VICP Registry Case Source Bundle
Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_19-vv-01914
Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_19-vv-01914
Petitioner: Sarah Griffore
Filed: 2019-12-18
Decided: 2022-05-19
Vaccine: influenza
Vaccination date: 2019-01-31
Condition: left shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA)
Outcome: compensated
Award amount USD: 66491

AI-assisted case summary:
Sarah Griffore filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program on December 18, 2019, alleging that she received an influenza vaccine on January 31, 2019, and subsequently suffered a left shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA). The respondent filed a Rule 4(c) report on June 11, 2021, conceding that Ms. Griffore was entitled to compensation. The respondent agreed that her injury met the criteria set forth in the revised Vaccine Injury Table, which presumes causation for SIRVA under specific conditions, including no prior history of shoulder pain, onset of pain within 48 hours of vaccination, pain and reduced range of motion limited to the injection shoulder, and no apparent alternative cause. The respondent also agreed that her residual effects lasted more than six months. A ruling on entitlement was issued on June 11, 2021, by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. The parties later reported an impasse on the issue of damages, specifically pain and suffering. In a decision awarding damages on May 19, 2022, Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran awarded Ms. Griffore a total of $66,491.20. This amount included $65,000.00 for actual pain and suffering and $1,491.20 for past unreimbursable expenses. The court found that while Ms. Griffore experienced pain and limitations, her treatment was conservative and her reported pain levels were not as severe as in cases that received higher awards. The award was considered comparable to other SIRVA cases with similar treatment and outcomes, taking into account that her pregnancy and care for her newborn complicated her recovery. Petitioner was represented by David John Carney and David Carney of Green & Schafle LLC, and respondent was represented by Mollie Danielle Gorney and Catherine Stolar of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Theory of causation field:
Petitioner Sarah Griffore alleged a left shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following an influenza vaccine received on January 31, 2019. The respondent conceded entitlement to compensation, agreeing that Petitioner met the criteria for a presumed SIRVA injury under the Vaccine Injury Table: no prior shoulder pain, onset of pain within 48 hours of vaccination, pain and reduced range of motion limited to the injection shoulder, and no apparent alternative cause. Residual effects lasted more than six months. A ruling on entitlement was issued on June 11, 2021, by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. Damages were subsequently adjudicated, with Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran awarding $65,000.00 for pain and suffering and $1,491.20 for past unreimbursable expenses, totaling $66,491.20, in a decision dated May 19, 2022. The Special Master found Petitioner's reported pain levels and treatment to be less severe than in cases with higher awards, noting that her pregnancy and care for her newborn complicated recovery. Petitioner was represented by David John Carney and David Carney (Green & Schafle LLC), and respondent by Mollie Danielle Gorney and Catherine Stolar (U.S. Department of Justice).

Public staged source text:

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DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_19-vv-01914-0
Date issued/filed: 2021-07-12
Pages: 2
Docket text: PUBLIC ORDER/RULING (Originally filed: 06/11/2021) regarding 28 Ruling on Entitlement Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (sw) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:19-vv-01914-UNJ Document 30 Filed 07/12/21 Page 1 of 2
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 19-1914V
UNPUBLISHED
SARAH GRIFFORE, Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner, Filed: June 11, 2021
v.
Special Processing Unit (SPU);
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;
HUMAN SERVICES, Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;
Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine
Respondent. Administration (SIRVA)
David John Carney, Green & Schafle LLC, Philadelphia, PA, for petitioner.
Mollie Danielle Gorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.
RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1
On December 18, 2019, Sarah Griffore filed a petition for compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she received an influenza (“flu”) vaccine on January
31, 2019 and subsequently suffered a left shoulder injury related to vaccine administration
(SIRVA). Petition at 1-2. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the
Office of Special Masters.
On June 11, 2021, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes that
Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at 1.
Specifically, Petitioner has satisfied the criteria set forth in the revised Vaccine Injury
Table and the Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation, which afford petitioners a
1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required
to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E-Government Act
of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance
with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information,
the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that
the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa
(2012).

