VICP Registry Case Source Bundle
Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_20-vv-00496
Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_20-vv-00496
Petitioner: Holly Young
Filed: 2020-04-23
Decided: 2025-12-09
Vaccine: influenza
Vaccination date: 2017-10-04
Condition: shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA)
Outcome: compensated
Award amount USD: 494297.32

AI-assisted case summary:
On April 23, 2020, Holly Young filed a petition alleging that an influenza vaccine administered on October 4, 2017 caused a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration. Some public filings also refer to her as Holly Tigges.

Entitlement was found on August 5, 2021. The damages record treated the injury as substantially affecting her daily life and earning capacity and included life-care planning by Staci L. Schonbrun. The damages ruling included actual and projected pain and suffering, lost wages, past expenses, first-year future expenses, and future life-care needs funded by an annuity.

On December 9, 2025, Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran entered a final damages decision awarding a $494,297.32 lump sum plus an amount sufficient to purchase a life-contingent annuity for future life-care expenses. The lump sum included $200,000.00 in actual pain and suffering, $19,330.86 in projected pain and suffering, $264,570.00 in projected lost wages, $3,477.07 in actual unreimbursed expenses, and $6,919.39 in first-year projected expenses.

Theory of causation field:
Influenza vaccine October 4, 2017 causing SIRVA; adult exact age not stated. COMPENSATED. Entitlement August 5, 2021. Damages December 9, 2025: $494,297.32 lump sum = $200,000.00 actual pain/suffering + $19,330.86 projected pain/suffering + $264,570.00 projected lost wages + $3,477.07 actual expenses + $6,919.39 first-year projected expenses, plus life-contingent annuity for future life care. Life-care planner Staci L. Schonbrun. Petition filed April 23, 2020.

Public staged source text:

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DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_20-vv-00496-0
Date issued/filed: 2021-09-09
Pages: 2
Docket text: PUBLIC ORDER/RULING (Originally filed: 08/05/2021) regarding 30 Ruling on Entitlement Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (sw) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 35 Filed 09/09/21 Page 1 of 2
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 20-0496V
UNPUBLISHED
HOLLY TIGGES, Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner, Filed: August 5, 2021
v.
Special Processing Unit (SPU);
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;
HUMAN SERVICES, Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;
Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine
Respondent. Administration (SIRVA)
Maximillian J. Muller, Muller Brazil, LLP, Dresher, PA, for petitioner.
Kimberly Shubert Davey, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.
RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1
On April 23, 2020, Holly Tigges filed a petition for compensation under the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the “Vaccine
Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine
administration (SIRVA) as a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccine administered to her on
October 4, 2017. Petition at 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of
the Office of Special Masters.
On August 5, 2021, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes
that Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at
1. Specifically, Respondent agrees that the evidence shows that Petitioner had no history
of pain, inflammation, or dysfunction in her left shoulder; Petitioner’s pain and reduced
1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required
to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E-Government Act
of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance
with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information,
the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that
the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa
(2012).

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 35 Filed 09/09/21 Page 2 of 2
range of motion occurred within 48 hours of receipt of an intramuscular vaccination;
Petitioner’s symptoms were limited to the shoulder in which the vaccine was
administered; and no other condition or abnormality was identified to explain Petitioner’s
symptoms. Id. at 8. Respondent further agrees that Petitioner has satisfied the statutory
requirement that an injury must last for at least six months, as required by 42 U.S.C. §
300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i). Id.
In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that
Petitioner is entitled to compensation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
2

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DOCUMENT 2: USCOURTS-cofc-1_20-vv-00496-1
Date issued/filed: 2025-11-12
Pages: 17
Docket text: PUBLIC ORDER/RULING (Originally filed: 10/06/2025) regarding 74 Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law,, Scheduling Order. Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (cr) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 77 Filed 11/12/25 Page 1 of 17
Corrected
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 20-0496V
HOLLY YOUNG,
Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner,
v. Filed: October 6, 2025
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
Maximillian J. Muller, Muller Brazil, LLP, Dresher, PA, for Petitioner.
Sarah Christina Duncan, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
RULING ON DAMAGES1
On April 23, 2020, Holly Young2 filed a petition for compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.3 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine
administration (“SIRVA”) as a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccine administered to her on
October 4, 2017. Petition at 1. After Respondent conceded entitlement, the parties were
unable to resolve damages on their own,4 so I ordered briefing on that matter.
1 Because this Ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made
publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or
at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government
Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the Ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance
with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information,
the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that
the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2 Ms. Young filed this claim using her married name, but reverted to her maiden name after obtaining a
divorce. On August 28, 2021, I amended the caption accordingly. ECF No. 34.
3 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. §
300aa (2018).
4 Although I authorized the parties to retain economists and life care planners, they were unable to reach
an agreement related to the appropriate amount of damages in this case. On January 17, 2023, I ordered
additional briefing.

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 77 Filed 11/12/25 Page 2 of 17
For the reasons set forth below, I find that Petitioner is entitled to a damages award
in the amount of $200,000.00 past pain and suffering, $1,000.00 per year for future
pain and suffering – equating to a net present value of $19,330.86. I also find
$264,570.00 is the appropriate amount of future lost wages. For expenses,
Petitioner is awarded $3,477.07 for past and an amount sufficient to purchase an
annuity to cover the future expenses described in this Decision.
I. Legal Standard
Compensation awarded pursuant to the Vaccine Act shall include “[f]or actual and
projected pain and suffering and emotional distress from the vaccine-related injury, an
award not to exceed $250,000.” Section 15(a)(4). Additionally, a petitioner may recover
“actual unreimbursable expenses incurred before the date of judgment award such
expenses which (i) resulted from the vaccine-related injury for which petitioner seeks
compensation, (ii) were incurred by or on behalf of the person who suffered such injury,
and (iii) were for diagnosis, medical or other remedial care, rehabilitation . . . determined
to be reasonably necessary.” Section 15(a)(1)(B). The petitioner bears the burden of proof
with respect to each element of compensation requested. Brewer v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 93-0092V, 1996 WL 147722, at *22-23 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 18,
1996).
There is no mathematic formula for assigning a monetary value to a person’s pain
and suffering and emotional distress. I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 04-1593V,
2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 14, 2013) (“[a]wards for emotional
distress are inherently subjective and cannot be determined by using a mathematical
formula”); Stansfield v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 93-0172V, 1996 WL 300594,
at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 22, 1996) (“the assessment of pain and suffering is
inherently a subjective evaluation”). Factors to be considered when determining an award
for pain and suffering include: 1) awareness of the injury; 2) severity of the injury; and 3)
duration of the suffering. I.D., 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (quoting McAllister v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., No 91-1037V, 1993 WL 777030, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar.
26, 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 70 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
I may also consider prior pain and suffering awards to aid my resolution of the
appropriate amount of compensation for pain and suffering in this case. See, e.g., Doe
34 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 87 Fed. Cl. 758, 768 (2009) (finding that “there is
nothing improper in the chief special master’s decision to refer to damages for pain and
suffering awarded in other cases as an aid in determining the proper amount of damages
in this case.”). And, of course, I may rely on my own experience (along with my
predecessor Chief Special Masters) adjudicating similar claims. Hodges v. Sec’y of
2

