VICP Registry Case Source Bundle
Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_15-vv-01100
Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_15-vv-01100
Petitioner: N.S.
Filed: 2017-02-09
Decided: 2017-02-09
Vaccine: DTaP
Vaccination date: 2013-03-01
Condition: transverse myelitis
Outcome: compensated
Award amount USD: 257521.29

AI-assisted case summary:
Maria Crespo, on behalf of her minor daughter N.S., filed a petition for vaccine compensation on October 1, 2015, alleging that N.S. suffered transverse myelitis (TM) caused by the DTaP and pneumococcal conjugate (PC) vaccines received on March 1, 2013. The petition initially mentioned an MMR vaccine, but this was later clarified as an error, and N.S. did not receive it before the alleged injury. N.S. also received a Hib vaccine on the same day. Respondent denied that the vaccinations caused N.S.'s TM or any other injury. The parties reached a stipulation to resolve the case, agreeing to compensation for N.S.'s injuries, which were alleged to have residual effects for more than six months. Special Master Laura D. Millman adopted the stipulation on February 9, 2017, awarding a total of $257,521.29 in compensation. This amount included a lump sum of $232,549.31 for first-year life care expenses ($12,549.31) and pain and suffering ($220,000.00), payable to petitioner as guardian/conservator of N.S.'s estate. An additional lump sum of $25,000.00 was awarded for past unreimbursable expenses, payable to Maria Crespo. A further lump sum of $2,971.98 was awarded for reimbursement of a Medicaid lien, payable jointly to petitioner and First Recovery Group. The stipulation also provided for an amount sufficient to purchase an annuity contract for future expenses. The annuity contract was to provide various future payments for unreimbursable expenses, including medical, therapy, and diaper costs, with increasing annual amounts and specific durations, some extending for N.S.'s lifetime. The parties also agreed to further proceedings for attorneys' fees and costs. Petitioner Maria Crespo was represented by Amber D. Wilson. Respondent was represented by Debra Filteau Begley. Later, on December 5, 2017, the Special Master awarded attorneys' fees and costs. Petitioner sought review of this decision, arguing that the Special Master improperly denied fees for certain legal research and review of court orders, and for costs associated with Florida state law guardianship requirements. Judge Patricia E. Campbell-Smith reviewed the motion for review. In a decision filed June 21, 2018, the court sustained the Special Master's decision, denying petitioner's motion for review. The court found that the Special Master did not abuse her discretion in reducing fees for administrative tasks and for legal research deemed educational. The court also found that the Special Master did not err in denying reimbursement for future guardianship costs and guardian ad litem costs, as these were required by Florida state law and not incurred as part of the Vaccine Act proceedings. The court noted that the Special Master's characterization of the guardian ad litem's role was imprecise but that the analysis regarding the costs being unrelated to the Vaccine Act was correct. The court directed the clerk to enter final judgment in accordance with the Special Master's decision on fees and costs.

Theory of causation field:
Petitioner alleged that N.S. suffered transverse myelitis (TM) caused by the DTaP and pneumococcal conjugate (PC) vaccines received on March 1, 2013. The petition also mentioned an MMR vaccine, but this was clarified as an error. N.S. also received a Hib vaccine on the same day. Respondent denied causation. The parties entered into a stipulation for compensation, acknowledging that N.S. experienced residual effects for more than six months. The Special Master adopted the stipulation, awarding damages. The specific mechanism of causation was not detailed in the public decision, and the case was resolved via stipulation rather than litigation of the causation theory. The theory of causation falls under the Vaccine Injury Table (Table). The award included a lump sum and an annuity for future damages. Attorneys' fees and costs were awarded separately and later reviewed by the court, which sustained the Special Master's decision regarding certain disallowed costs related to Florida state law guardianship requirements, finding they were not incurred as part of the Vaccine Act proceedings.

Public staged source text:

