VICP Registry Case Source Bundle
Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_18-vv-01896
Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_18-vv-01896
Petitioner: Courtney Graham
Filed: 2018-10-10
Decided: 2020-07-10
Vaccine: influenza
Vaccination date: 2017-12-13
Condition: right shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA)
Outcome: entitlement_granted_pending_damages
Award amount USD: 

AI-assisted case summary:
Courtney Graham filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program on October 10, 2018, alleging that she suffered a right shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) caused by an influenza vaccine administered on December 13, 2017. The respondent, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, reviewed the medical records and filed a Rule 4(c) report on July 10, 2020, conceding that Ms. Graham is entitled to compensation. The respondent agreed that Ms. Graham satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation under the Vaccine Act. Based on the respondent's concession and the evidence of record, Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran ruled on July 14, 2020, that Ms. Graham is entitled to compensation. The case was proceeding to determine the amount of damages. The public decision does not describe the specific onset of symptoms, medical tests performed, treatments received, or the specific mechanism of injury. Petitioner was represented by Leah VaSahnja Durant of the Law Offices of Leah V. Durant, PLLC, and respondent was represented by Debra A. Filteau Begley of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Theory of causation field:
Petitioner Courtney Graham filed a petition alleging a right shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) caused by an influenza vaccine administered on December 13, 2017. The respondent conceded entitlement to compensation, agreeing that Petitioner satisfied all legal prerequisites under the Vaccine Act. The Special Master's ruling on entitlement was issued on July 14, 2020, by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. The theory of causation is based on the "Table" injury provision of the Vaccine Act. The public text does not name specific medical experts or detail the mechanism of injury beyond it being a "Table" injury. Petitioner was represented by Leah VaSahnja Durant and respondent by Debra A. Filteau Begley. The case was proceeding to determine damages.

Public staged source text:

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DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_18-vv-01896-0
Date issued/filed: 2020-08-13
Pages: 2
Docket text: PUBLIC ORDER/RULING (Originally filed: 07/14/2020) regarding 29 Ruling on Entitlement Signed by Chief Special Master Brian H. Corcoran. (sw) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:18-vv-01896-UNJ Document 31 Filed 08/13/20 Page 1 of 2
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 18-1896V
UNPUBLISHED
COURTNEY GRAHAM, Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner, Filed: July 14, 2020
v.
Special Processing Unit (SPU);
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;
HUMAN SERVICES, Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;
Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine
Respondent. Administration (SIRVA)
Leah VaSahnja Durant, Law Offices of Leah V. Durant, PLLC, Washington, DC, for
petitioner.
Debra A. Filteau Begley, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.
RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1
On October 10, 2018, Courtney Graham filed a petition for compensation under
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.,2 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a right shoulder injury related to
vaccine administration (“SIRVA”) caused by an influenza (“flu”) vaccine administered on
December 13, 2017. Petition at 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing
Unit of the Office of Special Masters.
On July 10, 2020, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes
that Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report
1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am
required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E-
Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of
Electronic Government Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to
the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to
redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such
material from public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for
ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. §
300aa (2012).

Case 1:18-vv-01896-UNJ Document 31 Filed 08/13/20 Page 2 of 2
at 1. Specifically, Respondent stated that he reviewed the records and concluded that
compensation is appropriate under the Vaccine Act Id. at 1, 5. Respondent further
agrees that Petitioner has satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation under the
Vaccine Act. Id.
In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that
Petitioner is entitled to compensation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
2

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DOCUMENT 2: USCOURTS-cofc-1_18-vv-01896-1
Date issued/filed: 2025-05-28
Pages: 8
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 05/01/2025) regarding 94 DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES. Signed by Special Master Daniel T. Horner. (cd) Service on parties made.
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Case 1:18-vv-01896-UNJ Document 95 Filed 05/28/25 Page 1 of 8
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 18-1896V
Filed: May 1, 2025
Special Master Horner
COURTNEY GRAHAM,
Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
Leah VaSahnja Durant, Law Offices of Leah V. Durant, PLLC, Washington, DC, for
petitioner.
Debra A. Filteau Begley, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.
DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES1
On December 10, 2018, petitioner filed a petition under the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, et seq. (2012),2 alleging that she suffered a
Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine Administration (“SIRVA”) in her right shoulder
following an influenza (“flu”) vaccination that she received on December 13, 2017.
(ECF No. 1.) On July 14, 2020, a ruling on entitlement was issued finding petitioner
entitled to compensation for her SIRVA. (ECF No. 29.) On April 8, 2025, a damages
hearing was held. (See Transcript of Proceedings (“Tr.”) at ECF No. 93.) At the
conclusion of the hearing, the undersigned issued an oral ruling on damages,
constituting findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Section 12(d)(3)(A), as
follows:
1 Because this document contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be
made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or
at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government
Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic
Government Services). This means the document will be available to anyone with access to the
internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact
medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from
public access.