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 77 Filed 11/12/25 Page 3 of 17
Health & Hum. Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Congress
contemplated the special masters would use their accumulated expertise in the field of
vaccine injuries to judge the merits of individual claims).
Although pain and suffering in the past was often determined based on a
continuum, as Respondent argues, that practice was cast into doubt by the Court several
years ago. Graves v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 109 Fed. Cl. 579 (Fed. Cl. 2013).
Graves maintained that to do so resulted in “the forcing of all suffering awards into a global
comparative scale in which the individual petitioner’s suffering is compared to the most
extreme cases and reduced accordingly.” Id. at 590. Instead, Graves assessed pain and
suffering by looking to the record evidence, prior pain and suffering awards within the
Vaccine Program, and a survey of similar injury claims outside of the Vaccine Program.
Id. at 595. Under this alternative approach, the statutory cap merely cuts off higher pain
and suffering awards – it does not shrink the magnitude of all possible awards as falling
within a spectrum that ends at the cap. Although Graves is not controlling of the outcome
in this case, it provides reasoned guidance in calculating pain and suffering awards.
II. Prior SIRVA Compensation Within SPU5
A. Data Regarding Compensation in SPU SIRVA Cases
SIRVA cases have an extensive history of informal resolution within the SPU. As
of July 1, 2025, 4,983 SPU SIRVA cases have resolved since the inception of SPU more
than ten years before. Compensation has been awarded in the vast majority of cases
(4,817), with the remaining 166 cases dismissed.
2,744 of the compensated SPU SIRVA cases were the result of a ruling that the
petitioner was entitled to compensation (as opposed to an informal settlement), and
therefore reflect full compensation.6 In only 310 of these cases, however, was the amount
of damages determined by a special master in a reasoned decision.7 As I have previously
5 All figures included in this decision are derived from a review of the decisions awarding compensation
within the SPU. All decisions reviewed are, or will be, available publicly. All figures and calculations cited
are approximate.
6 The remaining 2,073 compensated SIRVA cases were resolved via stipulated agreement of the parties
without a prior ruling on entitlement. These agreements are often described as “litigative risk” settlements,
and thus represent a reduced percentage of the compensation which otherwise would be awarded.
Because multiple competing factors may cause the parties to settle a case (with some having little to do
with the merits of an underlying claim), these awards from settled cases do not constitute a reliable gauge
of the appropriate amount of compensation to be awarded in other SPU SIRVA cases.
7 The rest of these cases resulting in damages after concession were either reflective of a proffer by
Respondent (2,403 cases) or stipulation (31 cases). Although all proposed amounts denote some form of
agreement reached by the parties, those presented by stipulation derive more from compromise than
3

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 77 Filed 11/12/25 Page 4 of 17
stated, the written decisions setting forth such determinations, prepared by neutral judicial
officers (the special masters themselves), provide the most reliable guidance in deciding
what similarly-situated claimants should also receive.8
The data for all categories of damages decisions described above reflect the
expected differences in outcome, summarized as follows:
Damages Proffered Stipulated Stipulated9
Decisions by Damages Damages Agreement
Special Master
Total Cases 310 2,403 31 2,073
Lowest $25,000.00 $4,000.00 $37,013.60 $1,000.00
1st Quartile $67,020.04 $60,000.00 $90,000.00 $30,000.00
Median $91,290.04 $79,444.74 $115,772.83 $50,000.00
3rd Quartile $125,000.00 $106,293.26 $161,501.20 $75,000.00
Largest $1,569,302.82 $1,845,047.00 $1,500,000.00 $550,000.00
B. Pain and Suffering Awards in Reasoned Decisions
In the 310 SPU SIRVA cases in which damages were determined via reasoned
decision, compensation for a petitioner’s actual or past pain and suffering varied from
$25,000.00 to $215,000.00, with $90,000.00 as the median amount. Only ten of these
cases involved an award for future pain and suffering, with yearly awards ranging from
$250.00 to $1,500.00.10 In one of these cases, the future pain and suffering award was
limited by the statutory pain and suffering cap.11
instances in which Respondent formally acknowledges that the settlement sum itself is a fair measure of
damages.
8 Of course, even though all independently-settled damages issues (whether by stipulation/settlement or
proffer) must still be approved by a special master, such determinations do not provide the same judicial
guidance or insight obtained from a reasoned decision. But given the aggregate number of such cases,
these determinations nevertheless “provide some evidence of the kinds of awards received overall in
comparable cases.” Sakovits v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-1028V, 2020 WL 3729420, at *4
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 4, 2020) (discussing the difference between cases in which damages are agreed
upon by the parties and cases in which damages are determined by a special master).
9 Two awards were for an annuity only, the exact amounts which were not determined at the time of
judgment.
10 Additionally, a first-year future pain and suffering award of $10,000.00 was made in one case. Dhanoa
v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 15-1011V, 2018 WL 1221922 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 1, 2018).
11 Joyce v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1882V, 2024 WL 1235409, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Feb. 20, 2024) (applying the $250,000.00 statutory cap for actual and future pain and suffering set forth in
4

