VICP Registry Case Source Bundle
Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_19-vv-01850
Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_19-vv-01850
Petitioner: Debra J. Moore
Filed: 2019-12-06
Decided: 2022-03-30
Vaccine: influenza
Vaccination date: 2018-10-05
Condition: shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA)
Outcome: compensated
Award amount USD: 115000

AI-assisted case summary:
Debra J. Moore filed a petition alleging that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) as a result of an influenza vaccine she received on October 5, 2018. The respondent conceded entitlement to compensation, stating that her medical course was consistent with SIRVA as defined by the Vaccine Injury Table and that she suffered residual effects for more than six months. The case proceeded to a damages determination as the parties could not informally resolve the amount. Petitioner sought $140,000.00 for past pain and suffering, while the respondent countered with $87,500.00. After an expedited hearing, the Chief Special Master awarded Debra J. Moore $115,000.00 for actual pain and suffering. The decision noted that her shoulder pain was moderate, with pain never exceeding a three on a ten-point scale. While she underwent surgery and physical therapy, there was a four-month gap in treatment, and her physician noted she was doing well with limited internal rotation due to pain by her last appointment. The award was based on the specific circumstances of her case, considering the severity and duration of her injury, and comparing it to prior SIRVA cases.

Theory of causation field:
Table

Public staged source text:

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DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_19-vv-01850-0
Date issued/filed: 2021-06-17
Pages: 2
Docket text: PUBLIC ORDER/RULING (Originally filed: 05/18/2021) regarding 32 Ruling on Entitlement Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (sw) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:19-vv-01850-UNJ Document 34 Filed 06/17/21 Page 1 of 2
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 19-1850V
UNPUBLISHED
DEBRA J. MOORE, Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner, Filed: May 18, 2021
v.
Special Processing Unit (SPU);
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;
HUMAN SERVICES, Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;
Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine
Respondent. Administration (SIRVA)
Richard H. Moeller, Moore, Heffernan, et al., Sioux City, IA, for Petitioner.
Colleen Clemons Hartley, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for
Respondent.
RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1
On December 6, 2019, Debra J. Moore filed a petition for compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine
administration (“SIRVA”) as a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccine administered to her on
October 5, 2018. Petition at 1-2. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit
of the Office of Special Masters.
On May 17, 2021, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes that
Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at 1.
Specifically, Respondent states that “[P]etitioner’s medical course is consistent with a
1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required
to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E-Government Act
of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance
with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information,
the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarrSanted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that
the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa
(2012).

Case 1:19-vv-01850-UNJ Document 34 Filed 06/17/21 Page 2 of 2
[SIRVA] as defined by the Vaccine Injury Table.” Id. at 4. Respondent further agrees that
“[P]etitioner suffered the residual effects of her condition for more than six months.” Id.
In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that
Petitioner is entitled to compensation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
2

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DOCUMENT 2: USCOURTS-cofc-1_19-vv-01850-1
Date issued/filed: 2022-03-30
Pages: 6
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 02/25/2022) regarding 46 DECISION of Special Master Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (sw) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:19-vv-01850-UNJ Document 56 Filed 03/30/22 Page 1 of 6
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 19-1850V
UNPUBLISHED
DEBRA J. MOORE, Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner, Filed: February 25, 2022
v.
Special Processing Unit (SPU);
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND Decision Awarding Damages; Pain
HUMAN SERVICES, and Suffering; Influenza (Flu)
Vaccine; Shoulder Injury Related to
Respondent. Vaccine Administration (SIRVA)
Richard H. Moeller, Moore, Heffernan, et al., Sioux City, IA, for Petitioner.
Colleen Clemons Hartley, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for
Respondent.
DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES1
On December 6, 2019, Debra J. Moore filed a petition for compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.,2 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine
administration (“SIRVA”) as a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccine administered to her on
October 5, 2018. Petition at 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of
the Office of Special Masters, and although Respondent conceded entitlement, the
parties could not informally resolve damages.
The parties’ damages disagreement was submitted for a Motions Day argument.
For the reasons discussed below, and pursuant to my oral ruling on February 18, 2022
1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am
required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the
E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of
Electronic Government Services). This means the decision will be available to anyone with access to
the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact
medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from
public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa (2012).