Case 1:19-vv-01914-UNJ Document 30 Filed 07/12/21 Page 2 of 2
presumption of causation for a SIRVA injury if there is no prior history of pain,
inflammation, or dysfunction in the affected shoulder; the onset of shoulder pain occurs
within 48 hours after receipt of an intramuscular vaccination; pain and reduced range of
motion are limited to the shoulder in which the vaccine was given; and there is no
apparent alternative cause. Id. at 4-5. Respondent further agrees that the medical
records demonstrate that Petitioner has experienced the residual effects of her SIRVA for
more than six months. Id. at 5.
In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that
Petitioner is entitled to compensation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
2

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DOCUMENT 2: USCOURTS-cofc-1_19-vv-01914-1
Date issued/filed: 2022-05-19
Pages: 11
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 04/05/2022) regarding 40 DECISION of Special Master Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (sw) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:19-vv-01914-UNJ Document 46 Filed 05/19/22 Page 1 of 11
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 19-1914V
UNPUBLISHED
SARAH GRIFFORE, Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner, Filed: April 5, 2022
v.
Special Processing Unit (SPU);
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND Decision Awarding Damages; Pain
HUMAN SERVICES, and Suffering; Influenza (Flu)
Vaccine; Shoulder Injury Related to
Respondent. Vaccine Administration (SIRVA)
David Carney, Green & Schafle LLC, Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioner.
Catherine Stolar, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES1
On December 18, 2019, Sarah Griffore filed a petition for compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she received an influenza (“flu”) vaccine on January
31, 2019, and subsequently suffered a left shoulder injury related to vaccine
administration (SIRVA). Petition at 1-2. The case was assigned to the Special Processing
Unit (“SPU”) of the Office of Special Masters.
For the reasons described below, I find that Petitioner is entitled to an award of
damages in the amount of $66,491.20, representing $65,000.00 for actual pain and
suffering, and $1,491.20 for past unreimbursable expenses.
1 Because this unpublished Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am
required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E-
Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic
Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the
internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact
medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from
public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. §
300aa (2012).

Case 1:19-vv-01914-UNJ Document 46 Filed 05/19/22 Page 2 of 11
I. Relevant Procedural History
As noted, this case was initiated in December 2019. On June 11, 2021,
Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report conceding that Petitioner was entitled to
compensation. ECF 27. A ruling on entitlement was issued that same day. ECF 28. One
month later, the parties reported an impasse on the issue of Petitioner’s pain and
suffering.3 ECF 31. Both parties subsequently filed briefs on this issue, and the matter is
now ripe for adjudication.
II. Legal Standard
Compensation awarded pursuant to the Vaccine Act shall include “[f]or actual and
projected pain and suffering and emotional distress from the vaccine-related injury, an
award not to exceed $250,000.” Section 15(a)(4).
Additionally, a petitioner may recover “actual unreimbursable expenses incurred
before the date of judgment awarding such expenses which (i) resulted from the vaccine-
related injury for which the petitioner seeks compensation, (ii) were incurred by or on
behalf of the person who suffered such injury, and (iii) were for diagnosis, medical or other
remedial care, rehabilitation . . . determined to be reasonably necessary.” Section
15(a)(1)(B). The petitioner bears the burden of proof with respect to each element of
compensation requested. Brewer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 93-0092V, 1996
WL 147722, at *22-23 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 18, 1996).
There is no mathematic formula for assigning a monetary value to a person’s pain
and suffering and emotional distress. I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-
1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 14, 2013) (“[a]wards for
emotional distress are inherently subjective and cannot be determined by using a
mathematical formula”); Stansfield v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 93-0172V,
1996 WL 300594, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 22, 1996) (“the assessment of pain and
suffering is inherently a subjective evaluation”). Factors to be considered when
determining an award for pain and suffering include: 1) awareness of the injury; 2) severity
of the injury; and 3) duration of the suffering. I.D., 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (citing
McAllister v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No 91-1037V, 1993 WL 777030, at *3 (Fed.
Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 26, 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 70 F.3d 1240
(Fed. Cir. 1995)).
I may also consider prior pain and suffering awards to aid my resolution of the
appropriate amount of compensation for pain and suffering in this case. See, e.g., Doe
34 v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 87 Fed. Cl. 758, 768 (2009) (finding that “there is
3 In that same status report, the parties indicated that they had reached agreement on Petitioner’s out-of-
pocket medical expenses. ECF 31.
2

Case 1:19-vv-01914-UNJ Document 46 Filed 05/19/22 Page 3 of 11
nothing improper in the chief special master’s decision to refer to damages for pain and
suffering awarded in other cases as an aid in determining the proper amount of damages
in this case.”). And, of course, I may rely on my own experience (along with that of my
predecessor Chief Special Masters) adjudicating similar claims.4 Hodges v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Congress
contemplated that the special masters would use their accumulated expertise in the field
of vaccine injuries to judge the merits of individual claims).
Although pain and suffering in the past was often determined based on a
continuum, as Respondent argues, that practice was cast into doubt by the Court several
years ago. In Graves, Judge Merow rejected a special master’s approach of awarding
compensation for pain and suffering based on a spectrum from $0.00 to the statutory
$250,000.00 cap. Graves v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 109 Fed. Cl. 579 (Fed. Cl.
2013). Judge Merow maintained that do so resulted in “the forcing of all suffering awards
into a global comparative scale in which the individual petitioner’s suffering is compared
to the most extreme cases and reduced accordingly.” Id. at 589-90. Instead, Judge Merow
assessed pain and suffering by looking to the record evidence, prior pain and suffering
awards within the Vaccine Program, and a survey of similar injury claims outside of the
Vaccine Program. Id. at 593-95. Under this alternative approach, the statutory cap merely
cuts off higher pain and suffering awards – it does not shrink the magnitude of all possible
awards as falling within a spectrum that ends at the cap.
III. Prior SIRVA Compensation Within SPU5
A. Data Regarding Compensation in SPU SIRVA Cases
SIRVA cases have an extensive history of informal resolution within the SPU. As
of January 1, 2022, 2,371 SPU SIRVA cases have resolved since the inception of SPU
on July 1, 2014. Compensation was awarded in 2,306 of these cases, with the remaining
65 cases dismissed.
Of the compensated cases, 1,339 SPU SIRVA cases involved a prior ruling that
petitioner was entitled to compensation. In only 88 of these cases was the amount of
damages determined by a special master in a reasoned decision. As I have previously
4 From July 2014 until September 2015, the SPU was overseen by former Chief Special Master Vowell.
For the next four years, until September 30, 2019, all SPU cases, including the majority of SIRVA claims,
were assigned to former Chief Special Master Dorsey, now Special Master Dorsey. In early October 2019,
the majority of SPU cases were reassigned to me as the current Chief Special Master.
5 All figures included in this decision are derived from a review of the decisions awarding compensation
within the SPU. All decisions reviewed are, or will be, available publicly. All figures and calculations cited
are approximate.
3

Case 1:19-vv-01914-UNJ Document 46 Filed 05/19/22 Page 4 of 11
stated, the written decisions setting forth such determinations, prepared by neutral judicial
officers (the special masters themselves), provide the most reliable precedent setting
forth what similarly-situated claimants should also receive.6
1,223 of this subset of post-entitlement determination, compensation-awarding
cases, were the product of informal settlement - cases via proffer and 28 cases via
stipulation. Although all proposed amounts denote an agreement reached by the parties,
those presented by stipulation derive more from compromise than any formal agreement
or acknowledgment by Respondent that the settlement sum itself is a fair measure of
damages. Of course, even though any such informally-resolved case must still be
approved by a special master, these determinations do not provide the same judicial
guidance or insight obtained from a reasoned decision. But given the aggregate number
of such cases, these determinations nevertheless “provide some evidence of the kinds of
awards received overall in comparable cases.” Sakovits, 2020 WL 3729420, at *4
(emphasis in original).