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DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_15-vv-01100-0
Date issued/filed: 2017-03-06
Pages: 12
Docket text: PUBLIC DECISION (Originally filed: 02/09/2017) regarding 33 DECISION Stipulation/Proffer Signed by Special Master Laura D Millman. (tlf) Copy to parties.
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Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 34 Filed 03/06/17 Page 1 of 12
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 15-1100V
Filed: February 9, 2017
Not for Publication
*************************************
MARIA CRESPO, *
on behalf of N.S., a minor child, *
*
Damages decision based on
Petitioner, *
stipulation; DTaP vaccine;
*
pneumococcal conjugate (“PC”)
v. *
vaccine; transverse myelitis
*
(“TM”)
SECRETARY OF HEALTH *
AND HUMAN SERVICES, *
*
Respondent. *
*
*************************************
Amber D. Wilson, Washington, DC, for petitioner.
Debra Filteau Begley, Washington, DC, for respondent.
MILLMAN, Special Master
DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES1
On January 3, 2017, the parties filed the attached stipulation in which they agreed to
settle this case and described the settlement terms. Petitioner alleges that her daughter, N.S.,
suffered transverse myelitis (“TM”) caused by her March 1, 2013 receipt of the DTaP and
pneumococcal conjugate (“PC”) vaccines. Petitioner further alleges that N .S. suffered the
residual effects of this injury for more than six months. Respondent denies that N.S.’s TM, or
1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the special master’s action in this
case, the special master intends to post this unpublished decision on the United States Court of Federal
Claims’ website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012)
(Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). Vaccine Rule 18(b) states that
all decisions of the special masters will be made available to the public unless they contain trade secrets
or commercial or financial information that is privileged and confidential, or medical or similar
information whose disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. When such a
decision is filed, petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact such information prior to the
document’s disclosure. If the special master, upon review, agrees that the identified material fits within
the banned categories listed above, the special master shall redact such material from public access.

Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 34 Filed 03/06/17 Page 2 of 12
any other injury, was caused by her receipt of the DTaP or pneumococcal conjugate vaccines.
Nonetheless, the parties agreed to resolve this matter informally.
The undersigned finds the terms of the stipulation to be reasonable. The court adopts the
parties’ stipulation, attached, and awards compensation in the amount and on the terms set forth
in the stipulation. Pursuant to the stipulation, the court awards:
a. a lump sum of $232,549.31 representing compensation for first year life care expenses
($12,549.31), and pain and suffering ($220,000.00). The award shall be in the form of a
check payable to petitioner as guardian/conservator of the estate of N.S. for the benefit of
N.S2; and
b. a lump sum of $25,000.00 representing compensation for past unreimbursable expenses,
in the form of a check payable to petitioner, Maria Crespo; and
c. A lump sum of $2,971.98, representing reimbursement of a Medicaid lien for services
rendered on behalf of N.S., in the form of a check payable jointly to petitioner and
First Recovery Group
P.O. Box 771932
Detroit, MI 48277-1932
Attn: Felicity Solman
FRG File No.: 624092-114715
Petitioner agrees to endorse this check to First Recovery Group; and
d. An amount sufficient to purchase the annuity contract described in paragraph 10 of the
attached stipulation, paid to the life insurance company from which the annuity will be
purchased. The amount represents compensation for all damages that would be available
under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a).
In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the clerk of
the court is directed to enter judgment herewith.3
2 Petitioner represents that she presently is, or within 90 days of the date of judgment will become, duly
authorized to serve as guardian/conservator of N.S.'s estate under the laws of the State of Florida. No
payments pursuant to this Stipulation shall be made until petitioner provides the Secretary with
documentation establishing her appointment as guardian/conservator of N .S.'s estate. If petitioner is not
authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction to serve as guardian/conservator of the estate of N.S. at
the time a payment pursuant to this Stipulation is to be made, any such payment shall be paid to the party
or parties appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction to serve as guardian/conservator of the estate of
N. S. upon submission of written documentation of such appointment to the Secretary.
3 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by each party, either separately or
jointly, filing a notice renouncing the right to seek review.
2

Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 34 Filed 03/06/17 Page 3 of 12
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 9, 2017 s/ Laura D. Millman
Laura D. Millman
Special Master
3

Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 34 Filed 03/06/17 Page 4 of 12
IN THE UNITED STA T ES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
MARIA CRESPO. )
on behalf ofN .S., a minor child, )
)
Petitioner, )
v. ) No. 15-1 lOOV
) Special Master Millman
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN )
SERVICES, )
)
Respondent. )
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)
STlPULAT ION
The parties hereby stipulate to the following matters:
l. On behalf of her daughter, N .S., petitioner filed a petition for vaccine
compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10
to 34 (the "Vaccine Program"). The petition seeks compensation for injuries allegedly related to
N.S. 's receipt of the DTaP, MMR, and pneumococcal conjugate ("PC") vaccines, which
vaccines are contained in the Vaccine Injury Table (the "Table"), 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (a).
2. N.S. received the DTaP, Hib, and PC immunizations on March 1, 2013. 1
3. The vaccines were administered within the United States.
4. Petitioner alleges that N.S. suffered from transverse myelitis ("TM") that was
caused in fact by OTa P and PC vaccines, and that she experienced the residual effects of this
injury for more than six months.
Inclusion of the MMR vaccine in the Petition is an error, and N.S. did not receive an
MMR vaccine before the onset of her alleged injury. Petitioner's counsel agrees that this was an
error. Additionally, N.S. received a haemophilus influenzae type b ('"Hib") vaccine on March I.
2013, that was not included in the Petition.

Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 34 Filed 03/06/17 Page 5 of 12
5. Petitioner represents that there has been no prior award or settlement of a civil
action for damages on behalf of N.S. as a result of her condition.
6. Respondent denies that N.S.'s TM, or any other injury, was caused-in-fact by her
DTaP, Hib, and PC vaccinations.
7. Maintaining their above-stated positions, the parties nevertheless now agree that
the issues between them shall be settled and that a decision should be entered awarding the
compensation described in paragraph 8 of this Stipulation.
8. As soon as practicable after an entry ofj udgment reflecting a decision consistent
with the terms of this Stipulation, and after petitioner has filed an election to receive
compensation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-2 l (a)(l ), the.Secretary of Health and Human
Services will issue the following vaccine compensation payments:
a. A lump sum of $232,549.31, which amount represents compensation for first year
life care expenses ($12,549.31 ), and pain and suffering ($220,000.00), in the form
of a check payable to petitioner as guardian/conservator of the estate of N .S. for
the benefit ofN.S;
b. A lump sum of $25,000.00, which amount represents compensation for past
unreimbursable expenses, in the form of a check payable to petitioner, Maria
Crespo;
c. A lump sum of $2,971.98, which amount represents reimbursement of a Medicaid
lien for services rendered on behalf of N.S., in the form of a check payable jointly
to petitioner and
First Recovery Group
P.O. Box 771932
Detroit, Ml 48277-1932
Attn: Felicity Solman
FRO File No: 624092-114715
Petitioner agrees to endorse this check to First Recovery Group.
d. An amount sufficient to purchase the annuity contract described in paragraph I 0
below, paid to the life insurance company from which the annuity will be
purchased (the "Life Insurance Company").
2

Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 34 Filed 03/06/17 Page 6 of 12
These amounts represent compensation for all damages that would be available under 42
U .S.C. § 300aa-l 5(a).
9. The Life Insurance Company must have a minimum of $250,000,000.00 capital
and surplus, exclusive of any mandatory security valuation reserve. The Life Insurance
Company must have one of the following ratings from two of the following rating organizations:
a. A.M. Best Company: A++, A+, A+g, A+p, A+r, or A+s;
b. Moody's Investor Service Claims Paying Rating: Aa3, Aa2, Aa 1, or Aaa;
c. Standard and Poor's Corporation Insurer Claims-Paying Ability Rating: AA-,
AA, AA+, or AAA;
d. Fitch Credit Rating Company, Insurance Company Claims Paying Ability Rating:
AA-, AA, AA+, or A/\A.
10. The Secretary of Health and Human Services agrees to purchase an annuity
contract from the Life Insurance Company for the benefit ofN.S., pursuant to which the Life
Insurance Company will agree to make payments periodically to petitioner, as the court-
appointed guardian/conservator of the estate of N .S., for the following items of compensation:
a. For future unreimbursable Blue Cross Blue Shield Maximum-out-of-Pocket
(Parent's Policy) expenses, beginning on the first anniversary of the date of
judgment, an annual amount of $6,350.00 to be paid up to the anniversary of the
date of judgment in year 2037, increasing at the rate of four percent (4%),
compounded annually from the date of judgment.
b. For future unreimbursable Blue Cross Blue Shield Premium (Parent's Policy)
expenses, beginning on the anniversary of the date of judgment in year 2033, an
annual amount of $162.59 to be paid up to the anniversary of the date of judgment
in year 2037, increasing at the rate of four percent (4%), compounded annually
from the date of judgment.
c. For future unreimbursable Blue Cross Blue Shield Premium expenses, beginning
on the anniversary of the date ofj udgment in year 203 7, an annual amount of
$5,017.92 to be paid up to the anniversary of the date of judgment in year 2076,
increasing at the rate of four percent (4%), compounded annually from the date of
judgment.
3

Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 34 Filed 03/06/17 Page 7 of 12
d. For future unreimbursable Blue Cross Blue Shield Maximum-out-of-Pocket
expenses, beginning on the anniversary of the date of judgment in year 203 7, an
annual amount of $2,000.00 to be paid up to the anniversary of the date of
judgment in year 2076, increasing at the rate of four percent (4%), compounded
annually from the date of judgment.
e. For future unreimbursable Medicare Supplemental Plan C expenses, beginning on
the anniversary of the date of judgment in year 2076, an annual amount of
$2,268.00 to be paid for the remainder of N.S. 's life, increasing at the rate of four
percent ( 4%), compounded annually from the date of judgment.
f. For future unreimbursable Therapy and Shoe expenses, beginning on the first
anniversary of the date of judgment, an annual amount of $1,580.10 to be paid up
to the anniversary of the date of judgment in year 2030. Thereafter, beginning on
the anniversary of the date of judgment in year 2030, an annual amount of $80.10
to be paid for the remainder ofN.S.'s life, all amounts increasing at the rate of
three percent (3%), compounded annually from the date of judgment.
g. For future unreimbursable Hippotherapy expenses, beginning on the first
anniversary of the date of judgment, an annual amount of$3,900.00 to be paid up
to the anniversary of the date of judgment in year 2023, increasing at the rate of
three percent (3%), compounded annually from the date of judgment.
h. For future unreimbursable Diaper expenses, beginning on the first anniversary of
the date of judgment, an annual amount of $719.21 to be paid up to the
anniversary of the date of judgment in year 2019. Then, beginning on the
anniversary of the date of judgment in 2019, an annual amount of $359.61 to be
paid up to the anniversary of the date of judgment in year 2023, all amounts
increasing at the rate of three percent (3%), compounded annually from the date
of judgment.
At the sole discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the periodic
payments may be provided to the petitioner in monthly, quarterly, annual or other installments.
The "annual amounts" set forth above describe only the total yearly sum to be paid to the
petitioner and do not require that the payment be made in one annual installment. The petitioner
will continue to receive the annuity payments from the Life Insurance Company only so long as
N.S. is alive at the time that a particular payment is due. Written notice to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services and the Life Insurance Company shall be provided within twenty
(20) days ofN.S.'s death.
4

Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 34 Filed 03/06/17 Page 8 of 12
11. The annuity contract will be owned solely and exclusively by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services and will be purchased as soon as practicable following the entry of a
judgment in conformity with this Stipulation. The parties stipulate and agree that the Secretary
of Health and Human Services and the United States of America are not responsible for the
payment of any sums other than the amounts set forth in paragraph 8 herein and the amounts
awarded pursuant to paragraph 12 herein, and that they do not guarantee or insure any of the
future annuity payments. Upon the purchase of the annuity contract, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services and the United States of America are released from any and all obligations with
respect to future annuity payments.
12. As soon as practicable after the entry of judgment on entitlement in this case, and
after petitioner has filed both a proper and timely election to receive compensation pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-2 l (a)( l ), and an application, the parties will submit to further proceedings
before the special master to award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in proceeding
upon this petition.
13. Petitioner and her attorney represent that they have identified to respondent all
known sources of payment for items or services for which the Program is not primarily liable
under 42 U .S.C. § 300aa-l 5(g), including State compensation programs, insurance policies,
Federal or State health benefits programs (other than Title XIX of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.)), or entities that provide health services on a pre-paid basis.
14. Payments made pursuant to paragraph 8 and any amounts awarded pursuant to
paragraph 12 of this Stipulation will be made in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(i),
subject to the availability of sufficient statutory funds.
5

Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 34 Filed 03/06/17 Page 9 of 12
15. The parties and their attorneys further agree and stipulate that, except for any
award for attorneys' fees and litigation costs, and past unreimburseable expenses, the money
provided pursuant to this Stipulation will be used solely for the benefit ofN.S. as contemplated
by a strict construction of 42 U.S.C. §300aa-l S(a) and (d), and subject to the conditions of 42
U.S.C. § 300aa-l S(g) and (h).
16. Petitioner represents that she presently is, or within 90 days of the date of
judgment will become, duly authorized to serve as guardian/conservator of N.S.'s estate under
the laws of the State of Florida. No payments pursuant to this Stipulation shall be made until
petitioner provides the Secretary with documentation establishing her appointment as
guardian/conservator of N .S.' s estate. If petitioner is not authorized by a court of competent
jurisdiction to serve as guardian/conservator of the estate of N .S. at the time a payment pursuant
to this Stipulation is to be made, any such payment shall be paid to the party or parties appointed
by a court of competent jurisdiction to serve as guardian/conservator of the estate of N. S. upon
submission of written documentation of such appointment to the Secretary.
17. In return for the payments described in paragraphs 8 and 12, petitioner, in her
individual capacity and as legal representative ofN.S., on behalf of herself, N.S., and N.S.'s
heirs, executors, administrators, successors or assigns, does forever irrevocably and
unconditionally release, acquit and discharge the United States and the Secretary of Health and
Human Services from any and all actions or causes of action (including agreements, judgments,
claims, damages, loss of services, expenses and all demands of whatever kind or nature) that
have been brought, could have been brought, or could be timely brought in the Court of Federal
Claims, under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300 aa-10 et
seq., on account of, or in any way growing out of, any and all known or unknown, suspected or
6

Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 34 Filed 03/06/17 Page 10 of 12
unsuspected personal injuries to or death of N.S. resulting from, or alleged to have resulted from
the DTaP, Hib, and PC vaccinations administered on March 1, 2013, as alleged by petitioner in a
petition for vaccine compensation filed on or about October 1, 2015. in the United States Court
of Federal Claims as petition No. 15-1 IOOV.
18. IfN.S. should die prior to entry of judgment, this agreement shall be voidable
upon proper notice to the Court on behalf of either or both of the parties.
19. lf the special master fails to issue a decision in complete conformity with the
terms of this Stipulation or if the Court of Federal Claims fails to enter judgment in conformity
with a decision that is in complete conformity with the terms of this Stipulation, then the parties'
settlement and this Stipulation shall be voidable at the sole discretion of either party.
20. This Stipulation expresses a full and complete negotiated settlement of liability
and damages claimed under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, as amended,
except as otherwise noted in paragraph 12 above. There is absolutely no agreement on the part
of the parties hereto to make any payment or to do any act or thing other than is herein express! y
stated and clearly agreed to. The parties further agree and understand that the award described in
this Stipulation may reflect a compromise of the parties' respective positions as to liability and/or
amount of damages, and further, that a change in the nature of the injury or condition or in the
items of compensation sought, is not grounds to modify or revise this agreement.
21. Petitioner hereby authorizes respondent to disclose documents filed by petitioner
in this case consistent with the Privacy Act and the routine uses described in the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program System of Records, No. 09-15-0056.
7

Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 34 Filed 03/06/17 Page 11 of 12
22. This Stipulation shall not be construed as an admission by the United States or the
Secretary of Health and Human Services that N.S.'s TM, or any other injury or condition, was
caused in fact by her DTaP, Hib, and PC vaccinations.
23. All rights and obligations of petitioner hereunder shall apply equally to
petitioner's heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and/or assigns as legal representatives of
N.S.
END OF STIPULATION
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Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 34 Filed 03/06/17 Page 12 of 12
Respectfully submitted,
MARIA -..RESPO
' ORNEY OF RECORD FOR
PE J'IONER:
BER D. WILSON, Ph.D., ESQ.
MAGLIO CHRISTOPHER & TOALE eputy Director
1775 PeMsylvania Ave., NW Suite 225 Torts Branch
Washington, DC 20006 Civil Division
Tel: (888) 952-5242 U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 146
Benjamin Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044-0146
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE ATTORNEY OF RECORD FOR
OF THE SECRET Y F HEALT H RESPONDENT:
AND HU E VIC ' :
~;;: ~hkB~
R,M.D.
Director, Division of Injury Trial Attorney
Compensation Programs Torts Branch
Healthcare Systems Bureau Civil Division
U.S. Department ofliealtll U.S. Department of Justice
and Human Services P.O. Box 146
5600 Fishers Lane Benjamin Franklin Station
Parklawn Building, Mail Stop I 1C -26 Washington, DC 20044-0146
Rockville, MD 20857 Tel: (202) 616-4181
3=-i/---l=~fJ l9-_
Datecj: ----1)-r1-- /
I
9