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 77 Filed 11/12/25 Page 5 of 17
In cases with lower awards for past pain and suffering, many petitioners commonly
demonstrated only mild to moderate levels of pain throughout their injury course. This
lack of significant pain is often evidenced by a delay in seeking treatment – over six
months in one case. In cases with more significant initial pain, petitioners usually
experienced this greater pain for three months or less. Most petitioners displayed only
mild to moderate limitations in range of motion (“ROM”), and MRI imaging showed
evidence of mild to moderate pathologies such as tendinosis, bursitis, or edema. Many
petitioners suffered from unrelated conditions to which a portion of their pain and suffering
could be attributed. These SIRVAs usually resolved after one to two cortisone injections
and two months or less of physical therapy (“PT”). None required surgery. Except in one
case involving very mild pain levels, the duration of the SIRVA injury ranged from six to
30 months, with most petitioners averaging approximately nine months of pain. Although
some petitioners asserted residual pain, the prognosis in these cases was positive.
Cases with higher awards for past pain and suffering involved petitioners who
suffered more significant levels of pain and SIRVAs of longer duration. Most of these
petitioners subjectively rated their pain within the upper half of a ten-point pain scale and
sought treatment of their SIRVAs more immediately, often within 30 days of vaccination.
All experienced moderate to severe limitations in range of motion. MRI imaging showed
more significant findings, with the majority showing evidence of partial tearing. Surgery or
significant conservative treatment, up to 133 PT sessions - occasionally spanning several
years, and multiple cortisone injections, were required in these cases. In nine cases,
petitioners provided sufficient evidence of permanent injuries to warrant yearly
compensation for future or projected pain and suffering.
III. The Parties’ Arguments
Petitioner asserts that she is entitled to a past pain and suffering award of
$215,000.00; a future pain and suffering award of $34,500.00; $455,189.00 for lost
wages; $6,431.01 for past unreimbursed expenses; and an annuity which covers the
expenses listed in the life care plan created by her planner, Staci L. Schonbrun, Ph.D.12
Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Damages (“Brief”) at 1, 20, 29, ECF No. 64. Although the
amount Petitioner seeks for future pain and suffering - based upon annual payments of
Section 15(a)(4) before reducing the future award to net present value as required by Section 15(f)(4)(A));
see Youngblood v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 32 F.3d 552, 554-55 (Fed. Cir.1994) (requiring the
application of the statutory cap before any projected pain and suffering award is reduced to net present
value).
12 Dr. Schonbrun fulfilled the dual roles of vocational expert and life care planner for Petitioner. Exs. 31
(vocational expert report), 37-39 (life care plan). In addition to her doctorate degree, Dr. Schonbrun
possessed multiple degrees and certifications. Ex. 36 at 1 (curriculum vitae (“CV”)).
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Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 77 Filed 11/12/25 Page 6 of 17
$1,500.00 for a life expectancy of 23 years - has not yet been decreased to a net present
value (id. at 20), her economist, Robert W. Cook, Ph.D.,13 reduced the differing amounts
proposed for future lost wages using the determinations from his three expert reports. Ex.
25 at 4-7; Ex. 29 at 7-12; Ex. 40 at 7-9; see Section 15(f)(4)(A) (requiring “payment of
compensation . . . on the basis of the net present value”). Petitioner’s life care plan covers
expenses such as massage therapy, an adjustable bed, housekeeping, the maintenance
of rental properties that Petitioner owns, and transportation to and from medical care.
Brief at 26-29; see Exs. 38-39. Petitioner also includes $1,000.00 annually to cover her
medical insurance deductible until the age of 85. Ex. 38 at 1; Ex. 39 at 1.
The amount of lost wages Petitioner ultimately proposes is based upon Dr. Cook’s
calculations in his third and final report, provided on May 2, 202314 (Brief at 21 - citing
Exs. 40-41), as well as the opinion of her vocational expert, Dr. Schonbrun, “that
Petitioner’s pre-injury wages are most representative of her pre-injury earning capacity .
. . [and] Petitioner’s present job and actual earnings are the most reasonable
representation of her post-injury earning capacity” (Brief at 20-21 - citing Ex. 31).
Regarding her current position as an administrative/triage nurse - consisting of 32 hours
per week (80 percent employment), Dr. Schonbrun opines that “[i]t is not reasonable to
‘grow out’ this position to 100% time, since this position does not exist in that capacity.”
Ex. 31 at 19.
To support the amount she seeks for pain and suffering, Petitioner emphasizes
her severe pain levels and “grueling course of treatment over the past five and a half
years that surpasses the most severe SIRVA cases in the program.” Brief at 15. She
stresses that she received from treaters “a permanent partial disability rating of 30%, . . .
has endured insomnia, anxiety, depression, and weight gain, . . . [and] will likely never
fully recover from this injury.” Id. at 16-17. Petitioner favorably compares the facts and
circumstances in her case to those suffered by the petitioners in M.W., Schoonover, and
Meirndorf15 - decisions featuring past pain and suffering awards ranging from
13 Dr. Cook’s CV was provided with his first expert report. Ex. 26.
14 In his first expert report, Dr. Cook proposed $300,071.00 for lost wages. Ex. 25 at 7, 14. In his second
report, he proposed an additional amount of $182,428.00 for lost per diem income – resulting in a revised
total of $482,499.00. Ex. 29 at 13-30 (for specific calculations). After accounting for specific offsets related
to Ms. Young’s disability and workers’ compensation payments, Dr. Cook calculated $272,761.00 for lost
wages, plus the same lost per diem amount of $182,428.00 - resulting in the proposed lost wages amount
of $455,189.00
15 M.W. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18-0267V, 2021 WL 3618177 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 17,
2021) (awarding $195,000.00 for past pain and suffering); Schoonover v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 16-1324V, 2020 WL 5351341 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 5, 2020) (awarding $200,000.00 for past pain
and suffering); Meirndorf v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 19-1876V, 2022 WL 1055475 (Fed. Cl.
Spec. Mstr. Mar. 7, 2022) (awarding $200,000.00 for past pain and suffering).
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$195,000.00 to $200,000.00. Brief at 14-15, 17-18. However, she maintains that her injury
“had a more profound effect on [her] life than the lives of [those] [p]etitioners.” Id. at 18.
Respondent counters that Petitioner should be awarded $160,000.00 for past pain
and suffering. Respondent’s Damages Brief (“Opp.”) at 34, ECF No. 65. Insisting that
Petitioner’s “ongoing symptoms . . . are mild in nature and cause minimal functional
impairment,” and her “treatment at this point appears limited to infrequent physical
therapy of less than one session monthly and two visits annually for her pain medicine
physician for refills” (id. at 31), Respondent does not propose a future pain and suffering
award. He maintains that Petitioner’s case is most analogous to Reed[16]” – a case also
involving a $160,000.00 award.
Additionally, Respondent disputes several of the expenses (both past and future)
that Petitioner seeks. Opp. at 14-19, 32-34. For past expenses, he includes only the costs
related to Petitioner’s PT – including transportation costs paid at IRS medical mileage
rates for 2021-23, and the purchased shoulder brace, for a total past expense amount of
$741.83. Id. at 33-34. Relying upon the life care plan prepared by his planner, Linda J.
Curtis, RN,17 Respondent opposes Petitioner’s request for private healthcare deductibles
through age 85, any expenses related to acupuncture or massage, the cost of an
adjustable bed, housekeeping costs, and expenses related to the rental properties
Petitioner owns. Id. at 14-19. For health insurance, Respondent “recommends covering
[P]etitioner’s SIRVA related co-pays, but not her premium,[18] which is a routine expense,
until [P]etitioner attains the age of 65 . . . [and] [P]etitioner’s Medicare Part B deductible”
thereafter. Id. at 14-15.
For lost wages, Respondent relies upon reports from his vocational expert,
Behnush B. Mortimer, Ph.D.,19 and his economist, Patrick F. Kennedy, Ph.D.20 Opp. at
21-29 (citing Exs. A & C). Dr. Mortimer agrees that “Ms. Young has restrictions that
do preclude her from her past clinical work as a floor nurse working hands on with
patients” but opines that her education and work history in different departments “allow
Ms. Young to present as a strong nursing candidate for employment in the labor market
with many transferable skills.” Ex. A at 14. Furthermore, Dr. Mortimer opines “that Ms.
16 Reed v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-1670V, 2019 WL 1222925 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 1,
2019).
17 In addition to being a registered nurse, Ms. Curtis is a certified nurse life care planner. Ex. F.
18 Respondent mistakenly refers to Petitioner’s “premium” instead of deductible, but this reference appears
to be a simple mistake. Opp. at 14.
19 Dr. Mortimer’s additional degrees and certifications are listed in his CV. Ex. B at 2.
20 Dr. Kennedy’s CV was included at the end of his expert report. See Ex. C at 15-30.
7