The remaining 967 compensated SIRVA cases were resolved via stipulated
agreement of the parties without a prior ruling on entitlement. These agreements are often
described as “litigative risk” settlements, and thus represent a reduced percentage of the
compensation which otherwise would be awarded. Due to the complexity of these
settlement discussions, many which involve multiple competing factors, these awards do
not constitute a reliable gauge of the appropriate amount of compensation to be awarded
in other SPU SIRVA cases.
The data for all groups described above reflect the expected differences in
outcome, summarized as follows:
Damages Proffered Stipulated Stipulated7
Decisions by Damages Damages Agreement
Special Master
Total Cases 88 1,223 28 967
Lowest $40,757.91 $25,000.00 $45,000.00 $5,000.00
1st Quartile $70,950.73 $70,000.00 $90,000.00 $42,500.00
Median $95,974.09 $90,000.00 $122,886.42 $60,390.00
3rd Quartile $125,269.46 $116,662.57 $161,001.79 $88,051.88
6 See, e.g., Sakovits v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 17-1028V, 2020 WL 3729420, at *4 (Fed. Cl.
Spec. Mstr. June 4, 2020) (discussing the difference between cases in which damages are agreed upon by
the parties and cases in which damages are determined by a special master).
7 Two awards were for an annuity only, the exact amounts which were not determined at the time of
judgment.
4

Case 1:19-vv-01914-UNJ Document 46 Filed 05/19/22 Page 5 of 11
Largest $265,034.87 $1,845,047.00 $1,500,000.00 $550,000.00
B. Pain and Suffering Awards in Reasoned Decisions
In the 88 SPU SIRVA cases which required a reasoned damages decision,
compensation for a petitioner’s actual or past pain and suffering varied from $40,000.00
to $210,000.00, with $94,000.00 as the median amount. Only five of these cases involved
an award for future pain and suffering, with yearly awards ranging from $250.00 to
$1,500.00.8
In cases with lower awards for past pain and suffering, many petitioners commonly
demonstrated only mild to moderate levels of pain throughout their injury course. This
lack of significant pain is often evidenced by a delay in seeking treatment – over six
months in one case. In cases with more significant initial pain, petitioners experienced
this greater pain for three months or less. All petitioners displayed only mild to moderate
limitations in range of motion (“ROM”), and MRI imaging showed evidence of mild to
moderate pathologies such as tendinosis, bursitis, or edema. Many petitioners suffered
from unrelated conditions to which a portion of their pain and suffering could be attributed.
These SIRVAs usually resolved after one to two cortisone injections and two months or
less of physical therapy (“PT”). None required surgery. The duration of the injury ranged
from six to 30 months, with most petitioners averaging approximately nine months of pain.
Although some petitioners asserted residual pain, the prognosis in these cases was
positive. Only one petitioner provided evidence of an ongoing SIRVA, and it was expected
to resolve within the subsequent year.
Cases with higher awards for past pain and suffering involved petitioners who
suffered more significant levels of pain and SIRVAs of longer duration. Most of these
petitioners subjectively rated their pain within the upper half of a ten-point pain scale and
sought treatment of their SIRVAs more immediately, often within 30 days of vaccination.
All experienced moderate to severe limitations in range of motion. MRI imaging showed
more significant findings, with the majority showing evidence of partial tearing. Surgery or
significant conservative treatment, up to 95 PT sessions over a duration of more than two
years and multiple cortisone injections, was required in these cases. In four cases,
petitioners provided sufficient evidence of permanent injuries to warrant yearly
compensation for future or projected pain and suffering.
IV. Appropriate Compensation for Petitioner’s Pain and Suffering
8 Additionally, a first-year future pain and suffering award of $10,000.00 was made in one case. Dhanoa v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-1011V, 2018 WL 1221922 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 1, 2018).