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DOCUMENT 2: USCOURTS-cofc-1_15-vv-01100-2
Date issued/filed: 2018-06-21
Pages: 7
Docket text: Re-docketed for publication. JUDGE VACCINE REPORTED OPINION (Public Version of the court's opinion issued 5/30/2018, ECF No. 49). Pursuant to Rule 18(b) of the Vaccine Rules of the this court (Appendix B to the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims), this opinion was initially filed under seal on May 30, 2018. Pursuant to 4 of the ordering language, the parties were to propose redactions of the information contained therein on or before June 13, 2018. No proposed redactions were submitted to the court. Signed by Judge Patricia E. Campbell-Smith. Service on parties made. (Entered: 06/21/2018) (ypb)
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Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 52 Filed 06/21/18 Page 1 of 7
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 15-1100V
(E-Filed: June 21, 2018)1
)
MARIA CRESPO, on behalf of N.S., a minor )
child, )
)
Petitioner, ) Attorneys’ Fees and Costs;
v. ) Guardianship Costs;
) Compliance with State Law.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH )
AND HUMAN SERVICES, )
)
Respondent. )
)
Amber Diane Wilson, Washington, DC, for petitioner.
Daniel A. Principato, Trial Attorney, with whom were Chad A. Readler, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, C. Salvatore D’Alessio, Acting Director, Catherine E.
Reeves, Deputy Director, and Alexis B. Babcock, Assistant Director, Torts Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.
OPINION
CAMPBELL-SMITH, Judge.
Before the court is petitioner’s motion for review of the special master’s decision
awarding attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to the Rules of the United States Court of
Federal Claims (RCFC), Appendix B, Vaccine Rule 23. See ECF No. 44. The
government has responded. See ECF No. 47. Petitioner has requested oral argument,
which the court deems unnecessary. This matter is ripe and ready for a decision by the
court. For the following reasons, petitioner’s motion is DENIED, and the special
master’s decision of December 5, 2017, is SUSTAINED.
1 Pursuant to Rule 18(b) of the Vaccine Rules of the United States Court of Federal
Claims (Appendix B to the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims), this
opinion was initially filed under seal on May 30, 2018. Pursuant to ¶ 4 of the ordering
language, the parties were to propose redactions of the information contained therein on
or before June 13, 2018. No proposed redactions were submitted to the court.

Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 52 Filed 06/21/18 Page 2 of 7
I. Background
Petitioner filed the instant matter seeking compensation for injuries suffered by
N.S., a minor child, as a result of receiving the DTaP and pneumococcal conjugate
vaccinations, pursuant to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
300aa-1 to -34 (2012) (the Vaccine Act). See ECF No. 1. In January 2017, the parties
filed a stipulated agreement for compensation in an amount of $232,549.31. See ECF
No. 26. The agreement contemplated that petitioner would, within 90 days of the entry
of judgment, become duly authorized to serve as the guardian or conservator of N.S.’s
estate, in accordance with Florida state law. See id.
In addition to the terms of the agreement, petitioner contends that Florida law
requires several protections for settlements involving minors, as summarized below:
(1) that a guardian ad litem review settlements exceeding $50,000, see Fla.
Stat. § 744.3025(1)(b);
(2) that a guardianship be established for any awards to minors exceeding
$15,000, see Fla. Stat. § 744.387(2);
(3) that an annual accounting of the guardianship account be performed, see
Fla. Stat. § 744.3678;
(4) that a final petition for discharge of the guardianship be filed when the
child reaches the age of majority, see id.; and
(5) that all guardians be represented by an attorney, see Fla. Probate Rule
5.303(a).
See ECF No. 44 at 6-7. Petitioner represents that she has complied with the currently
applicable laws. See id. at 7.
Petitioner moved for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, which were awarded
by the special master in December 2017. See ECF No. 42. Petitioner now objects to
two aspects of the special master’s decision. First, petitioner claims that the special
master improperly denied attorneys’ fees for certain legal research and review of court
orders. See ECF No. 44 at 7. And second, petitioner argues that the special master erred
in denying reimbursement of the costs associated with the guardian ad litem and
guardianship required by Florida law. See id. at 7-8.
2