Case 1:19-vv-01850-UNJ Document 56 Filed 03/30/22 Page 2 of 6
(which is fully adopted herein), I find that $115,000.00 represents a fair and appropriate
amount of compensation for Petitioner’s actual pain and suffering.
I. Relevant Procedural History
Approximately 17 months after this case was initiated, Respondent filed a Rule
4(c) Report on May 17, 2021, conceding that Petitioner was entitled to compensation.
ECF No. 31. I thereafter issued a ruling on entitlement and directed the parties to work
collaboratively towards resolving damages. ECF Nos. 32-33.
In September 2021, the parties reached an impasse in their discussions. ECF No.
37. Accordingly, I set a schedule for any additional evidence and briefing. Scheduling
Order entered October 19, 2021; ECF No. 38. Petitioner filed her brief on November 18,
2021, requesting that I award her $140,000.00 in compensation for past pain and
suffering. ECF No. 39. On January 19, 2022, Respondent countered that Petitioner’s
evidence and a comparison to other conceded cases supported a pain and suffering
award of no more than $87,500.00. ECF No. 41. Petitioner’s reply brief was filed on
February 2, 2022. ECF No. 44.
In January 2022, I informed the parties that this matter appeared to be appropriate
for an expedited hearing and ruling, and they accepted my proposal. Scheduling Order
entered January 20, 2022; ECF Nos. 42-43. Therefore, at the February 2022 Motions
Day, I heard oral argument and issued a bench ruling on the appropriate award of pain
and suffering, which is memorialized below.3
II. Legal Standard
Compensation awarded pursuant to the Vaccine Act shall include “[f]or actual and
projected pain and suffering and emotional distress from the vaccine-related injury, an
award not to exceed $250,000.” Section 15(a)(4). Additionally, a petitioner may recover
“actual unreimbursable expenses incurred before the date of the judgment award such
expenses which (i) resulted from the vaccine-related injury for which petitioner seeks
compensation, (ii) were incurred by or on behalf of the person who suffered such injury,
and (iii) were for diagnosis, medical or other remedial care, rehabilitation . . . determined
to be reasonably necessary.” Section 15(a)(1)(B). Petitioner bears the burden of proof
with respect to each element of compensation requested. Brewer v. Sec’y of Health &
3 See Hearing Order filed January 27, 2022 (Non-PDF); Minute Entry entered February 23, 2022 (Non-
PDF). A court reporter made an official recording of the proceeding. A link to instructions on the Court's
website detailing how to order a certified transcript or audio recording of the proceeding can be found in the
minute entry. See also www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/trans (last visited February 23, 2022).
2

