VICP Registry Case Source Bundle
Canonical URL: https://vicp-registry.org/case/USCOURTS-cofc-1_01-vv-00361
Package ID: USCOURTS-cofc-1_01-vv-00361
Petitioner: Sarah Hebern
Filed: 2001-06-14
Decided: 2002-10-23
Vaccine: 
Vaccination date: 
Condition: 
Outcome: dismissed
Award amount USD: 

AI-assisted case summary:
On June 14, 2001, Sarah Hebern's parents filed a petition for vaccine compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 on her behalf. The public order does not identify the specific vaccine(s) administered, Sarah's age at the time of vaccination, or the alleged injury. The petitioners acknowledged that their claim was filed outside the Vaccine Act's 36-month statute of limitations, which requires claims to be brought within 36 months after the first symptom of the alleged vaccine-caused injury. They argued that special circumstances justified equitable tolling of the filing deadline. The special master rejected this argument on September 10, 2001, relying on the Federal Circuit's decision in Brice v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., which held that equitable tolling does not apply to Vaccine Act petitions. Consequently, the special master dismissed the compensation claim as barred by the statute of limitations. The petitioners did not seek review of this dismissal. Following the dismissal, the petitioners moved for an award of attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e). The special master denied this request on May 2, 2002, reasoning that because the court lacked jurisdiction over the untimely compensation petition, it also lacked jurisdiction to award fees and costs. The special master relied on the Federal Circuit's decision in Martin v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs. Petitioners moved for review of the fee denial. On October 23, 2002, Judge Wiese affirmed the special master's decision. Judge Wiese reasoned that, similar to the Martin case, the Vaccine Act's fee-shifting provision does not create an independent grant of jurisdiction when the underlying claim is outside the court's jurisdiction. Since Sarah Hebern's compensation petition was barred by the statute of limitations, the court had no jurisdiction over the petition and, therefore, no jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees. The case was dismissed without an award of compensation or attorneys' fees.

Theory of causation field:
Petition filed June 14, 2001, on behalf of Sarah Hebern, acknowledging it was outside the Vaccine Act's 36-month statute of limitations. Petitioners sought equitable tolling based on special circumstances, but the special master dismissed the compensation petition on September 10, 2001, ruling that equitable tolling does not apply to Vaccine Act petitions, citing Brice v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs. Petitioners did not appeal the dismissal. Attorneys' fees were denied May 2, 2002, by the special master, and affirmed by Judge Wiese on October 23, 2002, based on Martin v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., which held that the court lacks jurisdiction to award fees if it lacks jurisdiction over the underlying claim. The public order does not identify the vaccine, the alleged injury, the clinical timeline, or any expert testimony. No Althen causation analysis was performed as the case was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. No compensation was awarded.

Public staged source text:

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DOCUMENT 1: USCOURTS-cofc-1_01-vv-00361-cl6651452
Date issued/filed: 2002-10-23
Pages: 1
Docket text: lead-opinion
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ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF SPECIAL MASTER

WIESE, Judge.
This matter comes before the court on petitioners’ motion for review of the special master’s May 2, 2002, decision denying their application for attorneys’ fees and costs arising from a petition for vaccine compensation brought on behalf of their daughter, Sarah Hebern, under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (the “Vaccine Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-l to -34 (2000). The matter has been briefed by the parties and oral argument was heard on October 17, 2002. At the conclusion of the argument, the court issued a bench ruling in defendant’s favor. This order formalizes that ruling.

I.

Petitioners filed a claim for vaccine compensation in this court on June 14, 2001. In their petition, petitioners acknowledged that their claim was statutorily out of time because it had not been brought within 36 months after the occurrence of the first symptom of Sarah’s alleged vaccine-caused injury. Petitioners maintained, however, that in light of the special circumstances of Sarah’s case, the Vaccine Act’s 36-month filing deadline set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2) should be equitably tolled.

The special master rejected petitioners’ argument. Relying on Brice v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 240 F.3d 1367 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1040, 122 S.Ct. 614, 151 L.Ed.2d 538 (2001), the special master ruled that as a matter of law the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply in eases brought under the Vaccine Act. Hebern v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., No. 01-0361V (Fed.Cl. Sept. 10, 2001). Accordingly, the special master dismissed the petition as barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioners did not appeal the decision.

*549Following the dismissal of their compensation claim, petitioners moved for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Vaccine Act’s fee-shifting provision set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e). The special master rejected that claim as well. In an unpublished decision entered on May 2, 2002, the special master ruled that because this court did not have jurisdiction over petitioners’ case-in-chief, it similarly lacked jurisdiction over petitioners’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs. In support of this ruling, the special master relied on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Martin v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 62 F.3d 1403 (Fed.Cir.1995).

II.

In Martin, the Federal Circuit held that the fee-shifting provision of the Vaccine Act does not constitute an independent grant of jurisdiction that can be exercised in the absence of jurisdiction over the underlying claim. The Martin court concluded that because the petitioners in that case were precluded under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(6) from bringing their claim in this court (by virtue of already having sought relief in district court), there was no basis upon which to support an award of attorneys’ fees. The court explained:

[ 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1)] mandates the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to successful petitioners, and allows the special master or court to make a discretionary award of fees and costs to unsuccessful petitioners under certain conditions____ But the special master’s (or the court’s) discretion is not unfettered; there must first be a judgment “on such a petition”— that is, “on a petition filed under section 300aa-11.” Id. Section 300aa-15 says nothing about jurisdiction. Contrary to the Martins’ suggestion to this court, section 300aa-15(e)(1) simply authorizes fee awards in cases already within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.
Martin, 62 F.3d at 1405-06 (footnote omitted). The court concluded its opinion as follows: “Because the special master had no jurisdiction over the petition, there was no jurisdiction over the request for attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 1407.

We can discern no principled basis upon which to distinguish between the facts presented in Martin and the facts presented in this case. In Martin, as here, the claim before the court ran afoul of a prohibition on suit expressly set forth in the Vaccine Act and thus was held to be beyond this court’s jurisdiction. Because the court in Martin had no jurisdiction to hear the petitioners’ claim in the first instance, it correspondingly had no jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees. That same result must follow in this case.

III.

For the reasons set forth above, the special master’s dismissal of petitioners’ claim for attorneys’ fees and costs is affirmed.