5

Case 1:19-vv-01914-UNJ Document 46 Filed 05/19/22 Page 6 of 11
In this case, awareness of the injury is not disputed. The record reflects that
Petitioner is a competent adult with no impairments that would impact her awareness of
her injury. Therefore, I analyze principally the severity and duration of Petitioner’s injury
in determining the appropriate pain and suffering award.
In performing this analysis, I have reviewed the record as a whole, including all
medical records and affidavits filed, as well as the parties’ briefs and other pleadings. I
have also considered prior awards for pain and suffering in both SPU and non-SPU
SIRVA cases and rely upon my experience adjudicating these cases. However, I have
based my ultimate determination on the specific circumstances of this case.
A. The Parties’ Arguments
The parties agree Petitioner should be awarded $1,491.20 in unreimbursed
medical expenses. ECF 32 at 19; ECF 35 at 5. Thus, the only area of disagreement
concerns the amount of compensation that should be awarded for Petitioner’s pain and
suffering.
In arguing that she should be awarded $80,000.00 for her pain and suffering,
Petitioner compares the facts and circumstances in her case favorably with the
experiences of the petitioners in Pruett, Capasso, Kim, and Marino, all of whom received
awards of $75,000.00.9 ECF 32 at 12-14. She asserts that a slightly higher award is
appropriate, however, because she suffered with extreme pain for longer than two and a
half months and had little improvement or relief of symptoms for a “long time period”
thereafter. Id. at 14-15. She was also pregnant at the time of her SIRVA and had difficulty
caring for her infant after the baby was born, similar to the petitioner in Kim.10 ECF 14-
15.
Characterizing Petitioner’s injury as comparatively minor, requiring only
conservative treatment, Respondent argues in reaction that Petitioner should receive the
lesser sum of $45,000.00 for her pain and suffering. ECF 35 at 5. In reaching this
conclusion, Respondent argues that the facts of Petitioner’s case are more comparable
9 Pruett v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 17-0561V, 2019 WL 3297083 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr.
30, 2019) (awarding $75,000.00 for past pain and suffering); Capasso v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
No. 17-0014V, 2019 WL 5290524 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 10, 2019) (awarding $75,000.00 in actual pain
and suffering); Kim v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 17-0418V, 2018 WL 3991022 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
Mstr. July 20, 2018) (awarding $75,000.00 for actual pain and suffering); Marino v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., No. 16-0622, 2018 WL 2224736 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 26, 2018) (awarding $75,000.00 for
actual pain and suffering).
10 The petitioner in Kim had a three-month-old infant at the time of her SIRVA. Kim, 2018 WL 3991022, at
*1.
6

Case 1:19-vv-01914-UNJ Document 46 Filed 05/19/22 Page 7 of 11
to those in Ramos and George, cases where the petitioners’ SIRVA injuries were
characterized as mild, and they received only conservative treatment.11 Id. at 10.
In her responsive brief, Petitioner argues that Respondent’s characterization of her
case as warranting a below-median award is inaccurate. ECF 37 at 2. She emphasizes
that the duration and severity of her symptoms, as well as the short time between onset
of injury and when she sought treatment, distinguish her case from Ramos and George.
Id. at 2-6. Petitioner further reiterates the similarities between her case and the cases
discussed in her initial brief. Id. at 7-9.
B. Analysis
The guidance provided by the Graves decision is clear (although not controlling),12
and I have previously addressed the more general arguments about calculation of pain
and suffering damages made by Respondent during expedited “Motions Day” hearings
and in other damages decisions. I have specifically rejected Respondent’s argument “that
the amounts awarded in proffered cases are a more accurate gauge of the appropriate
amount to be awarded than reasoned decisions from the court and special masters.”
Sakovits, 2020 WL 3729420, at *4.
1. The Duration and Severity of Petitioner’s SIRVA Injury
Petitioner was 16-weeks pregnant when she received the flu vaccine in her left
deltoid during a routine obstetric visit on January 31, 2019. Ex 1 at 5. Four weeks later,
Petitioner presented to her primary care physician, Dr. Rong Lawson, with complaints of
left shoulder pain that began after her flu shot. Ex 3 at 3. At her first appointment with Dr.