Case 1:15-vv-01100-PEC Document 52 Filed 06/21/18 Page 3 of 7
II. Legal Standards
The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to review the special
master’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(1). See also Vaccine Rule 23.
Following its review, the court may either: (1) uphold the special master’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law and sustain the special master’s decision; (2) set aside some
or all of the special master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and issue different
findings of fact and conclusions of law; or (3) remand the petition for further action in
accordance with the court’s direction. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2)(A)-(C); see also
Vaccine Rule 27.
With regard to compensation, the Vaccine Act provides that: “[i]n awarding
compensation on a petition . . . the special master or court shall also award as part of
such compensation an amount to cover—(A) reasonable attorneys’ fees, and (B) other
costs, incurred in any proceeding on such petition.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1). The
court evaluates a special master’s decision on fees and costs for abuse of discretion.
Hall v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 640 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
A special master abuses his or her discretion when the decision is:
(1) . . . clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) . . . based on an
erroneous conclusion of the law; (3) . . . clearly erroneous; or (4) the record
contains no evidence on which the . . . [special master] rationally could have
based his decision.
Murphy v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 30 Fed. Cl. 60, 61 (1993) (quoting
Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). See also Munn v.
Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 970 F.2d 863, 870 (1992) (explaining this
court owes “great deference” to the fact-findings and fact-based conclusions of the
special master); Silva v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 108 Fed. Cl. 401,
405 (2012) (stating it is “extremely difficult” to establish the “reversible error” necessary
to disturb a special master’s decision on fees).
An “abuse of discretion may only be found where ‘no reasonable man would take
the view adopted by the [special master] . . . .’” Murphy, 30 Fed. Cl. at 62 (quoting PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
The court, however, reviews mistakes of law without deference to the special master’s
decision. See Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (citing Markovich v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 477 F.3d 1353, 1355-56
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
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III. Analysis
Petitioner in this case takes issue with two aspects of the special master’s decision
on fees and costs. First, petitioner contends that the special master abused her discretion
in making certain reductions to petitioner’s fee request. And second, petitioner contends
that the special master erred as a matter of law in denying costs associated with the
establishment of a guardianship in accordance with Florida state law. The court will
review each claim in turn.
A. The Special Master Did Not Abuse Her Discretion in Reducing Fee Award
In her motion, petitioner argues that the special master erred in reducing by $239
the fees associated with attorney review of certain court orders, see ECF No. 44 at 9-11,
and for reducing the award by ten percent for legal research and block-billed entries, see
id. at 11-15.
With regard to the first claim, it appears that petitioner objects to the special
master’s characterization of billing entries for 0.1 hour to “read court order; update case
management,” which appear after entries indicating that counsel had “review[ed] a one-
page court order or schedul[ed] a conference,” as administrative in nature. See ECF No.
42 at 5. The special master interpreted these billing entries as accounting for updates to
the calendar, rather than substantive legal review of the court’s orders. She stated:
“[b]eyond the fact that this is clerical work billed at an attorney’s rate, the undersigned
cannot imagine how it takes 0.1 hours or six minutes to enter a date, or even three dates,
on one’s calendar. These types of entries are clerical in nature and are not billable time.”
See id.
As the special master correctly noted in her decision, “[i]t is firmly rooted that
billing for clerical and other secretarial work is not permitted in the Vaccine Program.”
See id. (citing Rochester v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 379, 387 (1989); Mostovoy v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-10V, 2016 WL 720969, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Feb. 4, 2016)). Given the context of these entries, the court finds that the special
master’s conclusion that they reflect administrative tasks to be a reasonable one. As
such, she did not abuse her discretion in reducing the award accordingly.
Petitioner also claims that the special master inappropriately reduced the fee
award by ten percent on certain research tasks and block-billed entries. As an initial
matter, the special master noted that she “considers most of the hours included on the
billing entry to be reasonable.” See ECF No. 42 at 6. Nevertheless, she categorized a
number of entries related to Florida state law and fees recovery as counsel’s efforts at
“educating herself in the law,” and therefore “uncompensable.” See id. at 6 (citing
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (“Hours that are not properly billed to
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one’s client are also not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory
authority.”)).
Petitioner acknowledges that courts may reduce fee awards when an attorney bills
time for learning the law. See ECF No. 44 at 12-13. She argues, however, that the
research at issue here was sufficiently case-specific that the fee award should not be
discounted. See id. at 13. Locating the line between billable and educational, non-
billable research is an appropriate exercise of the special master’s discretion in awarding
fees. Because the special master applied the correct legal principle and provided a
factual basis for her decision to moderately reduce counsel’s recovery for research time,
she did not abuse her discretion.
Finally, petitioner takes issue with the special master’s reduction for block-billed
entries. She argues that “[f]ailing to employ a reasoned analysis of what constitutes