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Young has the capacity to work at a 100% full-time schedule with no additional per diem
work,” adding that his labor market research revealed “a variety of the types of
occupations which Ms. Young qualifies for available both in Iowa City, Cedar Rapids, and
remote positions.” Id. After accounting for Ms. Young’s earnings and offsets from disability
benefits and her workers’ compensation settlement, Dr. Kennedy calculates a total lost
wages award of $264,570.00. Ex. C at 13.
In their respective responsive damages briefs, the parties continue to disagree
upon the past and future expenses which should be reimbursed, reiterating previously
made arguments related to the costs of massage therapy, the adjustable bed,
housekeeping, repairs, and the appropriate mileage rates. Petitioner’s Reply Brief in
Support of Damages (“Pet. Reply”) at 1-5, 16-18, ECF No. 69; Respondent’s
Supplemental Brief Regarding Damages (“Res. Reply”) at 1-4, 10-14, ECF No. 68.
Regarding the prescription costs she seeks, Petitioner misunderstands the basis of
Respondent’s objection to her weight loss medication - insisting “the records (as
summarized by Respondent) clearly indicate weight gain as a side effect of the Lyrica
prescribed to Petitioner by Dr. Walia for her shoulder pain.” Pet. Reply at 17 (citing Opp.
at 33). But Respondent actually opposes this expense due to a lack of documentation –
maintaining that Petitioner has not provided “proof that she actually paid the amount
claimed.” Opp. at 33. When requesting payment of her future medical insurance costs,
Petitioner emphasizes the difficulties calculating “the actual cost and duration of [her]
ongoing treatment,” adding that “[t]he intent of the Vaccine Program cannot be to make
recovery of damages harder for petitioners than if they were in normal civil courts.” Pet.
Reply at 5.
Regarding Petitioner’s lost wages, the parties disagree on her future earnings
potential. Pet. Reply at 5-6; Res. Reply at 4-5. Petitioner disputes the job search results
from Dr. Mortimer, stating that she “underwent a real life job search and obtained
employment that met her physical limitations.” Pet. Reply at 8. Additionally, Respondent
argues that Petitioner’s past earnings should be based on a three-year average, rather
than only the year prior to her SIRVA as Petitioner contends. Res. Reply at 6; Pet. Rely
at 9-10. He also insists Petitioner should not be paid interest on her past award and
stresses that offsets related to Petitioner’s disability and retirement benefits should be
considered when calculating her past earnings. Res. Reply at 5-6. In response, Petitioner
notes that Dr. Cook accounted for the disability and retirement benefits offsets in his third
and final report. Pet. Reply at 11.
Finally, the parties continue to disagree on the extent and severity of Petitioner’s
pain and suffering. Pet. Reply at 12-16; Res. Reply at 7-10. Characterizing her case as
similar to those involving two surgeries and disputing Respondent’s assessment of her
ongoing symptoms as mild, Petitioner criticizes Respondent’s comparison of her facts
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and circumstances to those suffered by the Reed petitioner - insisting that the Reed
petitioner’s treatment amount and duration could be doubled and would still fall short. Pet.
Reply at 12-16. In contrast, Respondent insists “the placement of a nerve stimulation is
not comparable to an orthopedic surgery” as it did not require general anesthesia or pain
medication. Res. Reply at 8. Stressing that Petitioner’s ongoing treatment is limited and
her impairment rating is lower than the cases involving future awards that she cites (id. at
9), Respondent insists that “[P]etitioner has not produced evidence justifying an award
for future pain and suffering” (id. at 10).
IV. Appropriate Compensation for Petitioner’s Pain and Suffering
In this case, awareness of the injury is not disputed. The record reflects that at all
times Petitioner was a competent adult with no impairments that would impact her
awareness of her injury. Therefore, I analyze principally the severity and duration of
Petitioner’s injury.
When performing this analysis, I review the record as a whole to include the filed
medical records, affidavits, and sworn declarations and all assertions made by the parties
in written documents. I consider prior awards for pain and suffering in both SPU and non-
SPU SIRVA cases and rely upon my experience adjudicating these cases. However, I
base my determination on the circumstances of this case.
A thorough review of the medical records reveals that Ms. Young suffered a
particularly severe SIRVA injury, requiring arthroscopic surgery on August 7, 2018
(approximately ten months post-vaccination),21 and significant PT thereafter that provided
only limited relief.22 During the subsequent year, Petitioner pursued treatment from a pain
21 When Petitioner first sought treatment for her injury, she reported sharp pain, accompanied by numbness
and tingling down her arm. Ex. 4 at 33. Although her pain level then improved slightly, from nine to six out,
her decreased mobility continued. Id. Following 20 PT sessions attended from November 13, 2017, through
March 28, 2018, she was assessed as having a pain rating that were not improving and failing to meet any
PT goals. Ex. 5 at 397.
On August 7, 2018, Petitioner underwent a left shoulder arthroscopic surgery which included an
anterior capsular and rotator interval release, capsular release, subacromial decompression, biceps
tenotomy, and extensive debridement. Ex. 6 at 163-66. During a follow-up call the next day, Petitioner
reported doing well with pain reasonably controlled by prescribed medication, but some numbness in her
ring and pinky fingers after the temporary nerve block performed prior to surgery wore off. Id. at 166.
22 Petitioner made only slight progress during PT sessions in August through December 2018. Compare
Ex. 6 at 619-20 (showing significant deficiencies performing functional tasks in August) with id. at 789,
1073, 1356 (showing only slight improvement in September and the same difficulties thereafter).
Throughout her PT sessions, Petitioner continued to complain of severe pain, limited movement, difficulties
sleeping – including the need to sleep in her recliner on multiple occasions, and concerns about potential
weight gain from her medication and lack of activity. Id. at 625, 628, 631, 641, 668, 708, 768, 777, 901,
982, 1004, 1092, 1255.
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management specialist who administered nerve blocks on March 1 and May 29, 2019
(providing only temporary relief),23 and then more lastly and significant relief from the
implantation of a nerve stimulator on August 20, 2019.24 During this time, Petitioner also
continued to attend PT, began seeing a psychotherapist, and reported good benefits from
massage therapy.25 By October 2019 (now approximately two years post-vaccination),
Petitioner reported relief with the activation of the nerve stimulator and in response to the
prescribed Lyrica, but unfortunate side effects such as weight gain.26
Even though they involve petitioners who underwent two arthroscopic surgeries,
the SIRVA cases proposed by Petitioner offer the best comparisons to Petitioner’s facts
and circumstances. Petitioner’s one surgery, temporary nerve blocks, and a nerve
stimulation implant may not equate to multiple arthroscopic surgeries, but the overall
duration of her injury was greater. Furthermore, she did not obtain significant pain relief
until implantation of the nerve stimulation device in August 2019, more than 22 months
post-vaccination. And as described in detail in her two supplemental declarations,
Petitioner’s injury has affected multiple facets of her life, both professionally and
23 On January 3, 2019, more than two years post-vaccination, Petitioner was referred to a pain management
specialist by her occupational health physician. Ex. 9 at 96-97. At the initial appointment on February 19,
2019, the pain management specialist observed that Petitioner had some improvement in her ROM after
surgery but continued to experience pain that was aching, constant, and “radiating along the left side
shoulder with pulsating discomfort along the bicep and lateral aspect of [her] left arm down to 4th and 5th
fingers.” Ex. 6 at 251. Providing an estimated pain level of seven out of ten, Petitioner reported that her
pain often interfered with her ability to sleep. Id. at 252-53.
At the next appointment on March 1, 2019, the pain management specialist assessed Petitioner as
not meeting the criteria for complex regional pain syndrome, having a clinical presentation suggestive of
neuropathic pain, and showing evidence of degenerative changes in her cervical spine. Ex. 6 at 281. He
administered a mononeuropathy-left scapular nerve block. Id. at 284. Immediately thereafter, Petitioner
reported her pain had decreased from five to four. Id. At her next appointment, she described a pain
reduction to three out of ten and improved mobility and functionality for approximately five weeks, followed
by a return almost to pre-procedure levels. Id. at 300-01. She underwent a second nerve block on May 29,
2019, which again provided some temporary relief. Id. at 366.
24 After experiencing some difficulties associated with previously prescribed pain medication, Petitioner
started taking Lyrica on May 21, 2019. Ex. 6 at 342. On August 20, 2019, she received a nerve stimulator
implant. Id. at 460-61. One week later, Petitioner reported that her pain improved from seven to two when
her implant was active, and she was “very grateful for this implant . . . that . . . has helped her pain so much
[she] is able to function much greater in her day-to-day life.” Id. at 479-80.
25 During visits with her pain management specialist, Petitioner reported benefits from PT and massage
therapy. Ex. 6 at 515, 524, 533, 542. She attended 59 PT sessions, involving treatment described as
therapeutic procedure, manual therapy techniques, and neuromuscular reeducation, from March 2019
through May 2020. Ex. 17. On June 12, 2019, she began seeing a psychotherapist. Ex. 15 at 3-5.
26 In September and October 2019, Petitioner continued to reported improvement in pain and ROM from
the implant and Lyrica, but a concern with weight gain attributed to the prescribed Lyrica. Id. 493, 501-02,
515.
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personally.27
Additionally, Garcia and Tappendorf28 - cases involving arthroscopic surgery, plus
additional less invasive procedures (Tenex and two manipulations respectively) - are
instructive. Although the Garcia and Tappendorf petitioners suffered SIRVAs with a
shorter documented duration (approximately two years) and unrelated conditions to which
some of their symptoms could be attributed, they were awarded $190,000.00 and
$185,000.00, respectively for past pain and suffering.29
In contrast, the Reed case cited by Respondent involved a SIRVA injury that was
clearly less severe. That claimant suffered greater pain levels for only the initial six months
of her injury, until gaining significant relief following one arthroscopic surgery. Reed, 2019
WL 1222925, at *15-16. Although the overall duration of her injury was several years, the
Reed petitioner’s initial period of more intense pain was one-fourth of that suffered by
Petitioner. Id.
Furthermore, Petitioner has a documented permanent disability rating of either 20
or 30 percent, plus ongoing (albeit milder) symptoms30 that justify a projected pain and
suffering award, but at a lower amount than that requested - $1,000.00 per year. This
sum will also be reduced to net present value, utilizing a discount rate of 1.5 percent, as
I have recently found to be appropriate.31 Based upon a life expectancy of 84.5 years, the
27 These two declarations are signed under penalty of perjury as required by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1746. Exs. 27,
43. In the documents, Petitioner recounts the difficulties she encountered, including the end of her marriage,
limitations related to her employment, activities during family vacations, and interactions with her
grandchildren. Id.
28 Garcia v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 19-1529V, 2025 WL 1159016 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar.
21, 2025); Tappendorf v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1592V, 2024 WL 1299566 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
Mstr. Feb. 23, 2024).
29 As her own expert acknowledged, the Garcia petitioner simultaneously suffered from rheumatoid arthritis
and a superior labrum anterior-posterior or SLAP tear. Garcia, 2025 WL 1159016, at *8. And the Tappendorf
petitioner’s SIRVA symptoms lasted approximately two years with later symptoms, following a significant
gap in treatment, found not to be vaccine-related. Tappendorf, 2024 WL 1299566, at *4.
30 On April 6 and 14, 2020, Petitioner underwent independent medical evaluations which documented her
ongoing symptoms. Exs. 18-19. She was assess as having a 30 percent and 20 percent disability,
respectively. Ex. 18 at 7; Ex 19 at 14.