Lawson, Petitioner displayed decreased range of motion (ROM) of her left shoulder when
“mov[ing] [her] arm forward and side way [sic],” but Petitioner was “[o]k to reach back.”
Id. at 4-5. After six sessions of occupational therapy, Petitioner continued to display
“significant strength deficits;” however, she also had “near functional” range of motion in
her left shoulder. Ex 1 at 115, 118. She was discharged to a home exercise program after
her final visit on April 22, 2019. Id.
Approximately two months later, Petitioner returned to Dr. Lawson, at which time
she reported that OT had helped to increase her range of motion and decrease her pain
11 Ramos v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 18-1005V, 2021 WL 688576 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan.
4, 2021 (awarding $40,000.00 for actual pain and suffering); George v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
No. 18-0426V, 2020 WL 4692451 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 10, 2020) (awarding $67,000.00 for actual pain
and suffering).
12 See supra Section II (for further discussion).
7

Case 1:19-vv-01914-UNJ Document 46 Filed 05/19/22 Page 8 of 11
level. Ex 4 at 4-5. Physical examination of Petitioner’s shoulder by Dr. Lawson at this visit
and at a subsequent visit in September 2019 revealed normal findings. Ex 4 at 6; Ex 5 at
4-5; Ex 10 at 334-35.
Ten months after vaccination, in December 2019, Petitioner visited Dr. Kristalyn
Mauch, an orthopedist, for the first time. Ex 7 at 3. Physical examination continued to
reveal normal left upper extremity strength and range of motion, except for decreased
range of motion on active abduction. Id. at 6-7. Dr. Mauch did refer Petitioner for an MRI,
which demonstrated mild edema in the subacromial/subdeltoid bursa and mild increased
signal in the supraspinatus and infraspinatus tendons. Ex 8 at 11-12.
For reasons that are unclear, Petitioner did not subsequently return to Dr. Mauch,
but was instead reevaluated by Lindsey Pilling, PA, at another orthopedic practice,
Covenant Center for Advanced Orthopaedics (CCAO), one week after her MRI. Ex 8 at
5. At that time, Petitioner displayed decreased flexion and internal rotation but no
tenderness and normal strength. Id. at 7. PA Pilling opined that Petitioner’s MRI “look[ed]
normal” (except for “some cyst formation”) and that surgery would not be helpful in
alleviating Petitioner’s pain. Id. at 8. Petitioner was diagnosed with adhesive capsulitis
and was advised to perform a home exercise program. Id.
Approximately seven weeks later, on February 27, 2020, Petitioner was examined
by Dr. Colleen Linehan, an orthopedist affiliated with CCAO. Ex 9 at 8. For the first time,
Petitioner complained of numbness and tingling in her left upper extremity. Id. Physical
examination revealed normal strength and range of motion except for slightly decreased
internal rotation. Id. Dr. Linehan concurred with PA Pilling regarding the interpretation of
Petitioner’s MRI and advised Petitioner to consider steroid injections if her pain continued.
Id. at 9.
Despite Petitioner’s reports of continued left shoulder pain, the record reflects that
she did not seek out any additional treatment for another year. On February 9, 2021,
Petitioner presented to nurse practitioner (NP) Megan Layton to establish a new primary
care provider relationship. Ex 10 at 462. She now complained of left shoulder pain for two
years, although her physical examination was normal. Id. at 465. Steroid injections were
again discussed but Petitioner declined. Id. at 466. There is no evidence that Petitioner
has received any additional treatment for her shoulder since this date.