2 Within this decision, all citations to § 300aa will be the relevant sections of the Vaccine Act at 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-10, et seq.
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Case 1:18-vv-01896-UNJ Document 95 Filed 05/28/25 Page 2 of 8
THE COURT: Okay. So just by way of a little bit of background, before this
case was assigned to me, the Chief Special Master issued a ruling on
entitlement on July 14th, 2020, finding Petitioner entitled to compensation
for a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration, or “SIRVA.” That is
located at ECF docket number 29, and also is available online at 2020 WL
[4720687].
The ruling on entitlement was based on Respondent’s concession in his
Rule 4 report that Petitioner was entitled to compensation for a shoulder
injury, “consistent with SIRVA” and caused by her December 13th, 2017, flu
vaccination. That’s ECF number 28 at page 5.
Accordingly, as per Respondent’s concession, “The scope of damages to
be awarded are limited to Petitioner’s SIRVA and resulting sequelae.” That’s
ID at 6.
Although the case was subsequently reassigned to me, I confirm that I do
adopt the Chief Special Master’s ruling on entitlement as my own, and I
intend to award damages based on the scope of damages stated by
Respondent in his Rule 4 report.
At the Petitioner’s request, I am now going to issue a ruling from the bench
with respect to the appropriate amount of compensation for Petitioner’s
pain, suffering, and emotional distress as provided by Section 15(a)(4) of
the Vaccine Act, which allows for awards of up to $250,000 for actual and
projected pain and suffering and emotional distress.
As I understand it, only Petitioner’s pain, suffering, and emotional distress
are at issue for purposes of an award of damages. Do I have that correct?
MR. MILMOE: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. In light of everything we’ve talked about, and in light of
my consideration of the record, I am at this point concluding that
Respondent’s motion for discovery at ECF Number 75 is moot.
So moving on to the ruling with respect to damages, I’m going to begin with
some legal points that are going to inform the ruling. First, I have to note
that Petitioner bears the burden of proof with respect to each element of
compensation requested. For that proposition, I cite Brewer versus
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Number 93-92V, which is also
1996 WL 147722, at *22-23, which is a Federal Claims Special Master
decision dated March 18th, 1996.
Second, there is no mathematical formula for determining pain and
suffering. Instead, we generally look at three factors: One, awareness of the
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injury; two, severity of the injury; and, three, duration of the suffering. For
that proposition, see I.D. versus Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Number 04-1593V, which is also 2013 WL 2448125 at *9, a Federal Claims
Special Master decision of May 14th, 2013.
Third, with respect to the $250,000 statutory cap on awards for pain and
suffering, this ruling adopts the approach articulated in Graves versus
Secretary of Health and Human Services, which is 109 Fed. Cl. 579 (2013),
which is to say that the $250,000 cap is to be applied after determining the
amount of damages rather than operating as a ceiling under which damages
must be considered.
Fourth, Special Masters are permitted to consider prior awards in
determining what constitutes an appropriate award of damages, though
they are not binding. See Doe 34 versus Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 87 Fed. Cl. 758[,] 768 (2009).
I apologize. You’re going to have to bear with me. There’s a long string of
citations coming up. The parties cite the following decisions as points of
comparison. Petitioner cites Schoonover versus Secretary of Health and
Human Services, which is number 16-1324V, 2020 WL 5351341. That’s a
Special Master decision of August 5th, 2020, that awarded $200,000 for
actual pain and suffering and $39,600 in projected pain and suffering; the
projected pain and suffering award representing $1,200 per year for the
Petitioner’s remaining life expectancy.
Lawson versus Secretary of Health and Human Services, Number 18-882V,
2021 Westlaw 688560, a Special Master decision of January 5th, 2021,
awarding $205,000 for actual pain and suffering.
Welch versus Secretary of Health Human Services, Number 18-74V, 2021
Westlaw -- WL -- 1795205, a Special Master decision of April 5th, 2021,
awarding $210,000 for actual pain and suffering.
McDormand versus Secretary of Health and Human Services, Number 19-
814V, 2021 WL 5505698, a Special Master decision of October 8th, 2021,
awarding $200,000 for actual pain and suffering.
And Elmakky, which is E-l-m-a-k-k-y, versus Secretary of Health and
Human Services, 17-2032V, 2021 Westlaw -- WL -- 6285619, a Special
Master decision of December 3rd, 2021, awarding $205,000 in actual pain
and suffering.
Respondent cites the following cases as comparable, or at least relevant:
Glanville versus Secretary of Health and Human Services, Number 19-
1973V, 2023 Westlaw 6213271, a Special Master decision of August 25th,
2023, awarding $145,000.