Case 1:19-vv-01850-UNJ Document 56 Filed 03/30/22 Page 3 of 6
Human Servs., No. 93-0092V, 1996 WL 147722, at *22-23 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 18,
1996).
There is no mathematic formula for assigning a monetary value to a person’s pain
and suffering and emotional distress. I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-
1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 14, 2013) (“[a]wards for
emotional distress are inherently subjective and cannot be determined by using a
mathematical formula”); Stansfield v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 93-0172V,
1996 WL 300594, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 22, 1996) (“the assessment of pain and
suffering is inherently a subjective evaluation”). Factors to be considered when
determining an award for pain and suffering include: 1) awareness of the injury; 2) severity
of the injury; and 3) duration of the suffering. I.D., 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (quoting
McAllister v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No 91-1037V, 1993 WL 777030, at *3 (Fed.
Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 26, 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 70 F.3d 1240
(Fed. Cir. 1995)).
I may also consider prior pain and suffering awards to aid my resolution of the
appropriate amount of compensation for pain and suffering in this case. See, e.g., Doe
34 v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 87 Fed. Cl. 758, 768 (2009) (finding that “there is
nothing improper in the chief special master’s decision to refer to damages for pain and
suffering awarded in other cases as an aid in determining the proper amount of damages
in this case.”). And, of course, I may rely on my own experience (along with my
predecessor Chief Special Masters) adjudicating similar claims.4 Hodges v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Congress
contemplated the special masters would use their accumulated expertise in the field of
vaccine injuries to judge the merits of individual claims). Importantly, however, it must
also be stressed that pain and suffering is not determined based on a continuum. See
Graves v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 109 Fed. Cl. 579 (2013).
III. Appropriate Compensation for Petitioner’s Pain and Suffering
In this case, Petitioner’s awareness of her injury is not disputed, which leaves only
the severity and duration of the injury to be considered. In assessing those factors, I have
reviewed the record as a whole, including the medical records, affidavit, and all assertions
made by the parties in written documents and at the expedited hearing held on February
18, 2022. I considered prior awards for pain and suffering in both SPU and non-SPU
4 From July 2014 until September 2015, the SPU was overseen by former Chief Special Master Vowell. For
the next four years, until September 30, 2019, all SPU cases, including the majority of SIRVA claims, were
assigned to former Chief Special Master Dorsey, now Special Master Dorsey. In early October 2019, the
majority of SPU cases were reassigned to me as the current Chief Special Master.
3

Case 1:19-vv-01850-UNJ Document 56 Filed 03/30/22 Page 4 of 6
SIRVA cases and rely upon my experience adjudicating these cases. However, I
ultimately base my determination on the specific circumstances of this case.
Pursuant to my oral ruling on February 18, 2022 (which is fully incorporated
herein), I find that $115,000.00 represents a fair and appropriate amount of
compensation for Petitioner’s past pain and suffering.5 My determination is based on
several factors.
First, the record establishes that Petitioner’s shoulder pain was not extreme.
Although Petitioner sought treatment for her shoulder injury on October 15, 2018 (only
ten days after her October 5, 2018 vaccination), she reported “aching and burning
moderate in nature” and also noted only “pain with any manipulation of her shoulder”
leading her orthopedist to recommend that she perform light range of motion exercises
on her own. Ex. 3 at 22-24. Over the next month, Petitioner underwent conservative
treatment for her shoulder that included six sessions of physical therapy and one
cortisone injection. Ex. 3 at 27-28; Ex. 4 at 1-13.
Subsequently, there is an approximate four-month gap in Petitioner’s shoulder
treatment during which time she underwent a breast reduction and excision of excess
arm skin. She was seen by various medical professionals during this period, and did not
complain of shoulder pain. See Ex. 2 at 8-84; Ex. 7 at 1-76; Ex. 11 at 7-8, 27-31. While I
acknowledge that an individual would not be expected to report every bodily condition to
specialized treaters, the gap in seeking treatment specific to Petitioner’s shoulder is
otherwise meaningful evidence bearing on severity (as explained below in greater detail).
Second, Petitioner’s medical records establish that her overall injury was
somewhat moderate, for a case involving surgery. Petitioner’s reports of pain never
exceeded a three on a ten-point pain scale. After the four-month lull in treatment,
Petitioner submitted to an MRI and, on May 31, 2019 (nearly eight months after her flu
shot), underwent arthroscopic debridement, a subacromial bursectomy and mini-open
rotator cuff repair. Ex. 3 at 40-49. Her postoperative diagnosis included left shoulder
rotator cuff tear, left shoulder labral tear, and left shoulder subacromial bursitis. Id. at 46.
Following her shoulder surgery, Petitioner underwent an additional 24 physical
therapy sessions. Ex. 4 at 12-50. On August 26, 2019 – approximately three months after
surgery – Petitioner informed her physical therapist that her left shoulder was “great.” Ex.
14 at 28. On December 30, 2019, the date of Petitioner’s last orthopedic appointment,
5 Petitioner has not sought an award for future pain and suffering, and I do not otherwise find one would be
appropriate.
4