In her initial affidavit, Petitioner alleged that the pain caused by her shoulder injury
interfered with her sleep, activities of daily living (ADLs), and ability to exercise, which
caused physical and emotional stress. Ex 2 at ¶¶ 7, 10-11, 13, 22-23. Her symptoms also
interfered with her ability to care for her newborn. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 23, 24. In a supplemental
affidavit dated August 23, 2021, Petitioner alleged that she continued to have difficulty
8

Case 1:19-vv-01914-UNJ Document 46 Filed 05/19/22 Page 9 of 11
with ADLs and that her pain continued to interfere with her ability to exercise, sleep, and
care for her now toddler-aged daughter. Ex 11 at ¶ 3, 6-9.
2. Comparison to Other Awards
The question in this case is not whether Petitioner is entitled to any compensation
for her pain and suffering, but rather what amount of compensation is justified, based
upon the facts of the case and considered relevant input. This determination is not an
exact science but more of an art. While it is tempting to “split the difference” and award
an amount halfway between the amounts proposed by the parties (acknowledging that in
this case, the parties’ respective positions reasonably “frame” high and low potential
awards), each petitioner deserves an examination of the specific facts in his or her case.
Thus, while amounts ultimately awarded may end up falling somewhere in the range
between the awards proposed by both parties, this result flows from a specific analysis of
Ms. Griffore’s personal circumstances.
Overall, the record establishes that Petitioner has received limited, conservative
treatment that is inconsistent with the severity and persistence of the symptoms alleged.
This is not a case involving surgery. While her initial course of treatment was
understandably limited by her pregnancy, Petitioner’s daughter was born in July 2019,13
yet she never returned to occupational or physical therapy, nor did she take prescription
pain medication or receive more invasive treatment, such as injections, over the next two
years. In fact, after relatively consistent, yet conservative, treatment over the course of
the first year after vaccination, Petitioner has only complained of shoulder pain at one visit
since February 2020, at which time she declined an offer of a steroid injection.
I am thus unpersuaded by Petitioner’s argument that her injury is similar to, or even
slightly worse than, those in the cases cited by Petitioner in support of her pain and
suffering valuation. Those petitioners consistently rated their pain as ranging from 5-
10/10, often on the higher end of this range,14 while Petitioner never rated her pain as
more than 4/10 (even without medication). Ex 1 at 25; Ex 3 at 3; Ex 7 at 3; Ex 8 at 6; Ex
9 at 8. In fact, the decisions in Pruett, Capasso, and Kim reflect that the pain and suffering
awards were based in part on those petitioners’ subjective reports of the severity of their
pain as reflected in the medical records.15 Additionally, these petitioners, when compared
13 See Ex 10 at 65.
14 See Pruett, 2019 WL 3297083, at *1-3; Marino, 2018 WL 2224736, at *2-3; Capasso, 2019 WL 5290524,
at *3; Kim, 2018 WL 3991022, at * 1-2.
15 Pruett, 2019 WL 3297083, at *9-10 (a factor considered in the petitioner’s award was his initial severe
pain); Kim, 2018 WL 3991022, at *8 (award contemplates the petitioner’s initial period of significant pain
after her SIRVA); Capasso, 2019 WL 5290524, at *11-12 (the petitioner’s several-month initial history of
severe pain is a factor in determining the award).
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with the present case, had more severe findings on MRI, received more intensive
treatment, and encountered difficulty when returning to their prior employment.16
At the same time, Ramos (one of the cases referenced by Respondent in his brief
to support a lower award) also presents inapposite facts. The Ramos petitioner delayed
seeking any treatment for four months. Ramos, 2021 WL 688576, at *2. Furthermore,
while Petitioner can link her lack of more extensive care to her pregnancy, the Ramos
petitioner had no such justification. Finally, in contrast with Petitioner’s complaints of
residual pain, the Ramos petitioner’s pain had virtually resolved within seven months, and
he ceased complaining of shoulder pain entirely within 11 months of vaccination.17 Id. at
*2-3.
Instead, Petitioner’s case is more appropriately compared to Magee,18 in which
$65,000.00 was determined to be an appropriate award for pain and suffering. As
Petitioner has emphasized, her SIRVA treatment and recovery were complicated by her
pregnancy and her subsequent need to provide care for her newborn, an argument similar
to that made in Magee, where the petitioner had a five-month-old at the time of her SIRVA.