31 In a case I decided in February 2024, in which Dr. Kennedy also opined, I found his reasoning for
proposing a 1.5 percent discount rate to be sound. Joyce, 2024 WL 1235409, at *3. Thus, I will apply that
discount rate in this case when determining the net present value of Petitioner’s future pain and suffering
award.
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resulting amount would be $19,330.86.32
V. Appropriate Compensation for Petitioner’s Lost Wages
The parties agree that Petitioner’s SIRVA prevents her from performing the duties
of a registered nurse engaging in direct patient care, for example as a floor nurse. Ex. 31
at 18 (Dr. Schonbrun’s expert report); Ex. A at 14 (Dr. Mortimer’s expert report). Prior to
her injury, Petitioner worked two twelve-hour shifts on Saturday and Sunday as an
emergency room shift supervisor for which she was provided full-time pay at Mercy
Hospital in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, approximately 78 minutes from her hometown.33 Ex. 31
at 11. She was able to supplement her income by working lucrative, albeit temporary,
contract positions as a travel nurse or extra hours at her primary job. Ex. 31 at 11-12; Ex.
A at 8.
After the injury, Petitioner was placed in an alternate position (monitor tech and
assistant in the volunteer office) at Mercy Hospital following her return to work, but this
position was eliminated in May 2019, due to reasons unrelated to her injury or
performance. Ex. 31 at 12; Ex. A at 8. Fortunately, Petitioner was able to obtain
employment at the Admission Transfer Center at the University of Iowa Hospital in Iowa
City, resulting in eleven more minutes of drive time (from 78 to 89 minutes).34 Ex. 31 at
12; Ex. A at 14. “Her job is to “facilitate transfers from outside hospitals, internal triage,
bed planning, and patient follow-up.” Ex. 31 at 12. Although she now works two twelve-
hour shifts and one eight-hour shift per week (32 hours total), her position is considered
part-time (80 percent) employment. Ex. 31 at 12; Ex. A at 14.
Petitioner insists that she is unable to obtain additional income because her job
will never be increased to full-time. Ex. 31 at 15, 18. When making this assertion,
Petitioner (via Dr. Schonbrun) stresses her lengthy commute (id. at 18-19), but she had
a similarly long drive time at her previous job as well. And her schedule of three days of
work for 32 hours per week should allow for some additional employment, even if not
within the same position. Although Petitioner is unable to supplement her income in the
manner she previously did, she has failed to establish she is unable to supplement her
income by other forms of employment which she could perform. Dr. Mortimer’s job search
32 This result is obtained using the net present values (“NPV”) function in excel. Petitioner’s life expectancy
was obtained from the Social Security Administration’s website. See https://www.ssa.gov/cgi-
bin/longevity.cgi (last visited on Sept. 3, 2025).
33 This driving time was obtained using Mapquest.com and entries for Cedar Rapids and Dubuque, Iowa.
www.Mapquest.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2025).
34 This driving time also was obtained using Mapquest.com and entries for Iowa City and Dubuque, Iowa.
www.Mapquest.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2025).
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resulted in numerous positions available to Petitioner considering her expertise and
experience, which I agree is significant. Ex. A at 14-15. Furthermore, Dr. Mortimer still
allows for a substantial future lost wages component, but one that is based on an accurate
reflection of Petitioner’s current job as being part-time, 80 percent of a normal 40-hour
work week.
Additionally, Respondent’s method of calculating Petitioner’s past earnings based
on a three-year average is commonly used in the Vaccine Program. Limiting this
calculation to only one year is less reliable, especially as in Petitioner’s case when much
of her earnings are dependent on contracts for temporary employment. For example,
Petitioner’s 2015 income outpaced her 2016 income, showing she was not guaranteed a
steady rise in income. Ex. C at 2 (Dr. Kennedy’s expert report). And there is nothing in
the record to suggest Petitioner would be able to repeat the significant gains she was able
to procure the year prior to her SIRVA (2017), which appears to have been based on a
particularly lucrative contract position (even if temporary).
Petitioner’s request for inclusion of pre-Judgment interest seeks something not
appropriate for Vaccine Program awards. She did, however, include offsets for prior
disability and retirement benefit payments in her request. Still, due to these calculation
differences, as well as the more accurate portrayal of Petitioner’s future employment
possibilities provided by Respondent, I find the amounts Respondent proposes to be
more accurate. Petitioner is entitled to a net present value of $264,570.00 for her future
lost wages.
VI. Compensation for Petitioner’s Unreimbursed Expenses
Petitioner has failed to provide the evidence needed to establish that costs related
to massage or acupuncture are reasonably necessary to treat her SIRVA symptoms.
Petitioner initiated these treatments on her own, despite the fact that she had been
encouraged to continue the massage therapy. She was not instructed to pursue these
treatments by any of her treating physicians. And the cursory letter from Melissa Carey,
PA-C, who first treated Petitioner in November 2021, more than four years post-
vaccination and over 18 months after this claim was filed, is not sufficient to establish the
reasonableness of this expense. Ex. 35; see Ex. 33 (showing only one visit to PA Carey
on November 5, 2021).
Additionally, the massages received by Petitioner to date are 60 to 90-minute full
body massages. See, e.g., Ex. 44 at 8-9. There is no evidence that they are focused on
her left shoulder. And there is a dearth of information regarding the acupuncture that
Petitioner believes would be helpful. Furthermore, the costs of Petitioner’s PT – treatment
focused specifically on her SIRVA symptoms - are being fully reimbursed. Accordingly,
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such costs are not properly allowed.
Petitioner will, however, be reimbursed for the remainder of the past expenses
requested. Exs. 45-46. Petitioner has provided adequate documentation of costs
associated with the shoulder brace and prescription drugs. Ex. 44 at 18-20, 37, 43-44,
50; Ex. 45 at 1. And the medical records show Petitioner’s weight gain to be linked directly
to the Lyrica medication needed to combat her continued left shoulder pain. And although
the documentation regarding the deductibles paid to Petitioner’s psychotherapist is
questionable, I also will allow these costs, totaling $500.00. Ex. 44 at 4-7; Ex. 45 at 1. I
have also consistently found the IRS business rate to be appropriate when calculating
transportation costs.35
The elimination of all costs related to massage therapy and acupuncture results in
a reduction of past medical expenses – from $3,772.38 to $1,076.86, and total mileage
(from 4,059 to 2,515 miles). Exs. 45-46. Calculations based upon the IRS business rates
for 2020 to 2023, result in $1,500.21 in past transportation costs.36 Additionally, I will add
$900.00 to Petitioner’s past expenses to account for PT deductibles likely paid between
the briefing in this case and my final damages decision. Thus, the total for Petitioner’s
past unreimbursed expenses is $3,477.07.
Regarding future expenses, the parties agree Petitioner will continue to require PT,
as well as visits to the psychotherapist and pain management specialist, but they disagree
upon the frequency of this treatment. Compare Ex. 38 at 10-11 with Ex. D at 3-4, 7. They
also agree on the need for the purchase of jar openers, bathroom grab bars, a handheld
shower head, a bathroom chair, a shoulder ice sleeve, and over the counter Tylenol, but
they disagree on the cost and/or need for replacement related to all but the jar openers.
Compare Ex. 38 at 4-6 with Ex. D. at 5-6.
35 See Evans v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-1225V, 2025 WL 2303787, at *11 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
Mstr. July 7, 2025); Chalgren v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-0245V, 2025 WL 1649633, at *13
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 5, 2025); Hartz v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-0596V, 2024 WL
4546275, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 20, 2024); J.S. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-0879V,
2024 WL 3326833, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 29, 2024); Kahler v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No.
19-1938V, 2024 WL 1928451, at *16 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 27, 2024); Walters v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 21-1461V, 2024 WL 1299576, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 27, 2024); Tappendorf v.
Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1592V, 2024 WL 1299566, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 23,
2024); Kleinschmidt v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-0680V, 2023 WL 9119039, at *7 (Fed. Cl.
Spec. Mstr. Dec. 5, 2023); Gibson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-0243V, 2022 WL 17820891,
at *12 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 5, 2022).
36 This total is calculated as follows: 52 miles x $0.575 + 739 miles x $0.56 + 723 miles x $0.585 + 715
miles x $0.625 + 286 x $0.655 = $1,500.21. The business mileage rates from 2020 to 2023 can be found
on the IRS website. https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/standard-mileage-rates (last visited Sept. 12,
2025).
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In accordance with the Vaccine Act’s aim of generously compensating those
petitioners shown to be vaccine injured, sufficient payment will be allocated to purchase
the agreed-upon items at the maximum cost and frequency requested by Petitioner. This
equates to the following purchases: 1. bathroom grab bars ($200.00); 2. handheld shower
head ($110.00), replaced every ten years; 3. bathroom chair ($160.00), replaced every
two years; 4. shoulder ice sleeve ($41.72), replaced every year; and 5. bottle of Tylenol
($11.99), everyone month. See Ex. 38 at 4-6. Additionally, $25.00 co-pays through 2027
(age 64), Medicare Part B coinsurance of 20 percent per year beginning in 2028 (age 65)
and continuing for life,37 and accompanying transportation costs calculated using the IRS
business rate for life will be allowed for the following treatment: 1. twice monthly PT
sessions; 2. monthly psychotherapy visits; and 3. twice yearly visits with a pain
management specialist. See Ex. 38 at 2, 10. The parties agree that the Medicare Part B
coinsurance of 20 percent per year beginning in 2028 and continuing for life is as follows:
1. $720.00 for PT; 2. $432.00 for psychotherapy; and 3. $90.00 for pain management.
Besides the already addressed issues of massage and acupuncture costs and the
mileage to use when calculating transportation costs, the parties disagree upon all
remaining items on their respective life care plans.38 Of these disputed expenses, I will
allow the cost of the adjustable bed. When warranted, I have previously allowed such
accommodations. See, e.g., Dylla v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-2310V, 2024
WL 1435504, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 27, 2024) (approving the cost of a walk-in
shower). Given the documented difficulties Petitioner has encountered sleeping, I find this
expense to be reasonably necessary.
I do not, however, find the expenses related to housekeeping and the maintenance
and repair of the rental properties Petitioner owns to be reasonably necessary to manage
her injury. In this case, the record does not show Petitioner will be unable to perform these
housekeeping tasks. And it is usual for rental property owners to pay maintenance costs
out of the generated income.
Expenses such as heavy housekeeping and twice-a-year yard maintenance have
been compensated when a petitioner has suffered a significant vaccine-related injury
(such as Guillain-Barré syndrome resulting in intractable, life-long deficits) shown to
impact the petitioner’s ability to perform these tasks. See Hoisington v. Sec’y of Health &
37 As discussed later in this Decision, I am not awarding Petitioner the requested overall medical insurance
costs. Thus, I am awarding these amounts for the described future medical care.
38 A comparison of the parties’ life care plans reveals the disputed areas. Compare Exs. 38-39 with Exs. D.
Although Respondent failed to address two weeks of home health care related to the implanted nerve
stimulator, as well as supplies, maintenance, and follow-up with no additional cost, that Petitioner seeks
(Ex. 38 at 14; Ex. 39 at 3) in his plan (Ex. D), his life care planner objected to the reimbursement of this
expense in her accompanying narrative (Ex. E at 3).
15