Case 1:19-vv-01850-UNJ Document 56 Filed 03/30/22 Page 5 of 6
her physician observed that she was “doing well” and noted her report of improvement.
Ex. 14 at 13. However, while Petitioner exhibited full strength in her supraspinatus,
infraspinatus, and subscapularis and had full range of motion in forward elevation and
abduction, her internal rotation was “limited due to pain.” Id.
Although I find that the duration of Petitioner's injury was approximately 15 months,
my award for pain and suffering has nevertheless accounted for the four-month treatment
gap. Such pauses are a relevant consideration in determining the degree of Petitioner's
pain and suffering. Dirksen v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-1461V, 2018 WL
6293201, at *9-10 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 18, 2018). Petitioner asserts that this gap
occurred when she underwent breast reduction surgery and surgical excision of excess
skin under her arms. She further explains that, in the immediate aftermath of these
procedures, she “didn’t use her arms that much and it seemed like her shoulder was
improving.” Ex. 4 at 14. Moreover, Petitioner argues that it would be unreasonable to
equate the failure to report shoulder pain (during the course of wholly unrelated medical
appointments) with the complete abatement of pain. While these are not unreasonable
points, the fact that she was able to tolerate her pain and other limitations for this period
of time without medical care tends to suggest that her overall injury was less severe than
what a person who sought constant intervention might be experiencing.
In making my determination, I have also considered Petitioner’s affidavit which
details the limitations in her activities of daily living due to her shoulder injury. Ex. 1 at 3-
4. While Petitioner describes suffering from ongoing impediments as a result of her injury,
I find that she was significantly – thought not completely – recovered by her last
orthopedic appointment on December 30, 2019.
Petitioner argues that her case is comparable to the Collado, Dobbins, Rafferty,
and Wilson cases, which resulted in awards ranging from $120,00.00 to $130,000.00 for
past pain and suffering. But she requests a higher award, arguing that her injury was
more severe, and that she has endured a longer period of recovery.6 I do not find the
facts of her case justify such an award, however. Rather, I find that the present set of
facts is more comparable to the Weed case (cited by Respondent), where an award of
$105,000.00 was granted under similar circumstances. Weed v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., No. 18-1473, 2021 WL 1711800 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2021). While the Weed
6 Collado v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 17-0225V, 2018 WL 3433352 (Fed. Cl. June 6,
2018)(awarding $120,000 for pain and suffering); Dobbins v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 16-
0854V, 2018 WL 4611267 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 15, 2018) (awarding $125,000 for pain and suffering); Rafferty v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 17-1906, 2020 WL 3495956 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 21,
2020)(awarding $127,500.00 for pain and suffering); Wilson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 19-
0035V, 2021 WL 1530731 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. March 18, 2021)(awarding $130,000.00 for pain and
suffering).
5

Case 1:19-vv-01850-UNJ Document 56 Filed 03/30/22 Page 6 of 6
petitioner’s initial post-vaccination symptoms were severe and her MRI revealed
significant pathology, her post-surgical recovery (beginning less than two months post-
vaccination) was relatively quick. After four months, the Weed petitioner was generally
noted to have only mild levels of pain and was largely recovered ten months after her flu
shot. However, because the record herein establishes that magnitude of Petitioner’s injury
was slightly greater, I will approve a somewhat higher pain and suffering award.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the record as a whole and the parties’ arguments, I award Petitioner a
lump sum payment of $115,000.00 for actual pain and suffering. This amount
represents compensation for all damages that would be available under Section 15(a).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this decision.7
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
7 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by the parties’ joint filing of notice
renouncing the right to seek review.
6