2020 WL 5031971, at *2, 7. As with Petitioner, Ms. Magee promptly sought treatment and
underwent a brief course of physical therapy, and her physical examination findings were
within the “nearly normal” range within a year of her SIRVA. Id. at 1-2, 7.
Furthermore, while the Magee damages decision included a separate award for
lost wages, the pain and suffering award also reflected consideration that the petitioner
had to “alter her career path,” an inclusion consistent with consideration of Petitioner’s
allegations regarding her work certification. Id. at 3, 8. Finally, both Petitioner and Ms.
16 For example, in Marino, an MRI demonstrated evidence of mild to moderate tendinosis and a partial tear
of the supraspinatus tendon, and the petitioner received a cortisone injection in her injured shoulder. 2018
WL 2224736, at *2-3. In Capasso, an MRI showed findings suggestive of partial thickness tearing of the
infraspinatus tendon. 2019 WL 5290524, at *3. Furthermore, the petitioner in Marino, a nurse practitioner,
was unable to perform some of her required job duties, including lifting and repositioning patients. 2018 WL
2224736, at 5, 7. Similarly, the petitioner in Capasso provided evidence showing he was only able to work
at 50% of his prior capacity. 2019 WL 5290524, at *3. Petitioner has alleged that she allowed a work
certification to lapse because she could not perform the physical maneuvers that were required as part of
teaching the class. Ex 2 at ¶ 23. However, in contrast with the petitioners in Capasso and Marino, Petitioner
has not provided corroborating proof of this assertion, nor has she established that teaching this class was
an essential component of her job.
17 Respondent also references George in his brief. ECF 35 at 10. While the petitioner’s MRI in George
showed mild findings similar to Petitioner’s, the George petitioner underwent a cortisone injection and
attended 30 sessions of physical therapy within the first eight months after her SIRVA. 2020 WL 4692451,
at *2-3. This more intensive treatment renders George an inappropriate comparison.
18 Magee v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 18-185V, 2020 WL 5031971 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July
21, 2020).
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Magee described in their affidavits a level of pain inconsistent with the contemporaneous
medical records, which are generally accorded more weight than later-recorded
testimony.19 Id. at 7. Therefore, I find, consistent with Magee, that the records that do
exist are not suggestive of a severe or prolonged injury, and that $65,000.00 for past pain
and suffering is appropriate compensation in this case.
V. Conclusion
For all of the reasons discussed above and based on consideration of the record
as a whole, I find that $65,000.00 represents a fair and appropriate amount of
compensation for Petitioner’s actual pain and suffering.20 I also find that Petitioner
is entitled to $1,491.20 in actual unreimbursable expenses.
Based on the record as a whole and arguments of the parties, I award Petitioner
a lump sum payment of $66,491.20 in the form of a check payable to Petitioner. This
amount represents compensation for all damages that would be available under Section
15(a).
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this Decision.21
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
19 Special masters in the Vaccine Program have in most cases declined to credit later testimony over
contemporaneous records. See, e.g., Stevens v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 90–221V, 1990 WL
608693, at *3 (Cl. Ct. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 21, 1990); Vergara v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 08–
882V, 2014 WL 2795491, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 17, 2014) (“Special masters frequently accord
more weight to contemporaneously-recorded medical symptoms than those recounted in later medical
histories, affidavits, or trial testimony.”); see also Cucuras, 993 F.2d at 1528 (noting that “the Supreme
Court counsels that oral testimony in conflict with contemporaneous documentary evidence deserves little
weight”).
20 Since this amount is being awarded for actual, rather than projected, pain and suffering, no reduction to
net present value is required. See Section 15(f)(4)(A); Childers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 96-
0194V, 1999 WL 159844, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 5, 1999) (citing Youngblood v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 32 F.3d 552 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
21 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by the parties’ joint filing of notice
renouncing the right to seek review.
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