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 77 Filed 11/12/25 Page 16 of 17
Hum. Servs., No. 19-1043V, 2024 WL 3913712, at *16-17 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 22,
2024); Spayde v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-1499V, 2023 WL 6806125, at
*14 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 21, 2023). But they also have been denied when sufficient
evidence to substantiate such expenses has not been provided. See Goldman v. Sec’y
of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-1523V, 2020 WL 6955394, at *11 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Nov. 2, 2020). As previously noted by another special master, what is reasonably
necessary should be “construe[d] . . . to mean that an award should provide compensation
beyond that which is required to meet the basic needs of the injured person in the
compensable areas but short of that which may be required to optimize the injured
person’s quality of life.” Scheinfield v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-0212V, 1991
WL 94360, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 20, 1991). It should lie “lie[] somewhere
between that which is ‘indispensable’ and that which is ‘advantageous.’” Id. That showing
has not been made in this case for this category of expense.
Similarly, Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to support her claim for
two weeks of home health care related to the maintenance of her implanted nerve
stimulator. She has failed to establish that this care likely will be needed. There is no
evidence showing such care was required following the initial implantation, or that the
cost of such treatment would not be covered by her medical insurance. This expense is
simply too speculative.
Finally, Petitioner requests $1,000.00 annually to pay the deductible for medical
insurance through life. Ex. 38 at 1; Ex. 39 at 1. But this proposal fails to account for
Petitioner’s eligibility for Medicare coverage upon reaching the age of 65. And Petitioner’s
most significant co-pays or Medicare Part B coinsurance for all PT, psychotherapy, and
pain management have been awarded in this Decision.
The overall costs of medical insurance have been paid in vaccine cases where
“insurance can help cover those medical risks for which compensation would otherwise
be allowable under the Act and where the insurance is, in fact, a lower-cost alternative to
the funding of those risks.” Huber v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 255, 257
(1991) (finding the reimbursement of future medical insurance premiums was warranted
as a lower cost option). Even though Petitioner is requesting only a yearly amount for her
deductible, I find payment of this expense is not warranted. And Respondent’s proposed
method of paying Petitioner only her Medicare Part B annual deductible, but not premiums
for her Medicare Part B or Medicare Part D, has been approved in other cases. See, e.g.,
Goldman, 2020 WL 6955394, at *10. I will adopt this same approach in this case.
16