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Maxfield versus Health and Human Services, 2020 -- or Number 21-869V,
2024 WL 1999662, a Special Master decision of April 4th, 2024, awarding
$185,000.
Tappendorf versus Secretary of Health and Human Services, Number 20-
1592V, 2024 Westlaw 1299566, a Federal Claims Special Master decision
of February 23rd, 2024, awarding $185,000.
Lang versus Secretary of Health and Human Services, Number 17-995V,
2022 Westlaw 3681275, a Special Master decision of July 25th, 2022,
awarding $195,000. That actually was a decision by the undersigned.
Lavigne, L-a-v-i-g-n-e, versus Secretary of Health and Human Services 19-
1298V, 2022 WL 2275853, a Special Master decision of May 12th, 2022,
awarding $198,000. Almost done.
Meirndorf versus Health and Human Services -- Secretary of Health and
Human Services, 19-1876V, 2022 WL1055475, a Special Master decision
of March 7th, 2022, awarding $200,000.
Edminster versus Secretary of Health and Human Services, 19-184V, 2023
Westlaw 3059218, a Special Master decision of April 24th, 2023, awarding
$205,000.
And, like Petitioner, Respondent also cites the Lawson case, which I’ve
already cited.
I am mindful of these prior decisions regarding damages for SIRVA. All of
the prior decision I mentioned obviously are for damages for SIRVA.
However, I do not merely rely on any prior decision to determine the amount
of Petitioner’s damages in this case. Instead, I have reviewed the previous
SIRVA awards, the arguments presented by the parties, and the totality of
the evidentiary record, including, of course, testimony elicited today.
The primary considerations in forming pain and suffering in SIRVA cases is
the severity and the duration of the shoulder pain, and reduced range of
motion. Numerous aspects of Petitioner’s medical history potentially speak
to these issues, including the total duration of Petitioner’s pain, total duration
of Petitioner’s reduced range of motion, the length of time over which the
Petitioner actively treated the condition, the duration and outcome of
physical therapy, the modalities of treatment -- for example, steroid
injections or surgeries, et cetera -- the severity of MRI or surgical findings,
the subjective reports of pain levels, and the ultimate prognosis.
And, of course, as I mentioned, I also take into account the testimony that I
heard today. Today’s testimony primarily has the effect of allowing me to
better understand Petitioner’s personal experience of her injury, which is an
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especially important consideration given that pain and suffering are
inherently subjective concepts.
For a brief summary of Petitioner’s medical history and the issues that the
parties are disputing, I’m going to quote Respondent’s brief at ECF Number
89, page 13. “In this case, Petitioner first reported shoulder pain 15 days
after vaccination. She underwent two surgical procedures, and her second
surgery included a manipulation under anesthesia. She also attended four
rounds of PT (99 visits), had one steroid injection, and she filed records
showing active treatment through December of 2019. While Petitioner
continued to see Dr. Perkins once a year through May 2023, Petitioner
made clear in 2020 and thereafter she was only seeing Dr. Perkins as her
disability insurer required her to see him annually. (See Exhibit 17 at 1; 19
at 1; 21 at 1; 29 at 1). It does not appear that Petitioner agreed to any
additional care despite Dr. Perkins’ consistent explanation that she may
improve with conservative treatment and that further surgery or another
manipulation under anesthesia may be an option. See Exhibit 17 at 2;
Exhibit 19 at 2; Exhibit 21 at 2; Exhibit 29 at 2).”
The primary point of contention, as explained by the parties’ briefs, is
Petitioner’s status from December 2019 onward. As noted, Respondent
argues that Petitioner’s follow ups with Dr. Perkins do not constitute genuine
ongoing treatment and there is therefore -- and there is therefore not
argument -- there’s therefore not evidence of ongoing disability from that
point forward. And that’s indicated at Respondent’s brief at ECF Number
89, pages 13 and 14.
Petitioner argues that her annual follow ups with Dr. Perkins demonstrate
that her condition remains present and significant after seven and a half
years and has stagnated for so long that it should be considered permanent.
She argues that her condition is stagnant, but yet it is severe enough that
Dr. Perkins has recommended additional surgery, arthroscopic capsular
release, and manipulation under general anesthesia -- or under anesthesia.
That argument is made at ECF Number 90, page 22, citing Exhibit 21, page
2.
I addressed a similar concern in a prior case involving GBS, Rastetter
versus Secretary of Health and Human Services at 19-1850V, 2023
Westlaw 5552317, which is a Special Master decision of August 3rd, 2023.
In that case, the Petitioner had returned to his physical therapist for an
evaluation for purposes of documenting the sequelae of his GBS, but
declined any treatment recommendations, noting he only wanted the
evaluation for purposes of litigation.
