla but remains less than that required for a preponderance. See
id. Although Petitioner no doubt believes her medical evidence and witness statements establish
a reasonable basis for her claim, the Chief Special Master’s contrary evaluation of the evidence
did not serve to “impose[] a heightened evidentiary burden.” ECF No. 60 at 7. The Chief Special
Master was authorized to weigh the objective evidence when determining whether it established a
reasonable basis for the claim. Cottingham, 971 F.3d at 1347.
In doing so here, the Chief Special Master did not “disregard” the evidence, as Petitioner
claims. ECF No. 60 at 7. Rather, he reviewed the record and found that Petitioner lacked credible
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evidence demonstrating the temporal relationship required for causation. See ECF No. 58 at 4
(discussing Petitioner’s witness statements and Petitioner’s argument that her history of chronic
and debilitating migraines explains the inconsistencies in the timeline). Accordingly, the Chief
Special Master did not abuse his discretion or fail to act in accordance with the law.
C. The Chief Special Master Properly Evaluated the Viability of the Claim at the
Time of Filing.
Petitioner thirdly argues that the Chief Special Master “failed to evaluate the reasonable
basis at the time of filing.” ECF No. 60 at 7 (capitalization removed). Petitioner is correct that a
special master must determine whether a reasonable basis existed at the time the petitioner filed
her Vaccine Act claim. See Sheller, 121 F.4th at 1308. Here, however, the Chief Special Master
did not fail to do so.
In his decision, the Chief Special Master found that “[Petitioner’s] claim was objectively
untenable from the outset.” ECF No. 58 at 4 (emphasis added). According to the Chief Special
Master, “this is not a case in which the development of a fact, out of ambiguous records, later
revealed that a claim that initially appeared viable in fact was not.” Id. (emphasis in original). As
such, the Chief Special Master determined that the flaws in Petitioner’s case were clear at the time
of filing. See id.
When stating her objection, Petitioner does not point to any specific evidence or theory
that the Chief Special Master failed to consider in the context of the time of filing. See ECF No.
60 at 7. Petitioner solely argues that “[t]he claim was not speculative or frivolous” because
“Petitioner’s counsel had gathered affidavits, reviewed records, and reasonably relied on evidence
available when initiating the petition.” Id. Efforts to compile evidence do not necessarily ensure
that a claim is supported by a reasonable basis. The Chief Special Master was required to judge
the evidence gathered by Petitioner and determine whether it was sufficient to establish a
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reasonable basis at the time of filing. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–15(e)(1). Because the Chief Special
Master found Petitioner’s claim to be “untenable from the outset,” ECF No. 58 at 4, and Petitioner
cites no specific evidence that the Chief Special Master failed to consider in the time-of-filing
context, Petitioner’s objection fails.
D. The Chief Special Master Did Not Disregard Petitioner’s Medical and Affidavit
Evidence.
For her final objection, Petitioner again argues that the Chief Special Master failed to
acknowledge her medical and affidavit evidence. For the reasons explained above, this argument
is unavailing. To the extent Petitioner challenges the Chief Special Master’s evaluation of the
evidence, see, e.g., ECF No. 60 at 8 (arguing that the evidence “suffices to establish reasonable
basis”); id. at 9 (stating that Petitioner’s “affidavits strengthen the record . . . and fulfill the
evidentiary threshold for reasonable basis”), this Court is required to afford great deference to the
Chief Special Master. The role of this Court “is not to second guess the Special Master[’s] fact-
intensive conclusions; the standard of review is uniquely deferential for what is essentially a
judicial process.” Hodges, 9 F.3d at 961.
According to Petitioner, “Respondent’s own Rule 4(c) Report contains factual admissions
that reinforce the existence of a reasonable basis.” ECF No. 60 at 7. As Respondent aptly argues,
however, the Report’s inclusion of the facts of the case says nothing about their ability to establish
a reasonable basis. See ECF No. 62 at 12 (“In practice, the facts of the case are always included
in respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report to support his medical analysis and legal arguments.”). Even if
the facts listed in Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report were construed as “factual admissions,” ECF No.
60 at 7, Respondent did not admit that they were sufficient to establish a reasonable basis. And
regardless, whether the facts establish a reasonable basis is a conclusion left to the discretion of
the Chief Special Master. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–15(e)(1). Petitioner may argue that Respondent’s
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“acknowledgment of the facts . . . demonstrates that the claim rested on objective,
contemporaneous, and medically credible evidence at the time of filing,” ECF No. 60 at 8, but the
Chief Special Master remained free to disagree.
Upon review, this Court finds that the Chief Special Master properly examined the
evidence before finding that Petitioner’s claim lacked a reasonable basis. Petitioner’s medical
record documented complaints of bilateral shoulder pain prior to her receipt of the October 2017
flu vaccine. See ECF No. 6-3. And the first two times Petitioner reported shoulder pain post-
vaccination, she said the pain began prior to her vaccination. ECF No. 6-5 at 16–17; ECF No. 6-
2 at 3–4; see also ECF No. 52 at 14. Based on this timeline, the Chief Special Master found that
Petitioner failed to provide “objective evidence demonstrating that Petitioner’s alleged shoulder
injury occurred after vaccination—a critical element of any [Vaccine Act] claim . . . .” ECF No.
58 at 4 (emphasis in original); see also ECF No. 52 at 14 (“Petitioner’s self-described timeline, as
detailed in the medical records, is confusing and inconsistent, and certainly does not support a
finding that her symptoms began after the October 2017 vaccination.” (emphasis in original)). The
evidence relied on by the Chief Special Master is sufficient to assure this Court that the Chief
Special Master did not abuse his discretion or act arbitrarily or capriciously when reviewing
Petitioner’s claim to determine whether it was supported by a reasonable basis. Accordingly, the
Court will grant the Chief Special Master’s conclusion the deference it is owed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Chief Special Master neither erred in his
application of the law nor his assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence when finding that
Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable basis for her Vaccine Act claim. Therefore, the Chief
Special Master did not abuse his discretion by denying Petitioner’s Motion for Attorney Fees and
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Costs. Petitioner’s Motion for Review (ECF No. 60) is accordingly DENIED. The Clerk of the
Court shall enter judgment consistent with this Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 20, 2025 /s/ Kathryn C. Davis
KATHRYN C. DAVIS
Judge
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