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Conclusion
Based on my consideration of the complete record as a whole and for reasons set
forth in this ruling, I find that $200,000.00 represents a fair and appropriate amount of
compensation for Petitioner’s actual pain and suffering. For her projected pain and
suffering, I find that an award of $1,000.00 per year for life is a fair and appropriate
amount of compensation - reduced to its net present value of $19,330.86. I also find
that Petitioner is entitled to $264,570.00 for projected lost wages, $3,477.07 for
actual expenses, and an amount sufficient to purchase an annuity to cover the
expenses included in the life care plan as described in this Decision.
The parties shall file a joint status report updating me on their efforts to
finalize the award in this case by no later than Thursday, November 06, 2025. In the
status report, they should estimate the amount of additional time needed to fully
resolve the issue of damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
17

================================================================================
DOCUMENT 3: USCOURTS-cofc-1_20-vv-00496-2
Date issued/filed: 2025-12-09
Pages: 9
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 11/05/2025) regarding 76 DECISION of Special Master. Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (cr) Service on parties made.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 82 Filed 12/09/25 Page 1 of 9
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 20-0496V
HOLLY YOUNG, Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner, Filed: November 5, 2025
v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
Maximillian J. Muller, Muller Brazil, LLP, Dresher, PA, for Petitioner.
Sarah Christina Duncan, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES1
On April 23, 2020, Holly Young2 filed a petition for compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.3 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine
administration (“SIRVA”) as a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccine administered to her on
October 4, 2017. Petition at 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit
of the Office of Special Masters.
1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it mus//*/t be
made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or
at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government
Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In
accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other
information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I
agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2 Ms. Young filed this claim using her married name, but reverted to her maiden name after obtaining a
divorce. On August 28, 2021, I amended the caption accordingly. ECF No. 34.
3 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. §
300aa (2018).

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 82 Filed 12/09/25 Page 2 of 9
After Respondent conceded entitlement, the parties were unable to resolve
damages on their own,4 so I ordered briefing on that matter. On October 6, I issued a
Ruling on Damages, finding Petitioner entitled to $200,000.00 past pain and suffering;
$1,000.00 per year for future pain and suffering – equating to a net present value of
$19,330.86; $264,570.00 for future lost wages; $3,477.07 for past and an amount
sufficient to purchase an annuity to cover the described future expenses. ECF No. 74. On
November 3, 2025, Respondent filed the attached Joint Status Report, and
accompanying Tab A, providing more detailed calculations, including $6,919.39 for the
first-year future expenses and describing the annuity in greater detail. ECF No. 75. In the
Joint Status Report, Respondent represented that Petitioner “does not object to the
representations made herein.” Id. at 1. Based on the record as a whole, I find that
Petitioner is entitled to an award as stated in the Ruling on Damages and Joint Status
Report (including Tab A).
Pursuant to the terms stated in the attached Joint Status Report, Petitioner is
awarded the following:
A. A lump sum payment of $494,297.32, representing $200,000.00 for actual
pain and suffering; $19,330.86 for projected pain and suffering;
$264,570.00 for projected lost wages; $3,477.07 for actual expenses; and
$6,919.39 for first-year projected expenses; to be paid through an ACH
deposit to Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement
to Petitioner; and
B. An amount sufficient to purchase the annuity contract described in the
attached Joint Status Report (including Tab A).
These amounts represent compensation for all damages that would be available under
Section 15(a). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this
decision.5
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
4 Although I authorized the parties to retain economists and life care planners, they were unable to reach
an agreement related to the appropriate amount of damages in this case. On January 17, 2023, I ordered
additional briefing.
5 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by the parties’ joint filing of notice
renouncing the right to seek review.
2

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 82 Filed 12/09/25 Page 3 of 9
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
HOLLY YOUNG,
Petitioner,
v. No. 20-496V
Chief Special Master Corcoran
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND ECF
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
RESPONDENT’S JOINT STATUS REPORT REGARDING
COMPENSATION TO BE AWARDED AND FORM OF AWARD
In the Chief Special Master’s October 6, 2025 Ruling on Damages, the Chief Special
Master directed the parties to “file a joint status report updating [him] on their efforts to
finalize the award in this case by no later than Thursday, November 06, 2025.” ECF No. 74, at
17. Respondent submits this Joint Status Report providing the Chief Special Master with a
statement of all damages, including those that the parties have agreed upon, as well as those
decided by the Chief Special Master, in the manner that the parties agree contains the
information needed for the Chief Special Master’s Ruling on Damages.
While preserving his right, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e), to seek review of the
Chief Special Master’s Ruling on Damages, respondent submits the following Joint Status
Report regarding damages. Petitioner’s counsel has reviewed this Joint Status Report and does
not object to the representations made herein.

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 82 Filed 12/09/25 Page 4 of 9
I. Items of Compensation
A. Life Care Items
Respondent engaged life care planner Linda Curtis, RN, MS, CNLCP, CCM, and
petitioner engaged Staci L. Schonbrun, Ph.D., CRC, CDMS, CCM, CLCP, to provide an
estimation of Holly Young’s future vaccine-injury-related needs. Life care plans were filed in
this case. ECF Nos. 58, 66. Agreed-upon life care items, as well as life care items delineated as
awarded by the Chief Special Master, are illustrated by the chart entitled “Appendix A: Items of
Compensation for Holly Young,” attached to this Joint Status Report as Tab A.1
B. Future Lost Earnings
The parties agreed that based upon the evidence of record, Holly Young will suffer a
future loss of earnings under the Vaccine Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A). However, the
parties did not agree on an amount of future lost earnings to be awarded. On October 6, 2025,
1 The chart at Tab A illustrates the parties’ agreed-upon annual amounts for life care items and,
pursuant to the Chief Special Master’s October 6, 2025 Ruling on Damages (ECF No. 74),
includes the Chief Special Master’s award of the following life care items: Medicare Part B
Deductible, from compensation year 2028 through the remainder of petitioner’s life; Physical
Therapy, from compensation year 2025 through the remainder of petitioner’s life;
Psychotherapy, from compensation year 2025 through the remainder of petitioner’s life;
Shoulder Ice Sleeve, from compensation year 2025 through the remainder of petitioner’s life;
Adjustable Bed, from compensation year 2025 through the remainder of petitioner’s life; Grab
Bars, once in compensation year 2025; Bathroom Chair, from compensation year 2025 through
the remainder of petitioner’s life; Handheld Shower, from compensation year 2025 through the
remainder of petitioner’s life; Tylenol OTC, from compensation year 2025 through the
remainder of petitioner’s life; Pain Management, from compensation year 2025 through the
remainder of petitioner’s life; Physical Therapy Mileage, from compensation year 2025 through
the remainder of petitioner’s life; Psychotherapy Mileage, from compensation year 2025 through
the remainder of petitioner’s life; Pain Management Mileage, from compensation year 2025
through the remainder of petitioner’s life. Annual benefit years run from the date of judgment up
to the first anniversary of the date of judgment, and every year thereafter up to the anniversary of
the date of judgment.
2