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I explained that, “Without a bona fide ongoing treatment relationship, the
credibility and reliability of the history provided by Petitioner and his mother
is not enhanced merely because it was recorded by a medical provider. This
does not mean the information should be assumed to be inaccurate;
however, it is at best merely unsworn repetition of the testimonial evidence
Petitioner and his mother have otherwise provided (ID at *10). However, I
did not discount the weight to be given the direct observations and
impressions of the physical therapist.”
In this case, while I agree with Respondent that the primary purpose of
Petitioner’s follow ups with Dr. Perkins were primarily for a box-checking
exercise for purposes of her disability claim, nothing on this record calls Dr.
Perkins’ experience or credibility into question, and he was her treating
orthopedist.
Dr. Perkins’ Encounter records at Exhibits 17, 19, 21, and 29 include
sufficient physical exam findings and direct clinical observations to confirm
that Petitioner has experienced significant ongoing pain and reduced range
of motion through May of 2023.
Based on those records and the testimony provided today, I find Petitioner
has experienced seven and a half years of history -- seven and a half years
of pain and suffering to date, with the greatest pain being up to and around
December of 2019, though her ongoing reduced range of motion is severe
enough to warrant a recommendation for a third surgery.
However, especially in light of Petitioner herself stressing in her brief that
Dr. Perkins has recommended additional surgery, I cannot agree with
Petitioner that Dr. Perkins’ records demonstrate her injury to be permanent.
Certainly I understand that a seven and a half year history of pain and
reduced range of motion is not encouraging, and I understand and
appreciate Petitioner’s reasons for not wanting to pursue the additional
treatment. However, there is no medical opinion in the presented records
indicating that Petitioner’s condition is permanent, and the contention that
Petitioner’s condition is “stagnant” is premised on her current pattern of
pursuing primarily conservative measures such as home exercise, whereas
she acknowledges the surgery has been recommended.
I have not located any instance where Dr. Perkins has suggested the
Petitioner has reached her maximum medical improvement or otherwise
indicated that her injury is permanent.
Looking at the comparable cases cited by the parties, I find that Edmonster,
Lawson, and Elmakky are the most similar. All three of those petitioners
were awarded $205,000. Edmonster was a 56-year-old Petitioner. Her
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injury lasted for more than five years. She had a steroid injection, 111 PT
sessions, two surgeries, and used prescription medication.
Lawson was a 48-year-old Petitioner. Her injury lasted for more than four
years. She had three surgeries, seven steroid injections, four rounds of PT,
and plasma injections.
Elmakky’s age is not indicated in the decision awarding damages. She had
three surgeries and her injury persisted for about four years. Her course
was deemed comparable to that of the Lawson petitioner.
As compared to Lawson and Elmakky, Petitioner had a longer duration of
pain and suffering, but fewer surgeries and less substantial treatment
overall. I realized that no comparison is perfect. There was a lot of
discussion during the hearing today of the “little things” that personally affect
Petitioner’s experience of pain and suffering. I take those discussions very
seriously and I factor them into this ruling. I have to stress, however, that
many of those little things were also experienced by these other petitioners,
and so a lot of that experience is included within the assessments of
$205,000 for those petitioners.
That being said, no two petitioners are identical, and pain and suffering is
subjective. And I think there are specific factors in this case that I take
additional notice of based on both medical records and the testimony
provided today. Both Petitioner’s testimony and the medical records
indicate the Petitioner bore an added psychological burden in coping with
her SIRVA and its consequences, being a person who has been diagnosed
with anxiety, depression and OCD. For example, see Exhibit 16 at pages
63 and 94, which are appointments from August of 2018 and March of 2019
that note how Petitioner’s psychological conditions were affecting her ability
to recover from her SIRVA.
I stress that this is not a finding that Petitioner’s SIRVA exacerbated her
psychological condition and is not a finding based on Respondent’s expert
report by Dr. I-a-r-o-v-i-c-i. It is simply recognition that the Petitioner’s
psychological condition left her more vulnerable to experiencing the pain,
suffering, and emotional distress caused by her injury.
I also note that Petitioner is the spouse of a service member who was
deployed for approximately one year during the course of her injury, and
that is another factor that weighs into this consideration.
Balancing all of these considerations and considering the record as a whole,
and understanding that placing a specific dollar figure on an award of pain
and suffering is always an exercise in rough justice, I find that $220,000
represents a reasonable and appropriate award for Petitioner’s actual pain,
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suffering, and emotional distress, and that there is not preponderant
evidence to support an award for projected pain and suffering. That is the
extent of my conclusion.
(Tr. 153-65.)
In light of the above, I award petitioner a lump sum payment of $220,000.00,
representing compensation for actual pain and suffering to be paid through an
ACH deposit to petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement to
petitioner. This amount represents compensation for all damages available under
§ 300aa-15(a).
The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this decision.3
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Daniel T. Horner
Daniel T. Horner
Special Master
3 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by the parties’ joint filing of notice
renouncing the right to seek review.
8