block billing, the Fees Decision improperly denied compensation for this work.” Id. at
14. She continues, “[t]here is no support for a ruling that all multi-hour billing is per se
unreasonable block billing and not compensable under § 15(e) [of the Vaccine Act].” Id.
But the special master made no such categorical ruling. To the contrary, she found that
petitioner’s counsel submitted block-billed entries that “made it impossible for the
undersigned to determine the amount of time each task took.” ECF No. 42 at 6. Noting
her duty to ensure that requested fees are reasonable, the special master concluded that
counsel’s billing entries did not contain sufficient detail. See id. Here again, the court
concludes that the special master appropriately employed her discretion in reducing the
fee award due to the lack of specificity in block billing.
B. The Special Master Did Not Err in Denying Future Guardianship and
Guardian Ad Litem Costs
In addition to making the foregoing reductions, the special master denied
petitioner recovery of future costs associated with maintaining a guardianship, and the
appointment of a guardian ad litem, as required by Florida state law. See id. at 8-10. In
doing so, petitioner contends the special master erred as a matter of law.
1. Future Guardianship Costs
The special master’s decision to deny future costs associated with maintaining the
guardianship at issue rests primarily on her conclusion that the requested future costs
will not be incurred pursuant to the present proceedings. “The Vaccine Act limits the
amount of ‘compensation to cover petitioner’s . . . costs’ to those ‘incurred in any
proceeding on [a Vaccine Act] petition.’” Id. at 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1)).
An expense is “incurred” as part of a vaccine proceeding when the service provided for
that expense is “ordered by this court and accomplished as part of the process of
providing reasonable compensation to petitioner.” Id. (citing Ceballos v. Sec’y of
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Health & Human Servs., No. 99-97V, 2004 WL 784910, at *22 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Mar. 25, 2004)).
Here, petitioner’s duty to maintain the guardianship beyond the present
proceedings finds its source not in any order from the special master or any requirement
under the Vaccine Act, but rather, in a Florida state law that is not dependent on, or
specific to, vaccine actions. See Fla. Stat. § 744.387(2). The special master explained:
Here, the undersigned’s decision awarding damages only recognized the
establishment of N.S.’s guardianship, not the maintenance of it, as an
essential prerequisite for N.S.’s guardian to receive the award. Petitioner’s
but for assertion overlooks the criterion distinguishing costs incurred for
obtaining authorization as a legal representative, which is required under the
Act, to establish a guardianship, which is required at respondent’s behest in
a stipulation, from those costs incurred for maintaining the guardianship,
which is not.
ECF No. 42 at 9. The special master also notes that petitioner’s request is deficient
because the amount requested is both speculative and inaccurate, seeking fourteen years
of future fees and costs despite the fact that the minor child will attain the age of
majority in twelve years.
The court agrees with the special master’s judgment in this case. Petitioner is not
entitled to recover any and all costs that may be incurred in the future, regardless of the
reason for the expenditure. The court will not expand the scope of the Vaccine Act to
include costs incurred beyond what is required by the special master or the Act itself.
2. Guardian Ad Litem Costs
Finally, petitioner claims that she is entitled to recover the costs incurred in
connection with the appointment of a guardian ad litem, another requirement under
Florida state law. See ECF No. 44 at 12-14. In her decision, the special master stated
that the guardian ad litem served “in the Florida state court proceeding to facilitate the
appointment of a guardianship process.” ECF No. 42 at 10. Specifically, the special
master concluded that “[a]lthough the Florida Guardianship Law requires appointment
of a guardian ad litem to protect a minor’s interests, it was unrelated to the vaccine
petition and establishing the biological father as a legal representative of N.S.” Id. As
such, the fees “were not incurred as part of a ‘proceeding on [a Vaccine Act] petition’ as
the statue requires.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1)).
Petitioner argues that the special master mischaracterized the role of the guardian
ad litem when she stated that the guardian ad litem facilitated the establishment of a
guardianship process. See ECF No. 44 at 16. Instead, petitioner explains, Florida state
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law requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem to review settlements of claims
involving minors when the amount at issue equals or exceeds $50,000. See id. at 17
(citing Fla. Stat. § 744.3025). The court acknowledges that the special master’s
characterization of the guardian ad litem’s role was imprecise. That semantic
imprecision notwithstanding, her analysis is correct. The role of the guardian ad litem
was both required by and defined by Florida state law, wholly apart from the
requirements of the Vaccine Act. Because the Vaccine Act compensates parties for the
expenditures required under the Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1)(B), petitioner is not
entitled to recover the costs associated with the appointment of the guardian ad litem in
this case.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the special master’s reductions to
the attorneys’ fees award were permissible under the Vaccine Act. In addition, the court
finds that the special master’s denial of fees and costs incurred pursuant to Florida state
law and unrelated to the requirements of the special master or the Vaccine Act, is a
correct interpretation of the law. Accordingly,
(1) Petitioner’s motion for review, filed January 4, 2018, ECF No. 44, is
DENIED;
(2) The special master’s decision, filed December 5, 2017, ECF No. 42, is
SUSTAINED;
(3) The clerk’s office is directed to ENTER final judgment in accordance
with the special master’s decision of December 5, 2017; and
(4) The parties shall separately FILE any proposed redactions to this
opinion, with the text to be redacted clearly marked out or otherwise
indicated in brackets, on or before June 13, 2018.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Patricia Campbell-Smith
PATRICIA CAMPBELL-SMITH
Judge
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