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 82 Filed 12/09/25 Page 5 of 9
the Chief Special Master awarded petitioner “$264,570.00 for her future lost wages.” ECF No.
74 at 13.
C. Pain and Suffering
The parties agreed that based upon the evidence of record, Holly Young is entitled to an
award for actual and projected pain and suffering under the Vaccine Act. However, the parties
did not agree on an amount of pain and suffering to be awarded. On October 6, 2025, the Chief
Special Master awarded petitioner compensation for actual pain and suffering of $200,000.00
and projected pain and suffering of “$1,000.00 per year for future pain and suffering,” which
results in an award of $219,330.86, which amount reflects that the award for projected pain and
suffering has been reduced to net present value. ECF No. 74 at 2, 17; see 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
15(a)(4). Petitioner agrees.
D. Past Unreimbursable Expenses
The parties agreed that based upon the evidence of record, petitioner has incurred
past unreimbursable expenses related to her vaccine-related injury. However, the parties did not
agree on an amount of past unreimbursable expenses to be awarded. On October 6, 2025, the
Chief Special Master awarded petitioner an amount of $3,477.07 for past unreimbursable
expenses. ECF No. 74 at 2, 17.
II. Form of the Award
The parties request that the compensation provided to petitioner be made through a
combination of a lump sum payment and future annuity payments as described below, and
3

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 82 Filed 12/09/25 Page 6 of 9
request that the Chief Special Master’s Decision on Damages and the Court’s judgment award
the following:2
A. A lump sum payment of $494,297.32, representing compensation for life care
expenses, including those items awarded by the Chief Special Master referenced in footnote one,
expected to be incurred during the first year after judgment ($6,919.39), lost earnings
($264,570.00), pain and suffering ($219,330.86), and past unreimbursable expenses ($3,477.07)
in the form of an ACH deposit to petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement
to petitioner, Holly Young.
B. An amount sufficient to purchase an annuity contract,3 subject to the conditions
described below, that will provide payments for the life care items contained in the life care plan,
as illustrated by the chart at Tab A, attached hereto, paid to the life insurance company,4 from
2 Should petitioner die prior to entry of judgment, the parties reserve the right to move the Court
for appropriate relief. In particular, respondent would oppose any award for future medical
expenses and future pain and suffering.
3 In respondent’s discretion, respondent may purchase one or more annuity contracts from one
or more life insurance companies.
The parties further agree that the annuity payments cannot be assigned, accelerated, deferred,
increased, or decreased by the parties and that no part of any annuity payments called for herein,
nor any assets of the United States or the annuity company, are subject to execution or any legal
process for any obligation in any manner. Petitioner and petitioner’s heirs, executors,
administrators, successors, and assigns do hereby agree that they have no power or right to sell,
assign, mortgage, encumber, or anticipate said annuity payments, or any part thereof, by
assignment or otherwise, and further agree that they will not sell, assign, mortgage, encumber, or
anticipate said annuity payments, or any part thereof, by assignment or otherwise.
4 The Life Insurance Company must have a minimum of $250,000,000 capital and surplus,
exclusive of any mandatory security valuation reserve. The Life Insurance Company must have
one of the following ratings from two of the following rating organizations:
a. A.M. Best Company: A++, A+, A+g, A+p, A+r, or A+s;
b. Moody's Investor Service Claims Paying Rating: Aa3, Aa2, Aa1, or Aaa;
4

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 82 Filed 12/09/25 Page 7 of 9
which the annuity will be purchased.5 Compensation for Year Two (beginning on the first
anniversary of the date of judgment) and all subsequent years shall be provided through
respondent’s purchase of an annuity, which annuity shall make payments directly to petitioner,
Holly Young, only so long as petitioner is alive at the time a particular payment is due. At the
Secretary’s sole discretion, the periodic payments may be provided to petitioner in monthly,
quarterly, annual, or other installments. The “annual amounts” set forth in the chart at Tab A
describe only the total yearly sum to be paid to petitioner and do not require that the payment be
made in one annual installment.
1. Growth Rate
The parties agree that a four percent (4%) growth rate should be applied to all non-
medical life care items, and a five percent (5%) growth rate should be applied to all medical life
care items. Thus, the benefits illustrated in the chart at Tab A that are to be paid through annuity
payments should grow as follows: four percent (4%) compounded annually from the date of
judgment for non-medical items, and five percent (5%) compounded annually from the date of
judgment for medical items.
2. Life-contingent annuity
Petitioner will continue to receive the annuity payments from the Life Insurance
Company only so long as she, Holly Young, is alive at the time that a particular payment is due.
c. Standard and Poor's Corporation Insurer Claims-Paying Ability Rating: AA-,
AA, AA+, or AAA;
d. Fitch Credit Rating Company, Insurance Company Claims Paying Ability
Rating: AA-, AA, AA+, or AAA.
5 Petitioner authorizes the disclosure of certain documents filed by the petitioner in this case
consistent with the Privacy Act and the routine uses described in the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program System of Records, No. 09-15-0056.
5

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 82 Filed 12/09/25 Page 8 of 9
Written notice shall be provided to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Life
Insurance Company within twenty (20) days of Holly Young’s death.
3. Guardianship
Petitioner is a competent adult. Evidence of guardianship is not required in this case.
III. Summary of Payments Following Judgment
A. Lump sum paid to petitioner, Holly Young: $494,297.32
B. An amount sufficient to purchase the annuity contract described
above in section II. B.
Respectfully submitted,
BRETT A. SHUMATE
Assistant Attorney General
C. SALVATORE D’ALESSIO
Director
Torts Branch, Civil Division
HEATHER L. PEARLMAN
Deputy Director
Torts Branch, Civil Division
JULIA M. COLLISON
Assistant Director
Torts Branch, Civil Division
s/ Sarah C. Duncan
SARAH C. DUNCAN
Senior Trial Attorney
Torts Branch, Civil Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 146
Benjamin Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044-0146
Tel: (202) 514-9729
Email: sarah.c.duncan@usdoj.gov
DATED: November 3, 2025
6

Case 1:20-vv-00496-UNJ Document 82 Filed 12/09/25 Page 9 of 9
Appendix A: Items of Compensation for Holly Young Page 1 of 1
Lump Sum
Compensation Compensation Compensation Compensation
ITEMS OF COMPENSATION G.R. * M Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Years 4-Life
2025 2026 2027 2028-Life
Medicare Part B Deductible 5% 226.00
Physical Therapy 4% * M 600.00 600.00 600.00 720.00
Psychotherapy 4% * M 300.00 300.00 300.00 432.00
Shoulder Ice Sleeve 4% 41.72 41.72 41.72 41.72
Adjustable Bed 4% 1,403.00 140.30 140.30 140.30
Jar Openers 4% 15.99
Grab Bars 4% 200.00
Bathroom Chair 4% 160.00 80.00 80.00 80.00
Handheld Shower 4% 110.00 11.00 11.00 11.00
Tylenol OTC 4% 143.88 143.88 143.88 143.88
Pain Management 4% * 50.00 50.00 50.00 90.00
Mileage: Physical Therapy 4% M 2,402.40 2,402.40 2,402.40 2,402.40
Mileage: Psychotherapy 4% M 1,268.40 1,268.40 1,268.40 1,268.40
Mileage: Pain Management 4% 224.00 224.00 224.00 224.00
Future Lost Earnings 264,570.00
Pain and Suffering 219,330.86
Past Unreimbursable Expenses 3,477.07
Annual Totals 494,297.32 5,261.70 5,261.70 5,779.70
Note: Compensation Year 1 consists of the 12 month period following the date of judgment.
Compensation Year 2 consists of the 12 month period commencing on the first anniversary of the date of judgment.
As soon as practicable after entry of judgment, respondent shall make the following payment to petitioner for Yr 1 life care
expenses ($6,919.39), future lost earnings ($264,570.00), pain and suffering ($219,330.86, and past unreimbursable
expenses ($3,477.07): $494,297.32.
Annual amounts payable through an annuity for future Compensation Years follow the anniversary of the date of judgment.
Annual amounts shall increase at the rates indicated above in column G.R., compounded annually from the date of judgment.
Items denoted with an asterisk (*) covered by health insurance and/or Medicare.
Items denoted with an "M" payable in twelve monthly installments totaling the annual amount indicated.
Young (20-496) Tab A 1 of 1